» 从美军视角看朝鲜战争中志愿军步兵战术，对“人海战术”的误解
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    INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA
    
    Winter of 1950-1951
    
    
    OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
    The Johns Hopkins University
    Chevy Chase, Maryland
    
    科目：步兵
    Project DOUGHBOY
    1951年10月27日，约翰 霍普金斯大学作战研究中心收录
    Received 27 Oct 19 51，OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE，The Johns Hopkins University
    1953年6月军事行动研究中心第二次印刷
    Second Printing June 1953 By OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
    地址：马里兰州切维蔡斯市康涅狄格大道6410号
    6410 Connecticut Avenue Chevy Chars, Maryland
    原文目录页上的备注：
    This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
    1998年4月18日解密
    (↑↑↑猴子，上面就是来源，中文部分网络搜集整理，原始出处不详)
    
    
    进攻中的中共军队
    当描述敌人在这个国家开展的军事行动时，人们滥用了“人海战术”一词。新闻报道曾给人一种印象：中国人以极度密集的大量兵力发动进攻。某些官方文件也曾过于随意地用过这个词，因此就加深了人们的这样一种误解，即在我军各种武器火力笼罩下的敌军目标，正如“人海战术”一词所形容的那样，是个密集而又宽大从而有利于我方火力大量杀伤敌军的那样一种目标。曾有过这种性质的目标。例如，二月初中共军队进攻第23步兵团在砥平里的阵地时，以密集队形向前推进，在狭小区域内被大批地扫倒。
    但这样的高兵力密度是例外。二战中红军在乌克兰战役对付德国人时，连续使用过以人海吸收并最终中和敌军火力，中国人集中兵力时并不是这样。更确切的说，中国人在接敌的最后阶段从纵队展开后，往往以多层细散兵线接近我们的工事，彼此间有相当的间隔。接敌纵队可能为一列宽，甚至为以4列纵队接敌的团级兵力，这取决于形势和攻击部队的规模。
    地面状况的复杂情况也增加了我军火力集中捕捉敌军目标的困难，因为在各种复杂的地面状况下，敌军的进攻队形被自然的分散了，这就加大了我军火力集中一处而大量杀伤敌军的难度。山岭从来不是平直的，经常有突出部、裸岩、台地、细沟。结果，即使攻击队列行进速度一致，也没有哪种防御武器有杀伤任何大量敌人的清晰的射程。当敌人进入各种武器的反击火力射程之内，渐渐向阵地推近时，依然不会过分簇集。
    在防御时，中共军队有效利用了地被植物，避免使用长的壕沟和密集队形，经常通过自身部署使我们的各种火力极少有大规模杀死他们的机会。主要战果是通过系统地使用合成火力取得的，没有哪一种或哪一类武器(迫击炮、大炮或轻武器)在实施决定性射击的过程中起主导作用。
    
    
    
    CCF IN ATTACK
    The word “mass” has been used quite loosely in descriptions of enemy operations circulated in this country. Press accounts have given the impression that the Chinese attack in great numbers closely concentrated. Some official documents have also used the term rather indiscriminately, thus furthering the belief that broad targets are frequently presented to all weapons. There have been some targets of this character. For example, in the assault against 23rd Infantry Regiment positions in Chipyong-ni in early February, CCF pressed forward in fairly solid ranks, and were cut down in large numbers within small areas.
    But intense concentrations are the exception. The Chinese do not characteristically employ mass, for example, in the way that the Red Army used it against the Germans in operations in the Ukraine during World War II, coming on in such numbers that the human sea absorbed and ultimately smothered the fire volume. Rather, in the attack, CCF tend to move against our works in multiple, thin lines, well spaced each from the other, after having deployed out of column in the last phase of the approach.The approach column may be single file, or even a regiment moving four abreast, depending on the situation and the size of the attack force.
    The nature of the ground also compounds the fire problem, since it induces greater dispersion. The ridges are not evenly bottomed or sided. There are frequent bulges, outcroppings, draws, and small ravines. In consequence, even when the attacking line advances quite uniformly, no defending weapon is likely to have a clear field of fire against any significant number of the enemy. When brought in check by the counterfire of various weapons, the enemy gradually presses forward against the position, but still does not tend to bunch excessively.
    On defense, CCF make efficient employment of ground cover, eschew use of long intrenchments and tight formations, and in general so dispose themselves that our fires, in any type, rarely have a large killing opportunity. The chief effects are therefore achieved through the systematic employment of fires in combination, with no one weapon or group of weapons (such as mortars, artillery, or small arms) predominating in the delivery of decisive fire.
    
    
    机枪
    
    用法
    由于朝鲜特殊的地形，使得我们在那里操作机枪的方式与常规以及教科书的规定大相径庭。
    在防御的时候，机枪通常并不从两翼组成交叉火力，而是常常置于敌军的直接正面，从而对敌军最有可能的突破口进行直接的火力封锁和压制。一般情况下，那些利用山脊的高低起伏而建起的山头阵地，并不完全依赖机枪的保护。尽管有利的地形使我们的机枪在阵地上的作用变小了，但是当需要阻断一个在相当狭窄的扇形区域的敌军进攻时，通常还是机枪的作用大。有时候，机枪设置在与防线成直角的山梁和褶皱处，以这种方式他们的火力可以投射到任何径直闯进阵地的人身上。他们更频繁地布置在能以火力覆盖有利于敌人攀登的褶皱和斜坡的地方。在朝鲜很少遇到良好的机枪射界。
    地形限制使这种武器失去了正常的战术效能和压制能力，而且消耗比迫击炮、勃朗宁轻机枪和步枪更大的弹药量。即使所有机枪操作状态良好，但单凭机枪火力不足以粉碎敌人的进攻，保障阵地安全。
    中共军队主要以机枪火力为基础发扬战斗力，他们采用以下两种方式：(1)在防御时，将机枪配置在坚强的防御工事后方的掩体内；(2)在进攻时将机枪前出到尽可能靠近前沿的地方，尽管不可避免地要付出暴露目标的代价。
    我方很少以这种方式使用机枪。
    
    
    
    MACHINE GUNS
    THEIR USE
    The pattern of machine-gun operation in Korea is highly unconventional and contrary to the book, but the ground permits of nothing else.
    In defense, the gun is most frequently used to block the more likely avenues of approach; its fire is directed straight ahead instead of from flankward across the front.The average hilltop position, by reason of elevation and the unevenness of the ridge crust, does not lend itself to over-all protection by machine guns. They do their bit, but usually they are set to traverse over a relatively narrow sector of the perimeter.
    Occasionally, as the ground and situation permit, the guns are set up on a nose or fold in the ridge running at right angles to the defending line, in such a way that their fire will take in flank any body moving directly into the position. More frequently they are disposed in such a way as to cover the main draws or the slope which looks most favorable to ascent by the enemy. Good fields of fire for the machine gun are rarely met with in Korea.
    This limiting factor in the terrain deprives the weapon of its normal tactical power and persuasion, and throws an extra load of work on the mortars, the BARS, and the riflemen.Even though all guns remain in operation, machine-gun fire alone is never enough to break up enemy attack and give security to the position.
    The CCF develop their fighting power largely around a base of machine-gun fire by (1) bunkering the guns behind heavily resistant works when on defense, and (2) advancing the guns well to the fore in the attack, despite the entailed exposure.
    Our guns are seldom employed in this manner.
    
    
    进攻中，我军士兵携带的机枪通常并不向前推进到前沿，而更经常地被布置在具有合理掩蔽条件的地点以提供半压制性的火力尽管如此，我军仍在敌军火力下损失了相当比率的机枪。在防御时，机枪经常在上方敞开的情况下作战，通常只有薄弱的防护，比如土堆或不牢固的岩石垒成的胸墙。我军要比中共军队进行更多的机动，阵地位置变换极为频繁。很少有时间为机枪提供保护措施。我军的攻势往往在黄昏时分趋弱，到天黑时机枪必须要准备好从新阵地上进行射击。
    这些机枪操作方式上的一般差异，并不能确切反映出双方使用效率的高低，或是反映了在机枪技术发展方面的出现了某种空白。更准确的说，那些差异和技术空白直接源自交战双方所采用的战术手段的不同，而关键在于机枪只是整个火力体系中的一部分。
    In the attack our man-handled machine guns are not ordinarily pressed far to the fore but are more likely to be used to provide a semi-covering fire from whatever ground will provide them reasonably good protection. Even so, we lose a high percentage of machine guns to enemy fire.
    On defense, the gun is usually fought in the open and is seldom given better than superficial protection - such as an earth bank or a rude parapet of loose rock.We maneuver more than CCF; changes in position are most frequent. There is rarely time to provide the gun with a protected siting. Our own attack is likely to wear along until late afternoon; the guns must be ready to fire by dark from the new defensive position.
    These general differences in operating method do not accurately reflect relative efficiency, or lack thereof, in the development of machine-gun technique. Rather, they arise from the fact that the two sides are employing two greatly differing tactical methods, in which emphasis on the machine gun is only part of the over-all fire equation.
    
    
    
    中共军队的行动是以单一的火力手段为特色的，这种单一的火力手段完全以机枪为中心，围绕机枪的效用，将机枪的作用发挥到极至。而之所以可以这么做，其中一个重要因素是中共军队具有足可消耗的人力。中共军队中的重机枪组成员总是能够忠于职守，最后一个撤退，因此就使他的机枪发挥了更大的作用(当然，这种做法是要冒着被歼灭的风险的)。
    而在我军的行动则发展出多元性的火力使用特点——比其他军队中发展出更多的特点。因为有多种可以选择的武器系统，机枪的使用并不十分重要。我们现在习惯认为机枪的使用就意味着广泛和良好的火力带。不过在朝鲜，这种情况比较少见。偶尔，时机合适，机枪也能够发挥在较大距离中充分发挥作用。不过，当战斗到关键时刻，这个优势距离会被前沿的缩短迅速打破。此时，步枪和勃朗宁轻机枪在300码以下的范围内就发挥了更大的杀伤效能。
    中共军队使用机枪的有效距离是30到500码。进攻中，如果需要前沿火力压制，他们可以尽可能的使机枪伴随步枪和半自动步枪。并且在白天的就地防御中，如果他们能够得到较好掩护前沿，他们有时就会把机枪阵地设在步枪线前面。
    他们的远距离射击缺乏准头，我们的重机枪则能很正常地射击，相比之下，他们在极短距离内对这种武器鲁莽而有效的使用则威胁较大。只有在极少数的情况下中共军队才会在500码的距离上使用机枪。当他们试图延长射程，也就是说加上200码，我们的部队就会毫不犹豫的开火，并且忽视他的存在。这通常是正确的，大群的步兵或者一个车队通常是一个相当合适的目标。根据教科书，重机枪在中等距离是相当精确的阻止武器。可根据我军在冬季战役中的经验，这并不是一个好方法。有大量战例记录显示，在几个小时的战斗中，2到3挺敌人机枪在600到700码距离上打击一个有限目标，取得的效果非常差。所有的参战条件都表明在火力范围超过500到650码这个范围，杀伤效率更多的依靠人眼所能看到的而不是机枪所能做到的。
    CCF operations are characterized by simplicity of fire means, centering around maximum use of the machine gun. The expendability of this force’s human material is one of the enabling factors toward this end. When Chinese MG crews can be committed repeatedly to situations permitting no escape, the weapon ipso facto is given a chance to score heavily prior to liquidation.
    Our operations develop around multiplicity of fire means - an evolution more marked in our Army than in any other. The effects of the gun are less decisive simply because of the existence of so many complementary weapons. We habitually think of machine-gun usage in connection with expansive and favorable fields of fire. In Korea these are generally lacking. There are some occasions when the gun is useful at the longer ranges for relatively brief periods. But in the crises of action, the preponderant portion of its fire almost invariably is directed against the immediate foreground. As with the rifle and the BAR, its killing effects for the most part are achieved at ranges under 300 yards.
    The CCF employ the machine gun effectively at ranges running between 30 and 500 yards. In the attack, when there is suitable cover in the foreground, they will get in as close with their machine guns as with rifles and sub-machine guns, and in local counter-attacks during daylight, if they are advantaged by a thicket or brush-covered salient, they will sometimes run the machine gun out as a point beyond the rifle line.
    Their reckless and effective use of the weapon at extreme short ranges, however, is less instructive than what their gunnery appears to lack over distances which we have always considered quite normal for the HMG. It is only in the exceptional tactical circumstance that CCF employ the machine gun successfully against our infantry at 500 yards range. When they attempt to engage with the gun at ranges longer than that, say adding another 200 yards to the distance, our troops are relatively unsusceptible to the fire and pay it little heed. That holds generally true even when the fire is delivered broadside against a body of infantry (or a column of vehicles) offering a fairly substantial target. According to the book, the HMG should be an accurate stopping weapon at these intermediate ranges. Insofar as the general experience of our own line during the winter campaign sheds light on this subject, it does not work out in practice. There are numerous examples in the record of engagements wherein two or three enemy guns, firing from 600-700 yards distance against one limited target area, failed to bear effectively during several hours of fighting. All of the attendant circumstances appeared to indicate that when fires are exchanged at ranges in excess of somewhere between 550 and 650 yards, the rate of effectiveness is less dependent on what the gun can do than on what the human eye can see.
    
    
    他们对机枪的使用最为持久稳定。有保养机枪和在任何天气情况下操作的诀窍。他们的火力在较短距离内十分精确。最大限度的使用火力掩护部队插入而不是浪费大量子弹去扫射地面。通过这些很基本的技术，他们取得了巨大的战果。机枪作为他们的进攻的支点表现出色。
    一般情况下，如果和我们携带的其他步兵武器，即7.62毫米通用口径武器族的使用效果相比，在朝鲜的战斗中，我们机枪火力所发挥的影响力似乎逊于以往的那支现代化美军中所使用的机枪火力。距离有限，使机枪不能发挥防御点和在交火中阻止敌人进攻的关键作用。怎么会这样？很难解释，因为步兵连队里的搬运工们过去从来也没有抱怨过轻机枪是个特别沉重累赘的东西。枪不是特别重，机枪手们不会掉队。曾经有过部队扛着机枪径直向敌人阵地冲锋的事例。但是一般情况下机枪却做不到根据战术形势变化而机动部署。这可能真的是出於我们多种武器系统里面天生的惰性吧：武器多了，其战术效果就是加进一种新的兵器，导致其他所有兵器的相对机动性就下降。
    在朝鲜的机枪使用，特别是在我们的进攻中，上述这种情况似乎出现的相当普遍，尽管普通勃朗宁轻机枪手的灵活性和显著的积极性提供了反例。
    Their use of machine guns is most persistent. They have the knack of keeping their guns fed and operating under any weather conditions. Their fire is accurate at the short distances. They make maximum use of grazing fire, with the object of keeping troops inert, rather than wasting an excess of bullets by shooting into the dirt embankments. Out of these rather elementary techniques, they achieve large effects. The gun is pretty much the pivot of their attack.
    In general, the impact of our own machine-gun fire upon the local situation in the Korean fighting, when considered in relation to the effects of other weapons carried by the infantry (this refers to the .30 fire), would seem to be somewhat less than in past performances by modern American forces. The instances are few indeed in which the operation of the machine guns appears to be the decisive factor in retaining a position, or in depressing the counterfire which is deterring the attack. Why this is so becomes difficult to evaluate, since the LMG is almost never mentioned among the overburdening items in the company load by the load carriers. The weight of the gun is not prohibitive; the gunners do not straggle. There are instances in the record where it was carried by troops directly charging the enemy position. But the average employment of the gun is not mobile in respect to local changes in the tactical situation. This may well be the consequence of an inertia inherent in our multiple weapons system: is it not within reason that one of the tactical effects of weapons multiplication is that the addition of each new weapon tends to lower the relative local mobility of every other weapon?
    The employment of machine guns in Korea, particularly by our attack, would seem to call for exploration of the question, though the phenomenal enterprise and mobility of the average BAR carrier is evidence to the contrary.
    
    
    步枪
    
    老伙计
    在朝鲜的战斗中，步枪兵(包括装备卡宾枪的士兵)参与积极射击的比例明显要高于二战中的军事行动。
    人们能察觉这一点但无法进行精确地计算，因此很难以精确的百分率表示这个增长。然而，根据调查所涉及的昼间和夜间军事行动的平均状况，研究人员认为无论敌人使用哪种武器，超过50%的部队都能够在交火时坚守阵地。
    在朝鲜的军事行动中，手榴弹往往是初上战场的新兵的首选。然而，根据观察，一条几乎不变的法则再次得到验证：一旦我军士兵开始使用某种武器打击敌军士兵，他就会一直用下去，后来他就会积极主动地使用这种他擅长的火器。在朝鲜的昼间进攻中，部队经常以很窄的正面前进。因为山岭的棱线上缺少活动空间，所以连队以纵深队形行进。由于队列本身的限制，让所有人都毫无阻碍的使用手中的武器是不可能的。在某连中只有两三个班或许还有同等数量的重武器，能够进入阻止敌军进攻、控制战场的关键阵地。地形本身就减少了积极使用武器的人数，除非让各班轮流进入和撤出前沿阵地。
    此外，向可从正面进攻的较低的小山岭突击时，步兵在登上山顶后通常立即靠拢，与他们随身携带武器的微弱火力相比，攀登中的士兵更需要火炮、坦克、多用途战车、迫击炮的弹幕射击把敌人赶下山去。在这种行动中，步兵很少实施行进间射击。在一般情形，这种射击打不中任何目标，因为在到达军事棱线前山坡的突出部会干扰交战双方的射击，它也从来没有牵制住敌人。当散兵线看到某个像目标的东西时都会停下来射击。但在这种行动中，步枪的用处不大，反之，手榴弹却可以大显身手。
    THE RIFLE
    THE OLD STANDBY
    In the Korean fighting, there is manifestly a higher percentage of active fire participation by riflemen (including those armed with the carbine) than in operations during World War II.
    This can be felt, rather than accurately counted, and therefore it is difficult to arrive at an accurate percentage figure indicative of the increase. However, averaging out the night and day operations which were covered in the survey, it is considered that well in excess of 50 percent of troops actually committed to ground where fire may be exchanged directly with the enemy will make use of one weapon or another in the course of an engagement.
    The pattern of Korean operations is such that the hand grenade is frequently the first weapon employed by the novice in combat. But again it is observed as an almost invariable rule that once the individual uses any weapon against enemy personnel, he will go on then to become in future engagements relatively a self-starter with his personal firearm. In the daylight attack in Korea, troops frequently advance with an extremely narrow front, the company going forward in depth because of the lack of space for deployment in the movement along the ridge crest. This cramping of the formation by its nature often makes it impossible for all hands to use their weapons freely. Of a given company, only two or three squads, and perhaps the same number of heavy weapons, may be able to take position where they can bear against the enemy-held ground. In such instances, the terrain itself reduces the number who participate actively with weapons, except as squads are rotated in and out of the forward positions.
    Again, in the assault upon the lower sub-ridges, which can be attacked frontally, the foot force is likely to close as rapidly as it can toil uphill, with the climbing men depending more upon the barrage fires of the artillery, armor, multiple mounts, and mortars to beat the enemy down than upon the relatively feeble power of their hand-carried weapons. In this type of action, marching fire is rarely given effective use by the infantry. In the average situation, it would serve no object, since the bulge of the hillside intervenes between the two forces until the military crest is reached, and the fire would not even serve to keep the enemy pinned. The rifle line will halt and fire when it sees anything resembling a target. But in this type of action, there is likely to be small practical use for the rifle, whereas the grenade may prove very handy.
    
    
    
    夜间防御提供了证明M1加兰德步枪火力的最佳机会。是否能够在短时间内大规模发扬M1步枪的火力首先取决于识别目标的距离。如果敌军在我方开火前抵近并在交战的第一阶段出现双方互掷手榴弹的局面，那么即使防线位于高地、袭来的手榴弹威力不大，也不利于发扬步枪火力。对我方火力组遭受敌军投弹手的近距离压制的战斗的研究表明上述规律几乎无一例外出现在这些战斗中。在防御的第一阶段大量使用手榴弹抑制了其它或许是更有用的防御火力的使用。士兵们并不乐意从手榴弹换用步枪并在急需应对敌人的行动时又换回手榴弹。稳定的步枪战斗通常等到手榴弹互掷到了尾声才开始。在近战防御中，在使用双人散兵坑的场合，在同时需要手榴弹和子弹火力的情形，完全可以通过指定一人为专职投弹手、另一人为专职射手的办法建立有效的步枪火力。在三人或四人火力组中，一人应以投弹为主要任务。留意一下二战时的术语吧，他应该被叫做这个组的“爆破手”。
    当敌人的进攻被阻止在自动武器能首先与之交战的射程之内时，它们的火力将会使步枪防线明显活跃起来，对M1步枪和卡宾枪的全面使用将持续到战斗终止。关于步枪的射击量，应当再次指出这与不同形式下的战术变化所造成的阵地战和运动战间的比率有直接关系。至于在步枪防线中的叫喊和欢呼，这是稳定的射击的结果，每个士兵都从中受益，叫喊和欢呼激发他的判断力，使他更加活跃，努力寻找最有效的开火位置。所有对夜战的研究的结论是：开火最激烈的部队会根据形势变化做出最迅速使用的战术调整，不给敌人喘息的机会。
    The night engagement on defense provides the most favorable opportunity for Ml fire. Whether it can be developed quickly in considerable volume depends primarily on the distance at which recognition takes place. If the enemy gets in close before firing starts and the initial phase sees the two sides engage in a heavy exchange of hand grenades, the rifle firing is apt to develop raggedly, even though the defending line is on higher ground and the incoming grenades are doing little damage. The study of actions in which our firing groups are closely pressed by enemy grenadiers shows almost no exception to this. Heavy use of grenades in the first stage of defense tends toward the repression of other, and perhaps more useful, fires by the defense. Men do not shift readily from the grenade to the rifle and back again as enemy movement might seem to require. Steady rifle action will usually await the dying-away of the grenade exchange. In close defense, where the two-man foxhole system is used, it could conceivably build up the effectiveness of infantry fire as a whole to designate one man primarily as thrower and the other as firer, in any situation which calls for both grenade and bullet fire. Out of a three-man or four-man fire team, one man should be encharged with the main duty of grenading. To advert to World War I terminology, he should be the “bomber” of the team.
    When the enemy in the attack is intercepted at such range that the automatic weapons can first engage him, their fire is highly stimulating to the rifle line, and general use of the Ml and carbine (provided the ammunition holds) is likely to persist until the action is concluded. In connection with rifle fire volume, again it should be noted that there is a direct relationship between the rate of buildup and mobile response to the tactical changes in situation. As with shouting and cheering along the rifle line, there is something about steady fire production, and participation therein by the individual, which enlivens his senses and makes him move about more, in the endeavor to see where the fire would be most useful. The entire study of night actions is conclusive to this end: the unit which engages strongly with fire will also make the most rapid and practical adjustment to the changes in situation and will leave the fewest openings to the enemy.
    
    
    
    从十一月到次年三月的朝鲜战事中，实际上很少有部队(即使是排级兵力)在身体上被中共军队的进攻压垮。总的来说，我军步兵坚守阵地直至打光大多数武器的弹药；随后士兵们尽可能向后方阵地撤退。他们并未屈服于逃跑的欲望，那些幸存者是以相当良好的秩序撤退的。只有极少的战例中我军防线未进行强烈抵抗就被撕碎，这是因为散兵坑中的士兵遭遇了迅速的奇袭，当敌军在他们周围25至30码距离内开火才收到警报，他们“感觉被压得抬不起头来，无法射击”，由于缺少火力保护，阵地陷落了。
    但是在我军更多的战例中，尽管一开始面临同样严重的不利局势，士兵们仍然保持信心并用M1步枪开火，因而成功守住了阵地。只要实施坚决的指挥，大声下达命令，无论离敌军多近士兵们都会作出反应。但如果当士兵们遭受猛烈奇袭的打击时，把他们丢给自己的装备任其自生自灭，那么他们就会无所作为，或者软弱无力地试图用手榴弹阻击敌军。报告中有一些关于这种差别的非常令人吃惊的战例。
    In Korean operations from November to March, there were relatively few examples of units - even of platoon strength - being actually physically “overrun” by the CCF attack. Generally, our infantry stood its ground and fought until most of the weapons ran dry; the men then withdrew as best they could to positions farther back. They did not yield to the desire for flight; they went back in reasonably good order - those who survived. But in the rare cases in which the line was cracked apart without giving a strong account of itself, it was because the men in the foxholes were taken by swift surprise, getting their first warning as fire broke around them from 25 to 30 yards range. They “felt that they could not get their heads up to fire”; for lack of fire, the position fell.
    But there were just as many more case studies in which our troops, taken initially at this same heavy disadvantage, still rallied and opened fire with their Mls and thereafter managed to hold the position. When strong direction was given, and commands were shouted, the men responded, no matter how close the enemy. But when they were left to their own devices, under the shock of dramatic surprise, they either did nothing or made feeble attempts to grenade the enemy to a halt. The record provides some very startling examples of this difference.
    
    
    
    我军再次吸取了这个教训：即使近距离冲锋中的敌人也能被子弹火力阻止住，尽管他只要在运动中手榴弹就可能起不了多大作用。敌人的队伍退下去以后，可以把手榴弹滚下山或者直接扔向他的队列，那是一种完全不同的情形。但在近距离战斗中，手榴弹和子弹的合成火力依然比单独使用其中一种更为有效。
    因为新兵在夜战中经常胡乱开枪，在战后总结里，就算特别注意细节，也不可能说出每个人使用武器的情况，甚至不可能了解谁积极参战了。那些检查武器和个人弹药供给之类事物的下级军官也不可能彻底搞清楚这个问题。在紧张的夜战造成的混乱中，有相当数量的人错拿了别人的武器；此外，下级军官也不可能总是在黑暗中检查是否每个士兵都发挥了积极作用。因此，关于个人行为的数据并非总是能够获取并加以证实的，必须认识到这一点：某些参战者阵亡或失踪了，所有的目击者都受到震动，他们提供的情报无论如何都会有相当大的误差。
    然而，通过战后回溯战斗发生时的各个事件，加上点数士兵谁在战斗中使用了武器和谁积极参战，综合起来看，可以得出以下合理的估计：
    在朝鲜，一个普通步兵连中有12%——20%的人员不但积极参与射击，而且还程度不同的主动在关键岗位上发挥领导作用，同时也从事了改善阵地形势、增加凝聚力的个人活动。
    除了这支关键性力量，还有大约25%——35%的人员也不同程度地参与了整个射击行动，但并没有发挥出对战斗过程的标志性影响。
    
    
    
    The lesson is again drawn that a charging enemy, even at close range, can be stopped by bullet fire, though the grenade is not likely to avail as long as he is in motion. After his line has gone down, and grenades can be rolled downhill or thrown against his line, that is a quite different situation. But in short range action, combining grenade and bullet fire is still more effective than either weapon used separately.
    Because of the high incidence of panic firing among the unseasoned men during night defense, it was not possible in the Korean critiques, even when full attention was given to detail, to determine the total circumstances in which each man used his weapon, or even to be sure that he had been an active firer. That could not be finally ascertained even by those junior leaders who made a check of weapons and personal ammunition supply following engagement. There is considerable weapons-switching in the confusions of a strenuous night engagement; moreover, junior leaders cannot always determine, in the darkness whether each of their men is taking an aggressive part. Hence the data on personal action is not always obtainable and verifiable, and it must be recognized that, when some of the actors are dead or missing, and all of the witnesses have been shaken, there is a considerable margin of error which may apply either way.
    However, from synthesizing incidents around which the fighting developed, and from the post-critique showing of hands on the questions of which men had used weapons in addition to those who had played a prominent part in the engagement, this estimate is supportable :
    ??In the average infantry company in Korea, between 12 and 20 percent of the
    men not only participate actively in the firing, but exercise varying degrees of initiative in on-the-spot leading and taking personal action of a type that betters the unit position and induces cohesion. .
    ??In addition to this control force, there are between 25 and 35 percent of the men who take some part in the fire action, with varying degrees of consistency, but without otherwise giving marked impulse to the course of events.
    
    研究人员认为这种表现说明我军比起二战时的平均水平有了扎实的进步。
    在二战中，很容易遇到做出“我看见了敌人；我没有开火；我不知道为什么”这种回答的士兵。在朝鲜战场，这种回答奇怪地消失了。实际上，在战后总结中没有一个未开火的士兵做出这样的解释。
    未开火的士兵给出的理由可能会是这些：
    “我一直看不见敌军目标，我认为最好还是不开火。”
    “手榴弹劈头盖脸地砸来，我抬不起头。”
    “我面前有一座小土山，敌军隐藏在它后面，我看不见。”
    “我还没看见任何人向我冲过来，就从背后被俘了。”
    “机枪卡壳了，我在帮军士修理机枪。”
    “敌军人数太多，我希望他们可能没注意到我，就没开火。”
    “我的枪冻住了，又找不着别的枪。”
    诸如此类。所有的解释在他们所处的形势下都是可以说的通的。但与二战时的经验相比，没有一种回答显示士兵的双手为某种根深蒂固的习惯所束缚。
    从统计学的意义上说，没有出现那种回答的意义可能并不像表面看上去那么重要。我们甚至可以认为在一个普通连队中总有那么一些人串通好了掩盖真相。但这些答复强烈暗示，“参与射击是一种光荣的义务”的想法开始在步兵队伍中扎根，每个士兵都感觉到自己身负义务。
    It is believed that this showing is a substantial improvement over the participation averages among World War II troops.
    The infantry soldier, so commonly met with in World War II, who made the stock answer: “I saw the enemy; I didn’t fire; I don’t know why,” is strangely missing from the Korean scene. In fact, this reply was not returned by a single man among the non-firers at any critique.
    Among the reasons given by the non-firers would be these:
    “I didn’t see an enemy target at any time and I thought it best to hold fire until I did.”
    “Grenades were coming in at such a rate I couldn’t get my head up.”
    “There was a rise of earth in front of me which hid their people to view.”
    “I was captured from behind before I saw anyone come against me.”
    “I was helping the sergeant get the machine gun back into operation.”
    “There were so many of them that I held fire, thinking they might pass us by.”
    “My gun was frozen and I couldn’t find another.”
    And so on. All of these explanations made sense in the situation. But in contrast to World War II experience, there were no answers returned indicating that the soldier’s hand was held by some deep-rooted inhibition.
    Statistically, the absence of such answers may not be as important as it appears on the surface. We may even take it that there are a few such men in the average company, and that they are covering up. But there is a strong implication that the idea has become ingrained in the infantry line that fire participation is an obligation of honor, and the obligation is felt by the average soldier.
    
    
    狙击
    
    狙击战术在美军中应用最少。军官们一般都同意，战场上经常需要派神枪手在前哨阵地独立潜伏，等候打中目标的机会。敌军有时采用这种战术。我军从未系统化地应用狙击战术，通常只是一两人的即兴发挥而已。究竟是我军战术教学和训练中存在着某种局限，还是今日普通美国年轻人的天性中存在着某种自我克制，这真的很难说清楚。
    第八集团军缺乏狙击所需的器材，特别是夜间执行任务必备的红外瞄准镜。在冬季战役中，部队配备的数量极少，充其量不过是团部人员新奇的消遣而已。步兵指挥官们表示如果他们能获得大量的器材则将会对夜间防御大有裨益。不过很难在单兵行动中发现任何数据支持这一评估。
    在侧翼设置的前哨和警戒哨更依靠自动火力而不是一些专业人员用步枪操作的精密作业。当阵地面临的压力不断增强并开始收缩时，步兵更愿意撤退到能为机枪和勃朗宁轻机枪火力掩护的场所而非自动火力不能保护的邻近地区。尽管装备M1步枪的士兵的开火次数普遍增加，但未受重武器协助的步兵在稳定防御阵地中却很少起关键作用。
    发挥个人主动性的突出战例主要是巴祖卡火箭筒射手，勃朗宁轻机枪手和机枪手创造的。当敌军在距我军防线75到200码的距离设置机枪并冒着火力将它前送的时候，在大多数情况下它将被有进取心的重武器射手而不是两三个移动中的敢做敢为的步兵歼灭。
    在记录中发现的例外如此之少实在令人诧异，尽管你可能会猜想这是缺乏对狙击战术持续的教导所造成的。装备步枪的士兵在使用其单兵武器时很少表现出主动性，除非占领无论何时都能带给自己新的有利条件以应对敌军人员在开阔地上的移动的前沿阵地。个人灵活性加上枪法，再加上伪装的天赋，就构成了“狙击”行动的基础。
    由于我军普遍缺少这样的行动基础(“狙击”行动的基础)，同时，我军的步兵行动总是围绕或借助于战线中的某种重武器或者是别的什么优先前提而展开，因此也就从根本上减少了把所有火力作为一个整体沿防御正面平均分布的机会。这也是一个给每个步兵连配发双倍勃朗宁轻机枪的间接依据，因为从效用对比上看，双倍勃朗宁轻机枪的火力效果要好于双倍的M1步枪和卡宾枪的有效火力
    
    
    SNIPING
    There is minimal use of sniper tactics among American forces. Leaders are in general agreement that the situation would often lend itself to exploitation by individual sharpshooters working stealthily into the forward ground, taking independent cover, and there awaiting any target of opportunity. The enemy occasionally employs such tactics. It is never systematically done by our side, and such actual sniper tactics as are employed are usually an improvization of the moment by one or two individuals. Whether the limiting factor is the rigidity in our tactical teaching and training or some inhibition in the nature of today’s average young American would be hard to say.
    The Eighth Army is short on special equipment for the sniper, particularly the infrared scope needed for night work. During winter operations these were present in such limited numbers as to be hardly more than a novelty for the amusement of the command at a regimental headquarters.
    Infantry line commanders frequently expressed the view that if they could get the equipment in quantity, it would be a godsend in night defense. But it was impossible to find any data on individual usage in amplification of this estimate.
    Outposts and outguards posted along the flank tend to rely more on automatic firepower than on precision work by a few marksmen with the rifle. When the position comes under an increasing pressure and begins to contract, riflemen incline to fall back toward the ground covered by the machine guns and BARS rather than to deploy toward the adjacent spaces which the automatic fire cannot protect. Despite a general increase of firing by those who are armed with the Ml, it is rare indeed that a knot of riflemen, unaided by one of the heavier weapons, plays a pivotal part in the stabilizing of the defensive position.
    The examples of great individual initiative are generally provided by a bazooka man, a BAR carrier, or a machine gunner. When, for example, an enemy machine gun sets up somewhere within 75 to 200 yards of the defending line, and brings it under punishing fire, it will be eliminated in most cases by the enterprise of a firer with one of the heavier weapons, rather than by the mobile aggressiveness of two or three riflemen.
    It is really astonishing how few exceptions to this are to be found in the record, though one suspects that it is by nature the case, in the absence of persistent indoctrination in sniper tactics. The rifle-armed individual can hardly express initiative in the employment of his personal weapon except by taking up forward ground whenever so doing gives him fresh advantage against enemy personnel moving in the open. This individual mobility, plus marksmanship, plus a talent for concealment, is the essence of “sniper” action.
    Our general lack of it, and the tendency in our infantry to move with, and around, one of the heavier weapons in the line, or else forego all movement, materially reduces the chance that fire as a whole will be evenly distributed along the length of the defended front. This is a collateral argument for doubling the number of BARS per infantry company. In ratio, it might very well have the effect of doubling the useful fire from the Ml and carbine.
    
    
    战术奇袭的缺乏
    
    既然我军步兵中缺乏真正的狙击战术是因为我军的军事学说更强调团队精神，而不是因为美国人性格中有什么消极因素，产生另一项战术局限性的原因也应该在这方面仔细加以考察，尽管这与步枪并没有直接关系。
    处于敌军压力之下的美军连队在夜间进行环形防御的时候，从未对敌军暴露的侧翼发动突然的反突击，甚至在局势完全有利于采取这项行动时也未能有所作为。这支连队会尽可能坚守阵地，如果全面压力变得难以承受，它将向中央或最强的侧翼收缩防线。如果出现夺取和利用主阵地线内的更有利战场的机会，这支部队的一些人通常能抓住。一旦敌人没注意到与主阵地毗邻的山岭的褶皱和缓坡，而从那里自动火力可用来打击敌人的侧翼，那么我军士兵将利用这种地形。
    但是几乎所有的重要活动看上去都受到“如果不彼此靠拢也要保持不间断的联系”这一原则的限制
    LACK OF TACTICAL SURPRISE
    Since the lack of true sniper tactics in our infantry force appears to stem from doctrinal emphasis on the importance of unity within the group, rather than from negative characteristics in the American individual, one other of the constricting effects upon tactics might well be examined at this point, though it is not directly related to the use of the rifle.
    The American company under pressure, during nighttime defense of a perimeter,is never inclined to throw a surprise counterpressure against the open flank of the enemy, even when the situation appears wholly favorable to such a design. It holds ground, if possible. It contracts toward the center or toward the strongest flank if the general pressure becomes uncontainable. If an opportunity affords to seize and use more advantageous ground within the outline of the general position, some part of the force will usually grasp it. Should the enemy overlook a fold or attenuation of the ridge, in juxtaposition to the main position, from which automatic fire can be turned against the enemy flank, weapons men will take advantage of it.
    But practically all main movement appears to be circumscribed by the principle that all forces should remain continuously in juncture, if not contracting toward each other.
    我军从未使用过这样的奇袭战术，即从主力部队中暂时抽调小股部队去执行挫伤敌军锐气、分散敌军注意力的任务。
    设想一下这种局面：一个连队的兵力在岭脊上均匀地展开。敌军的攻势在正面和右翼发展迅速，看来这支队伍是输是赢完全取决于那个地段的态势。
    左翼仍几乎未参战。虽然看不见任何目标，但这个扇区内的机枪一直在掩护前方的斜坡，步兵呆在散兵坑中，等待什么时候能帮得上忙。60mm迫击炮埋伏在山后，但是敌军已经从邻近我军散兵坑的右翼逼近…，这些迫击炮的火力已不能成为决定性的威慑力量。
    看来这些迫击炮和所有未交火地带的武器都没有迅速地转移到远离敌人进攻路线的场所，并从他背后投射炽烈火力。机枪、轻机枪或除去底盘的轻迫击炮都能可靠地完成这种打了就跑的任务。他们本应在短时间内发挥奇袭作用，坚持到足以让对手动摇(就撤退)，迫使他(从我军正面)调走部分兵力。
    当炮火遮断整个战区的时候，缺乏这样的进取心还容易解释，但一项重要的事实是即使步兵独立作战它也从来没有尝试过实施奇袭，而只将生还的希望寄托在自身的武器和人力上。
    局部奇袭在心理上的价值几乎与主力奇袭一样重要。然而，没有记录证明我军曾有系统地利用了这些战术手段。在这方面，正如缺乏真正的狙击战术一样，我军小部队行动的粗糙质量终将给敌军以可乘之机。敌军在与我军小股部队交战中，几乎可以指望自己不上当。
    在大规模军事行动中，我军最大限度地使用了奇袭和欺骗，例如利用装甲纵队突围。为什么在我军的小部队战术教学中很少采用同样的原则呢？这个问题值得仔细考虑。在我们研究的所有在朝鲜的军事行动中，竟没有一个美国连队使用牵制火力的战例。然而，在许多战例中我们的中国敌人成功地以这种方式拓展了武器用途。
    There are no surprise tactics in which some fraction of the force detaches itself temporarily from the main body with the object of creating a demoralizing diversion.
    Take this situation : The Company is deployed along a ridge top with its strength distributed quite evenly. The enemy attack develops strongly against the front and right flank, and the whole appearance of the situation is that the line will win or lose according to what happens in that quarter.
    The left flank remains practically unengaged. The machine gun in that sector continues to cover a forward slope, though seeing no targets, and the riflemen stay in their foxholes, awaiting the time when they can be useful. The 60-mm mortars are behind the hill in a draw, but because the enemy has closed in right next to the friendly foxholes, their fire is not a decisive deterrent.
    It seems never to happen that any of these weapons from the quiet zone, or the mortar battery, will be moved out quickly into ground off the enemy avenue of approach with the object of throwing a shock fire across his rear. Such hit-and-run missions conceivably could be done either with machine guns, BARS, or light mortars minus base plates. They would be transitory by nature, done for surprise effect, and sustained just long enough to unsettle the opponent and make him divert some part of his force.
    When artillery is interdicting the general area, the lack of such enterprises as these is subject to explanation, But the significant fact is that it seems never to be attempted even in situations where infantry is operating on its own, and its hope for survival depends upon what can be achieved with its own weapons and manpower.
    The moral values in local surprise should be relatively as great as in major surprise. But it is not of record that we attempt systematically to explore them. In this, as in the lack of true sniper tactics, our small-unit operations have a gregarious quality which ultimately must provide some comfort to the enemy. In his grapple with the small unit he can pretty well count on not being bluffed.
    In the larger scale of operations, we employ surprise and bluff to a maximum; for example, in the sorties made by armored columns. The reason why we are loath to work by the same principle in our small-group teaching should be well worth searching consideration. In all the operations brought under study in Korea, there is not one example of an American company attempting to use diversionary fire. However, there are numerous examples of the Chinese enemy successfully exploiting his use of weapons in this manner.
    

网友评论(15102007)2013-02-21 18:09

    卡宾枪
    
    鸡肋
    在低于冰点的寒冷季节里，卡宾枪就不好使了。根据气温的不同，在实现正常的全自动射击前，无论你身处何处，都要对卡宾枪进行5至20次不等的试射预热。
    因为卡宾枪被制造成了全自动的，所以它就很敏感。在大热天，哪怕是很少的一点灰尘和潮气混在一起就能使它哑火；而在严寒下，他比其他任何武器都更容易被冻住，也更难以被润滑到可以正常使用的程度。
    弹仓是另一个麻烦不断的地方。只几周时间，弹夹边缘的子弹就被氧化和灰尘沾染的锈迹斑斑。痕迹非常明显。那些灰尘大的都能用指甲挖掉。当子弹进入弹膛，那些在子弹表面由于腐蚀而产生的金属污垢就会积留在弹膛内。就这样，它会逐渐的越积越多，最终形成一个大块污物，随后卡宾枪的部件就会(由于那个大块污物的存在)失灵。为了防止这样的失灵，除了频繁的退出和清洗弹仓内的子弹，别无他法。但这种方法所需的时间是耗不起的。
    这种武器不够威猛。太骄气。他的日常使用随着季节变化，时好时坏。当射击调到半自动档的时候，还可靠些，如果时全自动档，简直是浪费弹药。在半自动射击时，它的精度还不足以对付一个中等距离上的目标。以上批评来自于朝鲜战争中使用过卡宾枪的部队。
    “鸡肋”的名声比在二战包括太平洋战场中更加响亮。在太平洋战场，卡宾枪近乎无所作为。海军陆战队的批评比陆军更凶。陆战一师从上到下对这东西都没有好印象。他们在朝鲜战争中使用卡宾枪的经验就是完全失望。他们要求，要么彻底淘汰卡宾枪，要么就对卡宾枪进行改进，使之成为有可靠性的武器。第八集团军的绝大多数人对卡宾枪也是同样感觉。不过，偶尔也会有某连或某排对卡宾枪并无太强烈的感受，这种反映取决于该部队是否在战斗关键时刻使用了一定数量的卡宾枪，并同时遭受了惨痛的经历。通常部队中，配备卡宾枪的人属于少数，因此，在一场恶仗之后，某连并没有过多受卡宾枪连累而造成的伤亡，那也是有可能的。这也就使得人们的那种对卡宾枪几乎是一致的强烈反感完全变得更加出人意料。
    不单单是步兵有这种反感，就是那些经历过几次在炮兵阵地上与渗透过来的敌军步兵近距离交战的炮兵连，他们也会以尽可能快的速度(撂下卡宾枪)拿起M1步枪。人们对卡宾枪进行判断和选择时所怀着的那种对卡宾枪的宿怨，可以用一个事例加以说明。1950年11月26日晚到27日凌晨，第27步兵团E连作为第25步兵师主力正面突出部一点，与敌军进行了殊死的战斗。虽然该连在人数上远远少于中国人，但是该连的作战是如此勇猛，以至于该连能一直坚守着他们的阵地，黎明来临之时，敌军完成了最后的进攻就撤退了。随后该连奉命撤到一个朝向南面的新阵地。敌军进攻的压力减缓。死者和伤者被从高地上移走。在进行战斗总结的过程中，当将士们做出解释和说明时，除卡宾枪以外的所有武器都被提及，并被给予了肯定。尽管在高地上，卡宾枪被扔的到处都是，可并没有人愿意把它们捡起来使用。我们发现，在战斗过程中，卡宾枪并没有遭到咒骂；因此我们猜想，那是由于卡宾枪没有给将士们帮倒忙。
    由于这些卡宾枪的火力有助于敌人行动，所以没有多少声音要求一定要使用他们。在记录中的阵地战斗，也有几百件孤立事件涉及使用卡宾枪毙伤一个敌人的情况。这些非常有限的例子里，使用者都是在非常短的距离内用全自动档扫倒1，2个甚至4个敌人的。不过，卡宾枪能够通过近距离密集的火力削弱敌人的进攻意志的说法，还没有被敌方的反应情况所证实。没有清晰的案例支持这点，即由于卡宾枪密集的火力迫使敌人放弃进攻撤退的情况。这已经把夜晚战斗有限的观察条件和高度紧张的氛围考虑在内了。
    此外，中国军队执着与夜间进攻也是部分问题所在。按道理来说，卡宾枪也能够在战斗初期提供教强火力。但只有少量弹药能够达到敌人的进攻出发地。如果不计射速慢的M1，这些火力不足以组织敌人接近到手榴弹距离。而当士兵们面对敌人冲到足够近的缓坡时，能够够到敌人的手榴弹之类的投掷武器似乎更能够保护自己。在平坦的平地上，情况会有所不同，不过，朝鲜更多的是复杂的山地。在高地战斗中，卡宾枪的火力不足以阻止敌人接近，而当敌人最后进攻时，卡宾枪又形同虚设。
    在白天的战斗中。武器又要求另外的使用途经。需要的是半自动火力，火力洛点特别分散。事实证明，又没有多少目标能够让卡宾枪充分发挥自动火力的特点。
    
    
    
    射程和杀伤力
    没有充分数据支持卡宾枪的射程超过50码。记录中有极少数卡宾枪在这个距离或更远的地方撂倒敌人的情况。不过这个数量太少，不能够视为一般结论。卡宾枪的杀伤效果大约有95%发生在50码以内。因为在朝鲜的战术行动中，白刃战十分频繁，所以在如此短的距离内选择使用卡宾枪应该是一个不错的选择。
    杀伤效果差也是一个重要的抱怨理由。一些战斗总结中，大约50次行动记录中，有7名目击者声称他们毫无疑问打中了敌人身体，可那些被击中的敌人士兵仍然可以继续冲锋。一个目击者是陆战1团的约瑟夫 R 费舍尔中尉。陆战一师认为他是一个杰出的连级指挥官。他在描述下碣隅里战斗时，有如下呈词。“大约有30%的卡宾枪给我们造成了麻烦，一些不能开火，一些冻住了。但是我们的人对卡宾枪丧失信心的最主要原因是当我们把子弹打进25码远的中国佬的胸膛后，他还能继续前进。这使我十分震惊。这些子弹打得很深。敌人还能继续行动。我们有半打人有同样的抱怨。有些人发誓他们至少打中3，4次，都不能使被击中者停下来。”
    
    
    
    
    THECARBINE
    ANVIL CHORUS
    
    
    
    In subfreezing weather, the carbine operates sluggishly and, depending upon the degree of cold, will require anywhere from 5 to 20 warm-up shots before it will fire full automatic.
    Since being made full automatic, it is hypersensitive. In hot weather, even small amounts of dust and moisture together will cause it to misfire. In cold weather, it is more sensitive to frost than any other weapon, and more difficult to lubricate in such a way that it will remain operative.
    The magazines are a source of continuing trouble. After only a few weeks the clipped ammunition begins to corrode at the edges where it rubs the metal of the clip, and as the oxidization proceeds dirt becomes mixed with it. The discoloration is obvious, and the dirt can be scraped off with the fingernail. When the shell is injected, the fouled metal leaves its accumulation on the chamber. As this builds up, it gradually develops a block, and the piece goes out of action. There is no way to prevent such stoppages except by frequent unclipping and cleaning of the ammunition; time is insufficient for that.
    The weapon lacks “power.” It is “too delicate.” Its day-to-day operation is (too variable,” according to changes in the weather. It was “more dependable” when it was semi-automatic. When fired full automatic, it “wastes ammunition.” When fired semi-automatic it isn’t sufficiently accurate for “aimed fire at moderate distances.”
    . . . These are a few of the criticisms voiced by troops who have used the carbine in Korean operations. The anvil chorus is much louder than during World War II operations, including the Pacific, where the carbine was hardly an outstanding success.
    The Marine criticism is even more harsh than that of the Army. From top to bottom, 1st Marine Division takes the dim view of this weapon; their experience with it during the Chosen Reservoir operation was the final blow to confidence. They want it either eliminated or made over into a dependable weapon. The clear majority of Eighth
    Army infantry feels this same way about it. An occasional platoon or company can be found which does not feel particularly harshly about the carbine; the reaction ofthe average unit depends upon whether it has had a particularly costly experience with a number of carbines in a critical moment; since usually the carbine men are in the minority, it is possible for a company to go through a stiff fight without undue injury from carbine failures. That makes the almost unanimously strong feeling against the weapon all the more surprising. Not alone does the infantry feel this way; the artillery batteries, which have had several experiences with close-in defense of the gun positions against infiltration, are also going over to the Ml as rapidly as they can convert.
    The rancor which attends this judgment of the weapon can be attested by one incident. On the night of 26-27 November 1950, Easy Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, fought a desperate action when serving as the point, well to the fore of the main body of the 25th Infantry Division. They were vastly outnumbered by the Chinese, but they held their ground with such valor that the enemy, after a last full-scale charge, drew back just as dawn came. The company was then ordered by higher command to fall back on new ground to the southward. The pressure had eased. Dead and wounded were removed from the hill. Also, as the men explained in the course of the critique, all weapons were brought out “except the carbines. They were scattered around the hill, but no one felt like picking them up. We had found during the fight that they were no damned good and we figured they wouldn’t help the enemy.”
    As to the possible effect of full automatic fire by the carbine upon enemy action, there are no sound criteria for attempting an evaluation. In the perimeter fights which are covered by the record, there are literally hundreds of incidents in which the individual relates how with aimed fire from the carbine he shot one of the enemy. There are other instances, limited in number, in which the firer, using the weapon automatically, brought down two, three, or four of the enemy in one burst delivered at exceptionally close range. But what the weapon accomplishes to discourage the enemy and deter his aggressiveness by putting out a considerable volume of fire in a short space, is not provable by the data on enemy reaction. There were no clean-cut examples establishing that, because of a high rate of fire from the carbines in a particular sector, the enemy became discouraged and drew back.
    The conditions of limited observation and high nerve tension which attend nighttime engagement are generally exclusive of any such possible findings.
    However, the persistence of the Chinese after-dark attack has a partial bearing on the question. The carbines produce their heaviest volume of fire in the earlier stages of the fight. They begin to run low on ammunition before there is any marked flagging in the strength of the enemy attack. Their fire does not prevent the enemy from closing to within grenade range of the defended ground, nor for that matter does the slower fire of the Ml. When men are pinned fairly close to earth by an enemy down slope at close range, the grenade thrown from the high ground has a good chance of finding its mark, whereas because of instinctive reaction to the desire for self-preservation, fire delivered from a shoulder weapon will likely go high. On flat ground, the tendencies would be different. But, there is relatively little fighting on an even grade in Korea.
    In the hill fights, carbine volume does not prevent the enemy from closing, and when
    his final rushes are made, the carbines are beginning to go empty. In the daylight attack, the weapon more nearly pays its way. Only then it is used more frequently in semi-automatic firing, and its power is more evenly distributed over the course of the engagement. Sufficient to note that this was not the purpose for which the carbine was intended or the object for which it was changed to full automatic.
    
    
    
    
    RANGE AND EFFECT
    There are practically no data bearing on the accuracy of the carbine at ranges in excess of 50 yards. The record contains a few examples of carbine-aimed fire felling an enemy soldier at this distance or perhaps a little more. But they are so few in number that no general conclusion can be drawn from them. Where carbine fire had proved killing effect, approximately 95 percent of the time the target was dropped at less than 50 yards.
    Because of the frequency of hand-to-hand fighting in Korea operations, there has been a suitable opportunity for judging of the takedown characteristics of the carbine round when delivered at close range.
    This is not a source of general complaint. However, there is some illuminating comment. In the approximately 50 infantry actions covered, there were in all 7 witnesses who said that they had fired at an enemy soldier under conditions where there was no doubt that the bullet had struck him in a vital part of the body, and that he had kept on coming. One such witness is 1st Lt Joseph R. Fisher, 1st Marine Regiment. He was speaking of the defense at Hagaru-ri. The 1st Marine Division regarded him as one of its ablest and most objective company commanders. These were his words:
    “About 30 percent of our carbines gave us trouble; some wouldn’t fire at all; others responded sluggishly. But the main reason my men lost confidence in the carbine was because they would put a bullet right in a Chink’s chest at 25 yards range, and he wouldn’t stop. This happened to me. The bullet struck home; the man simply winced and kept on coming. There were about half a dozen of my men made this same complaint：some of them swore they had fired three or four times, hit the man each time, and still not stopped him.”
    
    
    火炮和无后座力武器的用途
    
    因为在针对敌军特定目标的军事行动中它们总是相互协同的，所以在此将两者一并考虑。
    在朝鲜的炮兵军官经常抱怨步兵总是呼叫炮兵执行那些以步兵自己的武器可以更好完成的任务；在步兵对付其火力难以解决的大型目标时如果更频繁地呼叫炮兵，步兵的日子就能好过一点，也就能挽救更多的生命，这种故事我们听得也不少。
    所有这一切形成了一个怪圈。
    尽管在过去的战争中这两种意见通常针锋相对因此也就彼此抵消。但如何在联合行动中最好地平衡步兵和炮兵的火力，没有一方就这个问题提出令人满意的解决方案。问题在於，在朝鲜的步兵作战中，无论这双方相互抱怨中的哪一种，是不是到了经年累月的程度，而显示步兵军官对炮兵的潜力，局限，后勤问题缺乏了解呢？
    因为步兵现在所拥有的远程重武器也具有巨大的破坏力，其效果与炮兵火力相差无几，所以，合理评估目标区域从而保证这两个兵种的火力整合就比以往更加紧迫了。步兵对无后座力武器的使用是在朝鲜的军事行动中战术的一项新发展；是否能平衡运用这些武器，仅能通过重新审视炮兵问题的某些方面来评估。
    在我们对所研究的步兵行动中被召唤和实际实施的炮兵火力进行考察时，涉及了战场的形势、目标等方面的问题，这样的考察表明，步、炮两个兵种的火力配合保持了合理的平衡与协调。步兵并没有过分使用炮兵火力支援的倾向。
    在冬季的军事行动中，步兵往往急迫地要求耗尽炮弹的炮击以保护夜间阵地。这种情况下可能消耗了超过形势所需的炮弹，因而造成了浪费。然而，把这种要求视作步兵对炮兵任务和困难的误判也不公允，因为这就忽略了非常人性化的考虑：步兵指挥官的首要职责是尽可能消除部下的焦虑感并保护他们的阵地而不是去担忧炮兵的后勤问题。当炮兵确信自己已准确了解局势时，他们就能强硬地面对这种倾向。根据为此项研究搜集的数据：我军步兵在朝鲜比在二战时更敢于冒一时之险，不呼叫炮兵就进行战斗。然而，一位在前线服役约一年的步兵营长发表了如下意见：“根据我的观察还有我从别的营长那里了解到的，我军大量的火炮和空中支援被不必要地消耗了。我们为求万无一失，在太多的场合使用了空军和炮兵。我曾经在率部攻打山头的时候呼叫空军和炮兵，而我当时并不肯定射程内是否存在任何敌人。在战斗中，我们为保证士兵的生命交纳了过高的“保险费。”有时，十个敌军步兵就可能挡住我军一个完整的团级纵队，直到一个营的火炮、坦克和所有支援武器准备完毕，能够协助少数步兵前进为止。”这是一位男子汉的观点。
    
    
    
    RECOILLESS WEAPONS
    USE OF ARTILLERY AND RECOILLESS WEAPONS
    These two subjects are considered together at this point because they are conjoint in operations against certain major enemy targets.
    Among artillery officers in Korea there is heard the usual plaint against infantry that it calls on the artillery for fire missions which could be better carried out by their own weapons; not less frequently is heard the story that the infantry would get along better, and save more lives, if it called on the artillery more frequently when operating against targets too big to be reduced by infantry fires.
    All of this has a strangely familiar ring.
    But since the two ideas, however general their circulation in past wars, are mutually exclusive and therefore cancel out each other, neither provides a satisfactory approach to the problem of how infantry and artillery fires are best balanced in combination.The question is whether either fault is chronic in such measure during infantry operations in Korea as to indicate that infantry officers are insufficiently trained in knowledge of the potential, limits, and logistical problem of the other arm.
    Because of infantry’s present possession of heavy weapons capable of producing heavy blast effects at long range, similar to the explosion of artillery shells, the need to conserve fires by both arms in conformity with sound evaluation of target areas is more pressing than ever. Employment of the recoilless weapons by the infantry is one of the new developments in Korean operations; whether the weapons are being employed in balance can only be assessed by reviewing certain aspects of the artillery problem.
    The check of artillery fires called for and delivered in the infantry actions which were taken under study, as to the situation, the target, etc., indicates that the equation is kept in reasonable balance. The infantry does not tend toward over-exploitation of its artillery support. In the main, its requests are reasonable.
    In the winter operations, the infantry was inclined to press hard for interdictory artillery fires for protection of the night position, and perhaps more shell was wasted this way than the situation sometimes warranted. However, it would be immoderate to view this as a fault in infantry appreciation of the artillery role and problem, for to do so would exclude the very human consideration that the first obligation of the infantry commander is to do all possible to relieve the anxieties and protect the position of his men, rather than to worry about artillery logistics. It is up to artillerymen to harden against this tendency when convinced that they have read the situation correctly. According to the data gathered for this study, our infantry in Korea was more inclined to take the casual risks of combat without crying for artillery help than during World War II. However, one infantry battalion commander, who had served almost one year in line, made this comment : “From what I observed, and what I learned from other battalion commanders, much of our artillery and air support was needlessly expended. We used both air and artillery in too many instances for outright insurance. I have called for air and artillery on hills which we were attacking, not knowing positively that there was any enemy within range. In combat, we seem still to place too high a premium on the worth of one human life. Ten enemy riflemen may sometimes hold up an entire regimental column until a battalion of artillery, tanks, and every supporting weapon within the battalion are ready to aid the advance of a few riflemen. The practice can become unduly expensive.” This was one man’s point of view.
    在朝鲜，敌军的许多主要目标经常是难以确知的，为了确定敌军目标，表面上看我军似乎是不遗余力，用尽了手段。而尽管成倍的努力和投入不过是敌军目标和敌军对常规火力抵抗力极端坚韧的必然结果，可我军的这种做法还是受到了质疑，人们怀疑这是否有用。
    中共军队利用沿岩石山岭的岭脊布置堑壕阵地的办法不断挫败我军重武器和空军的精确射击。重武器和空军竭尽全力去摧毁敌军坚强的支撑点，但经常除了造成强烈震动和歼灭一些部署在浅层工事的敌军以外，并不能取得决定性的战果。步兵还得接近敌军阵地，最终以自己的武器杀敌，敌军的重型工事有时能坚持到所有的防御者都被手榴弹炸死。
    传统上，摧毁“大型目标”是炮兵的任务，步兵也从来都承认这是炮兵的特权。在目标方面，“大型目标”在朝鲜的军事行动中特别难以捕捉。如果炮兵能够发现和直接瞄准这种目标，那么摧毁它便是一个不错的战果。但是，地形条件使得他们很少有这种机会。
    当中共军队拥有4到10天时间组织棱线阵地时，他们习惯把机枪掩体修的几乎与地面持平。他们在正、反斜面都有可能部署迫击炮，这取决于射程和能否有效掩护。步兵配置在散兵坑，掩护接近主要工事的通道。他们极少浪费兵力去防御较低的斜坡。
    掩体内壁通常是用被缆绳捆在一起的双层粗原木搭建的，而掩体顶部可能本身就是山体的一个突出部(而它由4到8英尺厚的泥土和岩石构成)，于是，掩体便能经得住除8英寸口径火炮以外所有武器的猛烈打击。除非是直接命中，否则轻型火炮根本就奈何不了这样的敌军工事。考虑到敌军工事的特点，要想直接命中，概率只有千分之一。枪炮眼通常高14到30英寸，而且通常凹进掩体壁。这些隐蔽部通常被设置在顺着山梁方向的地褶内，与主抵抗线垂直而与射击方向平行。他们被这样配置是要阻止我军步兵从侧翼迂回并沿棱线走向进攻。
    这意味着从前方观察，他们通常是完全隐蔽的。在一条山脊上，无论哪一处都可能会暗藏着2到6个那样的掩体。而数小时内，从敌军所在的主要区域一直可以射出稳定的重机枪火力。
    此外，在1500到2000码的距离，训练有素的观测员也不能识别出敌军的特定目标或任何重大活动。
    在表面上，这看上去是个主要靠炮兵的干预来解决的问题。炮兵认为情况正是这样，步兵也从来不会提出异议。但是在通常的情形，我军步兵占领的高地往往挡在炮兵和其目标之间。这种高地可能是一条或一连串的山岭。此时就需要间瞄射击了。在这种形势下，以野战炮兵的常规射击压制这些掩体的机会确实微乎其微。如果有人要搞清为什么会这样，他只需绘制出一门火炮向这样一个目标射出的炮弹飞行曲线就可以了。如果这条线偏移几英寸，那么炮弹就完全打不中目标。
    在我们所研究的各次行动中，尽管以密集炮火轰击中国人的掩体，但还没有一个火炮以直瞄射击打中它们的战例。它们也能经得起火箭弹和凝固汽油弹的空中打击；报告中有空军直接将凝固汽油弹投到掩体顶部的例子。那一发凝固汽油弹滚落到了嵌壁枪眼的前方。尽管如此，防御者仍未被杀死，而且在简短的间歇后又恢复了射击。
    
    
    
    当步兵向对面高地的特定敌军目标进行火力打击时，无后坐力武器所能带来的好处几乎是不言自明的。在1000到1200码间的射程，75mm无后座力炮是唯一能实施直瞄射击以较高概率一发精确击中并摧毁目标的火炮。如果驮载炮能够运上来，那么它也有可能做到这一点。不过，在没有驮载炮的情况，无后座力武器就是(步兵)主要的指望了。它们一次次以这种使用方式地证明了自己的实力。当距离超过1000码时，57mm无后坐力炮的射程就不够了。而为了试图推翻这个结论，部队已经浪费了过多的该口径炮弹。75mm无后坐力炮过于沉重，当部队向更高的山岭移动时，往往把它们放在队伍的后面，而把57mm无后坐力炮置于前面作为替代，但这样的使用超出了这个替代品的有效射程。
    这个问题的本质是，击中目标所需射程与目标的高程通常成正比。换句话说，当部队突越较低的山岭时，交战距离通常缩短。在运输重量不受太多限制的情况，即使所需射程较短，57mm无后座力炮能完成任务，带上75mm无后座力炮也是很合适的，因为它具有更强的冲击力。在这个意义上，有火力重叠的现象发生。
    
    
    
    另一方面，当步兵近距离突击据守高地的敌军步兵群时，57mm无后座力炮可谓无价之宝。总有一些暗堡坚持抵抗，由于它们受到山岭的保护，所以在远程炮火之下仍几乎毫发无伤。敌军散兵放弃外围的散兵坑防线之后，在向这些防御工事撤退的过程中，很容易得到小洞穴和裸露岩层的保护。子弹对这些掩护完全无效，但用57mm无后座力炮就可以把敌兵轰出来。
    
    
    
    In Korea, the baffling character of many of the main enemy targets has brought about use of a seeming excess of means in the effort to reduce them. But it is to be doubted that there is any help for it, duplication is the inevitable consequence of the extreme toughness of the targets and their resistance to normal fires.
    The use which CCF make of dug-in positions along the rocky ridge crests is frustrating of precision fire by the heavy weapons, including air power. Going their best to destroy the enemy strong points, frequently in the end they bring off nothing more decisive than a strong shock effect and the elimination of a certain number of the enemy who are disposed in the more shallow works; it then remains for the infantry to close and make the final kill with its own weapons, with the heavy works of the enemy sometimes holding out until the occupants are killed with grenades.
    Traditionally, it is the task of artillery to knock out the “big stuff,” and the infantry is ever ready to concede it that privilege. But in terms of target area, the “big stuff” in Korean operations is peculiarly elusive. It would be a fair mark for the guns, if they could see it and lay directly on it, but, such is the nature of the ground that they rarely have that opportunity.
    When the CCF have as many as four to ten days in which to organize a ridgeline position, they customarily hinge it upon machine-gun bunkers built close to the skyline. The mortars may operate from either the forward or reverse slope, depending on range and the availability of cover. The riflemen are disposed in foxholes covering the approaches in relatively close juxtaposition to the main works. They rarely waste force in an attempt to defend along the lower slopes.
    The walls of the bunkers are frequently double tiers of thick logs bound together by cable. The roof may be an overhang of earth and rock between four and eight feet in thickness; so being, it is shellproof to a collapsing fire from anything except an 8-inch gun. Except for a direct hit, light artillery fire cannot neutralize it, and in the nature of the position, direct hits are a l-in-1000 accident. The embrasures are between 14 and 30 inches in height and are usually recessed. Frequently these nests are sited in a fold along the facing of the ridge, putting them at right angles to our MLR and parallel to the fire issuing from it. They are thus sited to block the infantry advance when it moves in from the flank, attacking down the length of the ridgeline.
    This means that they are almost perfectly hidden to observation from the front. One ridgeline may hold anywhere between two to six such bunkers. Persistent machinegun fire may be received from the general area for hours. Still, at between 1500 and 2000 yards range, the trained observer cannot pick up a specific target or see any significant activity.
    On the surface, this appears as a problem to be solved mainly by artillery intervention. The artillerymen accept it as such, and the infantry is never inclined to say no. But in the average situation, the high ground held by the friendly infantry intervenes between the artillery and its target. This may be one ridge or a series. Therefore indirect fire is required. The chance that the bunkers will be neutralized through a normal shoot by field artillery under these conditions becomes very small indeed. One need only plot the curve of an artillery shell moving against such an object to see why this is so. If the line is only a few inches off, the effect is a total miss.
    During the operations taken under survey, there was not one instance of an artillery shell scoring a direct hit on a Chinese bunker, despite consistent fires against these objects. They were resistant also to air attack both with rockets and napalm; the record includes examples wherein the air scored direct hits with napalm atop the bunker. The napalm rolled over and down the front of the recessed embrasure. Still, the occupants were not killed, and, after a brief interlude, resumed their fire.
    
    
    
    The advantage which the recoilless weapons give infantry in firing against targets of this character from the opposing heights scarcely requires description. At ranges between 1000 and 1200 yards, the 75 recoilless is the only piece which can take them under direct fire, with a relatively good chance of hitting dead on and destroying the object in one round; pack artillery might do it if it were available, but in its absence, the recoilless weapons are the main hope. In this type of usage, they have justified themselves time and again. The 57 is too light for such work at ranges exceeding 1000 yards, though troops have wasted an excess of 57 ammunition trying to prove otherwise; because of the weight problem with the 75, it is often left behind during movement into the higher ridges, and the attempt is made to substitute the 57 at prohibitive ranges.
    In the nature of the problem, the range of fire that is needed is quite apt to be in proportion to the height of the ground which is to be surmounted. In other words, troops are fighting across low ridges, operating distances are apt to be foreshortened. Thus under conditions which are less prohibitive to weight carrying, when the ranges are shorter and the 57 would do the work, the 75 is still very apt to be taken along because it packs the extra wallop. To this extent, there is an overlapping.
    On the other hand, the 57 becomes invaluable during the closing infantry assault on an enemy-held high hill mass. Always a few bunkers remain in operation; those which were protected from the long-range fires by the folding of the ridge are likely to be almost unscathed. Falling back toward these works, after quitting the outer line of foxholes, enemy skirmishers are apt to seek protection in small caves and behind rock outcroppings. The 57 can blast them out from cover which would provide immunity to bullet fire.
    
    
    对武器的评价
    
    士兵们在迫切需要无后座力武器的情形下使用它们的次数越多，对它们的评价就越高。无一例外。他们会被问到：“你觉得75mm无后座力炮怎么样？”他们的回答可能是否定的。经过调查，你会发现他们一次也没有使用过这种炮：他们不喜欢它，因为它太沉重。但是，在使用者中只有一种反应：热情赞扬。他们发现这种武器无可挑剔，并为它的能力感到惊奇。
    在美国本土，军方人士对75mm无后座力炮尾端的火焰颇为关注，有一位将军觉得这使得它成了一种给步兵带来危险的武器。在战场上，这些疑虑并没有得到响应。士兵和指挥官们一致认为这种闪光在实战中并非一个问题。他们通常以这样的回答来解除疑虑：“为什么担心？他们(敌人)知道我们在哪。”有一位军士答道：“我部下的有些士兵担心火焰和反向冲击波，因为他们读过很多这方面的报道。但当我们开火时，他们就镇定下来了。”一般而言，这不是一个影响战斗组士气的关键因素。他们觉得如果可以在开火后转移一小段距离，这就足以提供充分的保护了。
    
    
    
    反坦克
    
    在我们所研究的军事行动中，没有使用这种武器打击敌军坦克的战例。在两个战例中，75mm无后坐力炮被用来打击敌军自行火炮；在这两个战例中，它都击毁了敌军火炮。然而，第7海军陆战团叙述它曾在早期军事行动中使用75mm无后坐力炮打击敌军坦克。
    在一个战例中，我军以75mm无后坐力炮击毁了4辆隐蔽中的敌军坦克。荷马 利曾伯格上校及其属下军官提交的战后总结中提到：在反坦克行动中，75mm无后坐力炮“从没有令本团失望。”但这次经历证实了与坦克战斗时，“在目标非常接近前不开火很重要，否则75mm无后坐力炮便不能击毁它们。”作战参谋威廉 R 厄内上尉给出了对这种武器有效性的非常有启迪作用的评估：“我们不把75mm无后坐力炮当作单用途武器；杀伤敌军人员是它的巨大价值之一。因为它弹道扁平，在小山顶的战斗中可以用它对付碉堡，敌军集群，机枪，还有其他武器难以奏效的洞口。我们发现它实现以上这些全面用途的时候十分轻便。”
    “在一个地势非常糟糕的地点，我军两个连为坚守一条300米高的棱线而艰苦备尝，我们需要能击毁峡谷对面1300码远的中国人的碉堡和机枪的武器。我前往反坦克组，找到了威廉 L 维克中士率领的小组，它们有一门炮和40发弹药。这两个连的退路已被切断，但是反坦克组还是成功地挤了进去。敌军再次从后方合围了我军，隔绝了这个阵地。这两个连一直坚守了整个晚上。
    “破晓时分，维克主动地去查找敌军的炮位并向它们开火，打了15发弹药。此时，中国人开始搜寻他。他把这门炮转移到了一个隐蔽的位置，等到敌人来到距炮200码远的地方时，将10发高爆弹打进敌军的一个连队。这样，他便以一门炮粉碎了这次进攻，同样，战况也证实了这种武器的机动性。这次战斗发生在柳潭里的正南方。”
    长津湖战役和三个月之后的“打桩机行动”提供了很多75mm无后坐力炮参战的战例。所有这些战例都证实了这种炮不同寻常的精确性以及它全面的战斗价值。
    在敌军对下碣隅里的围攻中，我们发现75mm无后坐力炮对于击退夜袭特别有效。它被用于击毁从相当远的距离外向我军步兵队伍开火的机枪和迫击炮。我们发现75mm无后坐力炮发射的白磷弹最适合执行这项任务。
    在这些夜战中，尽管阵地周围敌军火力很猛烈，75mm无后坐力炮也没有转移。士兵们在75mm无后坐力炮周围掘壕固守。
    至少这些记录传达了一种印象：不熟悉75mm无后坐力炮的性能是妨碍士兵们在朝鲜的战斗中更广泛地应用这种武器的唯一因素。应当强调的是：山岭越高，武器重量对其应用的限制性就越大。在突越高于地面300米以上的山岭时，通常存在一个问题：75mm无后坐力炮可能发挥的作用能否证明运输它所需的人力是划算的？在狭窄的山路或光滑的地面上的任何移动肯定都存在风险。第2步兵师和第24步兵师都有士兵在试图前运75mm无后坐力炮时摔伤了脊背。
    
    
    
    APPRECIATION OF WEAPON
    Appreciation by troops of the recoilless weapons is exactly in proportion as they have been given employment in those situations for which they were intended. There was no exception to this. Troops would be asked: “What do you think of the 75 recoilless?”The answer would be negative. Inquiry would then develop that they had never once used the gun: they disliked it because it was heavy. But among the users, there was only one reaction - enthusiastic approval. They found no fault whatever in the weapon and were amazed at its capabilities.
    In the ZI there has been considerable concern about the flash, and a general feeling that this made it a dangerous weapon for infantry. These doubtings have no echo in the field. Unanimously, troops and commanders said that flash was not a problem in actual operations. This feeling was usually resolved in some such answer as: “Why worry ? They know we’re there.” One sergeant replied: “Some of my men were concerned about flash and back-blast because they had read so much about it.But when we opened fire, they settled down.” In general, it is not a factor in the morale of operating crews. They feel that if they can displace a short distance after firing, that affords sufficient protection.
    
    
    
    
    AGAINST ARMOR
    In the operations studied, there were no examples of these weapons being used against enemy armor. In two instances, the 75 had been employed to fire on an SP gun; in both cases, it had knocked out the gun. The Seventh Marine Regiment did, however, recount its experience with the 75 in earlier operations against enemy armor.
    In one case the gun had been used to knock out four nesting tanks, the closest being
    15 yards and the farthest 75 yards. In the critique attended by the commander, Co1
    Homer Litzenberg and his officers, it was stated that the 75 had “never once failed the
    regiment” in action against armor, but that experience had proved that when fighting tanks “it is necessary to hold fire until the target is very close or the 75 will not knock them out.” A very revealing estimate of the weapon’s usefulness was given by Capt
    William R. Earney, S3, in these words: “We do not regard the 75 as a single-purpose
    weapon; one of its great values is in use against personnel. Because of its flat trajectory, in hilltop fighting it can be used against pillboxes, enemy groups, machine guns, and cave entrances when no other weapon will suffice. We have found it sufficiently portable for this general purpose.
    
    
    
    “In a particularly bad spot, with two companies having a hard time holding a ridgeline about 300 meters high, we needed something that could knock out Chinese pillboxes and machine guns as far as 1300 yards away across the valley. Me went to the AT section, got a group under S/Sgt William L. Vick, one gun and 40 rounds of ammo. The two companies had been cut off, but the section managed to squeeze through. Then once again the enemy closed across the rear, isolating the position. The companies remained there through the night.
    “At first light, on his own initiative, Vick located the enemy emplacements and
    fired on them, using 15 rounds. Then the Chinese came looking for him. He moved
    the gun to a concealed position, waited until they got within 200 yards of the gun, and
    then fired 10 rounds of HE into about a company of the enemy. That one gun broke
    up the attack; also, the circumstances speak for the mobility of the weapon. This action took place just to the south of Udam-ni.”
    There are many more examples of the gun in action supplied from the Chosen Reservoir operation, and from Operation Punch, three months later. All bespeak the unusual accuracy of the gun and it’s all-around combat worthiness.
    In the siege of Hagaru-ri, the 75mm recoilless was found to be especially useful in repelling the night attack. It was used to knock out machine guns and mortars firing on the infantry line from relatively long range. The 75’s WP shell was found to be most suitable for this work.
    During these night actions, the gun did not displace, though there was heavy enemy fire around the position. The men dug in beside the gun and stayed there.
    Lest these notes convey an impression that, unfamiliarity with the weapon is the only drag on greater use of the 75 by troops in the Korean fighting, it should be emphasized that the higher the ridge, the more prohibitive the weight factor becomes.In fighting across ridges in excess of 300 meters above the LD, it’ is always a question whether the possible use of the gun justifies the manpower required to move it. It is a positive danger in any movement along narrow trails or over slippery ground. Both in the 2nd and 24th Divisions men have had their backs broken in falls while trying to get the 75 forward.
    ROCKETLAUNCHERS
    A MARGINAL WEAPON?
    Due to the enemy’s lack of armor in winter operations 1950-51, this group of
    weapons had little decisive effect in the local fighting, except as CCF contrived to
    capture some of our weapons and employ them against our metal. They did not prove
    inexpert in exploiting the opportunity. There are a number of examples in the record
    of CCF using the rocket launcher against our tanks, field pieces, and vehicles at comparatively
    short range (15 to 50 yards) and scoring killing hits. The tank-killing weapons
    all involve this special jeopardy; no other materiel can be converted more quickly and
    decisively to enemy use upon capture, particularly when armor, being unopposed by
    its own kind, relaxes it’s normal precautions.
    
    
    火箭筒
    
    边缘武器？
    由于敌人在1950-51年的行动中缺乏装甲兵器，火箭筒这种兵器在实际战斗中并没有发挥巨大的作用。当然中共军队操作缴获的我们的火箭筒来打击我们的情况除外。事实证明，他们专长于利用这样的机会。比较我们的使用情况，有很多的中共战斗例子表明，他们用火箭筒在极近的距离(15到50码)打击我们的坦克，战地目标，和机动车辆并获得很多战绩。这种坦克杀手武器造成了极度危险，没有任何一种其他武器能够被敌人缴获，并且被敌人很快使用并且成为他们的主要武器。特别是对我们的装甲车辆，自以为无敌，放松警惕的时候。
    
    
    
    In the winter fighting, our bazooka fire was used mainly against machine guns, buildings where enemy skirmishers had taken cover, and other large objects. There was less of a tendency to employ it at short range against enemy personnel, in substitute for mortar fire. The data are insufficient to warrant saying whether the launcher justifies its place in the infantry company weapons system under the conditions in which the CCF was engaged by our line during the winter. There are some graphic examples of its killing effect in the crises of a number of local engagements; these are well outnumbered by the operational narratives in which the launchers are accounted as present, but have no influence upon the course of combat. From the data - which are admitt’edly an inconclusive sample - it is indicated only that the launcher is a marginal weapon when the enemy lacks armor. With few exceptions, its telling shots could have been contrived by some other weapon present with the line. In other words, it did
    not have unique advantages in infantry-against-infant’ry action, as it was used in the average tactical situation.
    在冬季战斗中，我们的巴祖卡主要用来摧毁敌方机枪，敌方占据的建筑物和其他大目标。并没有将其作为迫击炮的替代火力用于短距离战术对抗中的趋势。在冬天中共军队突破我军防线的战斗中，也缺乏数据证明火箭筒在步兵连武器系统中是否处于恰当地位。有一些例子说明在战斗关键时刻他的杀伤效果影响了局势。不过，现在的火箭筒战斗的描述非常夸张，实际上却并没有影响战斗的过程。从数据看——在一些不确定的例子中——当敌人缺乏装甲力量时，火箭筒实际上成为边缘武器。只有少数例外，火箭筒和其他武器一同在战场上使用。换句话说，在其被使用的战术行动中，他并不是步兵对抗中独一无二的优势兵器。
    By t’he account of our average line officer in Korea, under the conditions of the fighting there, the 3.5 launcher is of greater utility in any situation than the small bazooka, and he sees no argument for retention of the latter within the infantry weapons system. It becomes excess baggage as soon as the 3.5 is in good supply. But the question cannot be resolved that easily. If it is true that the small bazooka is an effective antipersonnel weapon, but that its potential has not been adequately exploited because of a hiatus in training, then its extra portability may give it advantage over the 3.5 in particular situations, for the same reason’ that the 60-mm mortar is useful, though the 81 has greater killing radius. Further light on the subject may come from study of an incident in which the small launcher was given decisive use against human targets.
    在我们普通韩国战地指挥官的考量中，结合这里的战斗条件，3.5寸的火箭筒在任何情况下都要比小巴祖卡有用的多，他们认为没有必要在步兵武器系统内列装后者。这造成，大量3.5寸火箭筒补充充裕。问题的解决可没那么容易。如果说巴祖卡作为一种有效的反单兵武器是正确的，也会因其操作手缺乏训练而限制其潜力的发挥，但由于其优于3.5寸超级巴祖卡的便携性，使他可以很好的替代超级巴祖卡——依据同样理由，尽管，81毫米的杀伤效果明显好，60毫米的迫击炮的使用更方便。这个项目的进一步明朗可能要取决于89毫米火箭筒是否能够在对抗步兵目标时取得绝对性作用研究。
    THE BAZOOKA AGAINST MEN
    用巴祖卡对抗步兵攻击
    In the attack of the 1st Marine Division from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, the 5th Marines assumed defense of the whole Hagaru-ri perimeter as the column got underway. To ease the initial progress of the column, it was necessary to gain the high ground east of the camp which had been held by CCF throughout the siege. The Regiment’s Second Battalion was given the mission and soon won the heights. Prior to the action, it had been reckoned that the Division as a whole would be able to clear Hagaru-ri by nightfall. But fighting along the road had delayed the 7th Regiment and the Division trains, so that the lead elements of the 5th Regiment had still not cleared by dark.
    在陆战一师从Hagaru-ri到Koto-ri的攻击战斗中，陆战五团负责防守整个Hagaru-ri以掩护主力通过。为了让先遣车队通过，有必要占领营地东侧被中共军队占领的山林高地。五团二营负责执行这个任务，并且很快占据一些制高点。在行动前，预计傍晚时分全师可以通过Hagaru-ri。但一路上的战斗迟滞了陆战七团和师车队。导致陆战五团到夜间也未能撤离。
    Easy Company held ground eastward of the river from a point approximately 700 yards north of the Hagaru-ri bridge around to the bottom of the main hill and back along the railway track for about 200 yards. The right flank of the Company ran along the railway approximately 400 yards east and north of the bridge. Between 1800 and 2000, the Chinese attacked from the high ground toward the bridge with the apparent object of cutting off troops manning the western half of the perimeter. Easy’s rocket team had been so stationed by Capt Sam Jeskilka that it could fire straight up a draw which ran halfway up the hill then forked off into gullys. This was the natural approach from the hill, as it was otherwise barren of cover. The Chinese pressed forward along the alley, and during an attack which persisted in strength for two hours and recurred intermittently through the night, this key feature was defended by rockets.
    E连占据的高地在河东侧约700码处，Hagaru-ri桥北边靠近主要山地的山脚，背后离铁路线大约200码。连的右翼沿铁路线400米延伸到桥的东北侧。在18时到20时之间，中国人从山林高地上冲下来，通过桥梁意图消灭环形防线西半部的守军。E连的火箭筒组正好由山姆 杰斯克里卡上尉指挥能够直接打击半山腰的溪沟。这里比较靠近山顶，没有多少植被。中国人沿着小路向上冲，一直持续了整整2个小时，并且在整个晚上也要反复冲锋。火箭筒守住了关键阵地。
    On the following morning, CCF pulled back into the hills. Co1 R. L. Murray, commander of the 5th Regiment, and Lt Co1 Hal Roise entered the draw and made a cursory examination of the damage done by the 2.36 fire. There were more than 50 bodies on the ground, scattered anywhere from 20 yards to 200 yards from the launcher position.
    到次日清晨时，中共军队被迫退回到山里去。于是，陆战五团的指挥官R L 马里上校和哈尔 罗易斯中校草草视察了使用89毫米火箭弹的战场。发现沿着火箭筒位置从20码到200码的距离上有超过50具尸体。
    Murray’s most amazing comment on the result was that his inspection of bodies convinced him that practically all of the Chinese had died from burns - that WP rounds had set their padded clothing afire. Jeskilka estimated more conservatively that 60 percent of the deaths were due to burns and the rest to concussion and fragmentation. His crew had fired quite a few HEAT rounds from the launchers. Jeskilka said that while the Hagaru-ri affair was Easy’s outstanding use of' the launcher, the Company had become habituated to using it as an anti-personnel weapon at every opportunity. It was therefore normal for the men to have final confidence in it in an extreme emergency.
    马里对大部分中国人尸体致命伤的检查结果十分震惊——这些伤口都是都是由于衣服的燃烧造成的。杰斯克里卡保守估计大约有60%的死者是由于烧伤，其他的则是冲击震荡和碎片杀伤。他的部下发射火箭弹时也有一些被尾焰烧伤。杰斯克里卡说由于在Hagaru-ri中，E连使用火箭筒的效果，这个连现在变得一有机会就用这种对抗步兵目标的武器。因此，人们对使用火箭筒有极高的热情和信心。
    In the November fight against CCF along the Chongchon River, one of the most mobile and aggressively successful defenses conducted anywhere along the American line was the action by Company F, 38th Infantry Regiment. From a detailed and lengthy narrative of this action, the following extract is made to illustrate the effect of one 3.5 round upon the engagement:
    在11月，沿Chongchon河，与中共军队的战斗中，38团F连的战斗是诸多美军防线随处可见的成功融合机动性和进攻性防御案例之一。从一份详细描述这支部队战斗的报告中，如下的描述是一个反应了3.5寸火箭筒情况的简报
    “When the squad on the right flank of 3rd Platoon was withdrawn by Sgt Smith because of the buildup of CCF fire against the nose of the ridge, that action left the machine gun on the left flank of 1st Platoon’s position as the chief block to the enemy’s main advance up the draw. There was a native hut to the right and forward of the machine gun. Lt Lemuel English, who was in command of 1st Platoon, had one of his BAR men, PFC Cleo Wachel, dug in right next to the house along the right rear corner. Wachel was thus in line to assist the machine gun in covering the draw, and in fact, as the fight developed, he bore the brunt of the defense. There were sandbags revetting his foxhole. He could deliver a grazing fire right down the gut without unduly exposing himself.
    由于中共军队的火力点在山脊前伸处建立起来，3排右翼的那个班在斯密斯中士的指挥下撤退，只留下一挺机枪在1排的左翼阻止敌人的进一步进攻。在机枪的右前侧有一间小屋。1排排长莱弭尔 英格兰中士手下有一个巴祖卡发射手，一等兵克莱奥 瓦彻尔。他在房屋的右后侧挖了一个散兵坑。这样，瓦彻尔可以协助机枪手火力覆盖，事实上，当战斗激烈时，他也一同承受进攻的压力。有一些沙包堆积掩护了他的散兵坑，这样他可以在腰以下的高度发射而不用暴露自己。
    “English deployed three riflemen to the rear of Wachel; they were told to fire in time with Wachel and to cut down any skirmishers making a sneak run toward his position. As the Chinese came up the footpath, Wachel was first to open fire on them. He had to be pretty delicate about it. Some of the GIs from 3rd Platoon had been withdrawing along this same path, and he wasn’t sure that they had all cleared. So, in the darkness, it was a problem to make certain that he was firing on an enemy target.
    英格兰部属三名步枪手在瓦彻尔的后侧，他们被告知和瓦彻尔一同行动，并且切断任何迂回瓦彻尔攻击位置的偷袭行为。当中国人开始从小路上冲时，瓦彻尔率先开火。他必须十分小心。3排的其他士兵都从这条路上往上撤，而他不能肯定他们都上来了。特别是在由于晚上。他很难确定是否准确打中敌人目标。
    “The Chinese got to within 25 yards of the BAR. Wachel challenged them, and they opened fire with two tommy guns. Then Wachel let them have a burst. Even so, they did not go flat. Only a few moved at a time, and they came on in short rushes,taking cover behind the rocks or at the far side of the house, but remaining standing. Immediately after the first skirmishers moved up, the Chinese set up a machine gun on the flat ground directly in front of the BAR position. Both Wachel and the riflemen behind him took the gun under fire, but they couldn’t get a clear idea of its position though it was less than 100 yards distant, and it continued to fire away. More of the Chinese worked up to the house and took positions next it, with only the building separating them from Wachel. Grenades began to come in on 1st Platoon’s left flank, but the throwing was inaccurate and the explosions didn’t worry the men. Then WacheI had a sudden idea; he set the house ablaze by firing into the roof. The thatch burned brightly and the scene became well illuminated. Together, the light and the heat drove back the Chinese who had moved in next the house. The machine gun kept firing.
    当中国人离巴祖卡只有25码时，瓦彻尔开火攻击，而敌人也用两支汤姆冲锋枪还击。然后瓦彻尔发射了一枚火箭。然而敌人并没有卧倒，而是持续冲锋，又冲了一段后，找岩石掩护，在离房子较远的距离，则仍然是站着的。第一波散兵攻击一开始，中国人就在巴祖卡前面平坦的地方架起了机枪。瓦彻尔和他后面的步枪手用枪还击，但他们对前方100码以上的目标没有任何概念。只是持续开火。越来越多的中国人冲到房屋边上，并且占据了这个和瓦彻尔只有一墙之隔的有利位置。手榴弹开始投到1排的左侧，只是精度不够还不足以威胁到他们。这时瓦彻尔有了奇想，他点燃了屋顶。屋顶迅速被烧亮并且照亮了周围的情况。光和热驱退了那些冲到房屋边的中国人。机枪又开始持续开火了。
    “In a few minutes, from ground to the rear of the machine gun, the Chinese opened fire with a 60-mm mortar against 1st Platoon’s left flank and the CP position. Very quickly, they unloaded about 20 rounds on this critical area. Lt Stevens, Lt Coleman, Lt Benson, and five enlisted men were hit by the mortar fire. Lt John N. Knight moved one of the Company’s 60 mortars out to the left of the platoon’s line and opened fire on the enemy mortar; for several minutes there was a direct duel between the two pieces, with both crews serving their weapons about equally. Then the Chinese dropped one round right amid the mortar crew. Three men were wounded, and though the tube was not damaged, it ceased fire temporarily. Sitting a little way up the slope from Wachel and the machine gun was Sgt Paul West, with a 3.5 launcher in his lap.
    几分钟内，从开阔地到机枪巢后面，中国人用60毫米迫击炮打击1排的左翼和中部防线。很快他们就在这狭窄的地域投下20发迫击炮弹。斯蒂文中士，克莱曼中士，拜森中士和其他五名士兵立即中弹负伤。约翰 N 莱特中士移来一门连直属的60毫米迫击炮到排阵地的左外侧，开火压制敌人迫击炮。双方炮击位置互相对射了几分钟。随后中国人的一发炮弹准确命中炮位。虽然炮没有被打坏，不过三名炮兵都负伤了，直接导致迫击炮哑火，在瓦彻尔和机枪点后面斜坡上一点点距离是保罗 维斯特中士，他的手边正好有一具3.5寸火箭筒。
    

网友评论(15102007)2013-02-21 18:10

    He had been watching the action, but so far had taken no part in it. So he raised the launcher and let. go one rocket,. His first round hit the Chinese mortar dead on - at 225 yards range. It was the luckiest kind of a fluke shot. That cooled off the enemy force attncking up the draw. When the mortar and crew were knocked out, their machine gun went silent. The pressure was then deflected to an entirely new quarter.”
    他观察了整个过程，但并没有参加战斗。于是他举起火箭筒，发射了一枚火箭弹。第一轮就命中了225码远的中国人迫击炮位。十分幸运的射击。这直接压制了敌人的进攻。随着迫击炮和迫击炮组被敲掉。他们的机枪也沉寂下来。压力缓解了一刻钟。
    l In the defense of Hagaru-ri, Company I, 1st Marine Regiment, knocked out two Hotchkiss machine guns at 150 yards range, using the 3.5 launcher at night. One other gun was knocked out at somewhat shorter range. The crew commented that they had to light> matches to set the sights on the launcher. They said that luminous sights are badly needed for night operations.
    在Hagaru-ri的防御中，陆战1团I连在夜间150码的距离上用3.5寸火箭筒敲掉两挺哈开斯奇重机枪(可能是日制6.5mm三年式重机枪)。还有一挺是在近一些的距离上。火箭筒手评价说，他们只有划亮火柴来照亮火箭筒，而在夜间行动中，这样的亮光是十分需要的。
    
    
    勃朗宁轻机枪
    
    中流砥柱
    在朝鲜一般的步兵战斗中，勃朗宁轻机枪甚至比机枪更多地用来构建火力支撑点，其他步兵武器可在它周围展开行动，部队一致表达了这种看法。对勃朗宁机枪所发挥作用的充分肯定不仅仅来自对连级规模战斗的书面分析报告，将士们同样也有他们自己的评价。他们坦言，勃朗宁机枪是他们行动的主发条，无论是它的移动还是射击，只要有它出现，就会给步兵队伍带来新的活力。
    第八集团军上上下下对勃朗宁轻机枪的赞赏重新肯定了二战欧洲、太平洋战场中使用同一种武器的经验。使这种反映更值得注意的是勃朗宁轻机枪在朝鲜的行动中比在二战中故障率明显要高，原因稍后解释。即使这样，普通步兵对这种自动步枪的信任也丝毫未减。它仍被认为是“不可缺少的”，士兵们一听到它最终将被别的某种武器取代就不寒而栗。他们不敢想象：没了它该怎么办。
    勃朗宁轻机枪之所以被看作是战斗中的中流砥柱，就是因为朝鲜复杂多变的地形状况极大的妨碍了重机枪发挥作用。中共士兵是出色的机枪手，他们使用这种武器比其它武器都要老练。他们的射击持久稳定；虽然他们的机枪型号五花八门，但他们有保养机枪的诀窍；在进攻时，他们携带机枪到非常靠前的地方；此外，由于他们很善于将自己隐蔽在灌木丛和岩壁后面，因此在他们接近目标时仍难以被发现。报告中有很多中共军队的机枪在30—40码的射程内压制我方阵地时仍保持隐蔽的例子。要用我们自己的机枪反击这种火力，通常就需要带着它们到很靠前的地方，在搬运过程中和放置后不久就会发生机枪组人员的意外死亡。我们的机枪组在移动和放置机枪的过程中太容易暴露了。勃朗宁轻机枪是小得多的目标，而且它的单人操作者兼具勇敢和必要的隐蔽性，因此是我军主要的反击手段。
    
    
    
    THE BAR
    THE MAINSTAY
    Under the conditions of the average infantry fight in Korea, the BAR, even more than the machine gun, provides the fire base around which the action of other infantry weapons builds up and the force expresses itself unitedly.
    It is not alone the case that analysis of company operations warrants this appreciation of the weapon; the men also make this estimate of its effectiveness; they state frankly that it is the mainspring of their action, and that wherever the BAR moves and fires, it gives fresh impulse to the rifle line.
    Appreciation of the BAR within Eighth Army therefore reaffirms experience with the same weapon in World War II operations both in the Pacific and in Europe.What makes this reaction all the more noteworthy is that there has been a markedly higher incidence of failure by the BAR in Korean operations than in World War II jighting,for reasons which will be explained later. Even so, there is no diminishing of general infantry confidence in the effectiveness of the automatic rifle. It is still considered “indispensable” and troops shudder at any suggestion that it might ultimately be replaced by some other weapon. They cannot imagine having to get along without it.
    The reason that the BAR is rated as the mainstay of the fire base is because of the greatly modifying influence of the Korean terrain upon the utility of the machine gun. The CCF are good machine gunners; they are more expert in their employment of this weapon than in all else; they are persistent; their guns are of every type under the sun; even so, they have the knack of keeping them going; in the attack, they bring the gun in very close; but they are good at concealment behind brush, thicket, and rock ledge, and therefore the close-in target remains very elusive. The record contains many examples of CCF machine guns bearing on our positions at 30-40 yards range and continuing unseen. To counter this fire with one of our own machine guns usually necessitates bringing it far forward, with consequent sudden death, either in transit or soon after placement. Our MG crews are far more obvious in moving and in setting up. The BAR, which is a lesser target and usually has as its operator an individual who combines boldness with a requisite stealth, is therefore the main counteragent.
    
    
    
    由于迫击炮的射程过远，而手榴弹的投掷距离又很有限，因此勃朗宁轻机枪的火力也就成了对付狙击手冷枪的最有效火力。如果一名勃朗宁轻机枪手表现正常的话，对付在局部出现的某一狙击手，他的射击火力会比五六支步枪所形成的散乱火力有更强的压制效果。
    勃朗宁轻机枪手通常是节约弹药的模范。他们不会神经过敏、乱扣扳机，只有局势真正需要的时候他们才打连发。可能你会觉得这事难以琢磨，但勃朗宁轻机枪在朝鲜的表现一向是最为卓越的，这一点也是有案可查的。
    在防御时，机枪通常被用来覆盖对面的平缓山地或其他对敌人实现其战术意图有利的通道。因为，当敌人展开进攻时，即使最初他们没有利用那一有利地形，但来自那片区域的威胁(敌军的进攻)差不多是经常性的，所以，对机枪的使用也就基本固定在那里了。
    不过，在敌人的进攻面前，我们的防御也不是静止不变的。随着敌军的进攻给我们防线造成的压力的改变，我们会相应的对防线进行收缩和伸展；而为了对付来自一个新的进攻点的威胁，我们也会对人员和装备进行相应的调整和调动。
    在这种战斗形势瞬息万变的惊涛骇浪之中，勃朗宁轻机枪是起到定海神针作用的关键武器。一旦步兵防线在一点被压弯，勃朗宁轻机枪就会被派往那里稳固局势。如果负责正面拦阻的机枪受到敌人通过射击盲区对它进行翼侧合围的威胁，勃朗宁轻机枪的火力常常能封闭机枪的火力死角，拯救机枪组于危难之中。在扫荡敌人的时候，勃朗宁轻机枪是压制散兵坑的主要武器。在防御中需要建立坚强的前哨阵地时，勃朗宁轻机枪也当仁不让。
    BAR fire is also the chief depressant of sniper fire delivered from ranges which are too close in for the mortars and too far out for the grenade. One man with a BAR, if he is the right man, will have a stronger neutralizing effect upon a local sniper-infested area than the random fire of five or six riflemen. Almost invariably, BAR men are exemplary in their conservation of ammunition. They do not have nervous fingers; they sustain fire only when the situation truly demands it. Why this is so is something of a mystery; it is recorded here as fact because the BAR record in Korea is one of consistently strong performance by the operators.
    On defense, the machine gun will usually be sited to cover a draw, the gentlest hill facing, or some other avenue of approach which seems particularly favorable to the enemy purpose. Because, as the attack develops, the threat from that quarter will continue more or less constant, even though the enemy does not initially take advantage of it, the employment of the machine gun is more or less rigid.
    But under attack, the defensive dispositions seldom remain static; the lines contract and expand as the pressure changes; men and weapons are shifted as an excess of danger threatens from a new point. The BAR is the pivotal weapon in this eddying of the tactical situation. Should the rifle line begin to bend at one point, the BARS are sent there to stabilize it. If the machine gun, stopping the enemy frontally, is threatened by flankers circling toward it over dead ground, BAR fire is used to cover the corners and save the gun. During the mop-up, it is the main weapon for neutralizing foxholes; when, on defense, strong out-posting is required, the BAR is also given that assignment.
    
    
    
    增加数量
    在朝鲜的绝大部分步兵和指挥官认为，如果给步兵连配发双倍的勃朗宁轻机枪，同时相应减少M1装备步枪的士兵，那么它的战斗力将大大增强。这么做并不会给该联队的负载增加令人苦恼的负担。做出这种改变的最后一个理由是它会使这个步兵连的攻防力量平衡更加完善。
    AUGMENTATION
    In the view of the great majority of infantry troops and commanders in Korea, the fighting strength of the infantry company would be greatly increased by doubling the number of BARS, while reducing the number of Ml carriers proportionately.This could be done without adding an upsetting burden to the company load. The final argument for the change is that it would make more perfect the balancing of offensive-defensive strength within the infantry company.
    
    
    迫击炮族
    
    我军迫击炮族的整体表现卓越。这几种迫击炮能够充分地服务于战术意图。所有这三种口径——4.2英寸，81mm和60mm的迫击炮都得到了广泛应用。在由朝鲜地形所造成的各种环境中，每一种口径的迫击炮在支援火力的合理规划中都扮演了独特的角色。
    比起二战中我军的军事行动，在朝鲜的步兵战斗中可能更典型化地体现为激烈的迫击炮战。步兵指挥官们了解了更多迫击炮的相关知识，也比以前更有把握发挥迫击炮的全部潜能。
    朝鲜——无穷无尽、层峦叠嶂的崇山峻岭——是迫击炮大显身手的天然舞台。因为中国敌人在夜袭中努力于近距离压制我方阵地，而当我军知晓敌军发动进攻时，敌军散兵线已经隐蔽起来预防我军炮击了，所以迫击炮就被赋予了多种多样的决定性射击任务。
    限制迫击炮在战斗中发挥作用的主要因素通常是弹药不足而非运用生疏。每一级指挥官都能充分了解迫击炮的作用。
    产生这种限制因素的原因已经很清楚了。步兵营，某些时候是个别的步兵连，坚守阵地，要在主抵抗线上与其他部队的分遣队保持联系。这支部队可能在其最近的支援单位左右1500～000码，支援它的野战炮兵前2000～4000码的地方。这支部队的阵地通常位于前线的山顶或山脊，或位于能掩护河床和公路的一夫当关、万夫莫开的隘口。最近的补给站要将补给送上这些山头，也必须进行长途拖运。因此，由于弹药装载量的限制，被投入战场的是威力多少有些小的60mm迫击炮。如果81mm迫击炮也被前送，那么一般情况下它们将会短缺弹药。
    通常60mm迫击炮的阵地位于我军高地反斜面的洼地或山脚下。在防御时，通常在指挥所附近设置迫击炮群。在进攻时，当我军尖兵向地平线前进时，需要在洼地或山沟寻找一处接近地平线的阵地以隐蔽迫击炮。当进攻局部阵地时，中共军队几乎从不使用从后方全力冲击的战术，他们习惯于沿正面或侧翼的缓坡(特别是覆盖着树木和灌木丛的缓坡)发动进攻。因此，对我方连队的伴随迫击炮最主要威胁是敌方迫击炮的火力。
    然而无论将迫击炮配置在作战半径内还是大部队的后方，较重型的迫击炮总能从远距离支援作战。由于朝鲜是个多丘陵的国度，而且敌人缺乏空中支援和强大炮兵，这便是一项实实在在的火力优势。
    对方的炮兵如果给我军的迫击炮带来危险，步枪防线后数百码内也总是有可隐蔽地架起迫击炮的地方。常常出现这种情况：只要地面最适合安置迫击炮，能以水平视角向敌军占据的山头发射炮弹，且在敌军发射子弹的火器的有效射程之外，81mm迫击炮和4.2英寸迫击炮就大胆地架设在空旷地。
    81mm迫击炮，4.2英寸迫击炮，75mm无后坐力炮，有时包括多用途防空武器，在一个炮兵群内从同一位置向一个宽大目标实施集火射击，这种情况也不少见。这是在白天的战斗中为进攻提供支援的火力配置方式。这种紧密协同的合同射击中各武器的激烈竞争往往导致弹药的过度消耗。
    
    
    
    MORTARS
    THE FAMILY
    The general performance by the family of mortars has been excellent. The several mortars serve the tactical need quite adequately. All three -the 4.2, 81-mm, and 60-mm - are given extensive use. Under the conditions imposed by the Korean terrain, each type has its particular role in the development of a balanced program of supporting fires.
    Strong mortar action is perhaps more generally characteristic of the pattern of infantry fighting in Korea than of our operations during World War II. Infantry commanders have greater awareness of the mortar and are more likely to make full use of the mortar potential than previously.
    Korea - being an unending complex of steep hills and sharp-faced ridges -is natural mortar country. Because the Chinese enemy in the night attack endeavors to smother the position at close range and his attacking line is frequently in defilade to our artillery fires by the time the attack is sensed, the mortars are given a wide variety of decisive fire missions.The limiting factor in mortar operation is usually the availability of ammunition rather than a failure at any command level to appreciate what the mortars can do.
    Why this is so is readily seen. The battalions, and sometimes separate infantry companies, hold ground in relative detachment from other components of the MLR.
    The unit may be 1500-3000 yards from its closest support on right and left and 2000-4000 yards forward of the supporting field artillery. Its position will usually be a hilltop or a ridge crest, if it is in the front line, or a defile covering a stream bed or roadway, if it is “blocking.” The hilltops are a long haul from the nearest supply point; the distance can be covered only by human carriers. Consequently, the 60-mm mortars are carried into the ground somewhat light as to ammunition load. If the 81s are also taken forward, in the average situation their ammunition, too, will be in short supply.
    The usual 60-mm position is in a draw on the rearward slope of the friendly hill or at the base of it. On defense, the mortars customarily set up approximate to the CP. In the attack, they seek a position in defilade in a draw or ridge fold somewhere short of the skyline against which the rifle point is advancing. CCF almost never press an attack on the local ground in such way as to make a main impingement on the rear; habitually, they either attack from the front or from the flank via the gentlest slope (particularly if it is covered with tree and underbrush). In consequence, the main threat to the mortars which close with the company is the enemy mortar fire.
    But however the unit is armed as to mortars operating from directly within the perimeter or setting up on the heels of the body in the attack, the heavier mortars are generally able to support the action from a distance. This is one of the very genuine fire advantages deriving from the hilliness of Korea and the enemy’s lack of air support and a competent artillery.
    Within a few hundred yards to rear of the rifle line, there is always ground where the mortars can set up in defilade, if there is any danger from counter battery.Frequently, the situation is such that the 81s and 4.2s set up boldly in the open, wherever the ground is best for emplacing, and fire away in plain sight of the enemy-heid hill, out of practical range of his bullet-firing weapons.
    It is not unusual to see the 81s, 4.2s, 75 recoilless, and sometimes the AA multiple-mount weapons all firing in battery from the same location against one broad target -this in support of the attack during daylight operations. The highly competitive aspects of this combined firing in close juncture tend to develop excessive expenditures.
    严寒中的破损
    “在朝鲜的步兵战术说明”这份文件已经涵盖了这个课题的很多细节。当气温在0℃ 到32℃之间时，迫击炮操作状态良好，没有什么特别严重的问题：地面仍有充分的弹性能缓冲对底盘的冲击力，升降螺丝杆也没有过度松动或磨损。当气温在-10℃到 -30℃之间时，情况就变得严峻了，如果迫击炮长时间以高速率发射，撞针还有特别是底盘的破损率就会使迫击炮报废。除了陆战一师在长津湖战役中的资料，我们在朝鲜的战斗经验中没有广泛的基本资料以进行这种对比。
    长津湖战役是迫击炮长时间(12～14天)在零度以下的环境过度发射的唯一冬季战役。总的来说，各型迫击炮的耐用性在朝鲜冬季战役的过程中经受住了考验。在陆战一师，士兵们并没有抱怨过迫击炮的报废记录；尽管战役结束后，大多数迫击炮不得不整体或部分更换，虽然这一事实提醒我们备用零件的储备是在零度以下开展军事行动的先决条件，将士们依然觉得这并不反映出三种口径迫击炮中的任何一种缺乏耐用性。他们坦承高破损率是严寒条件下的过度发射所造成的，而不是因为武器结构存在什么缺陷。
    BREAKAGE IN EXTREME COLD
    This subject is covered in some detail in the document, “Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea.”During operations in temperatures ranging between 0℃ and 32℃, the mortars stand up well, and there are no extraordinary problems; the ground is still sufficiently yielding to cushion the shock to the base plates, and there is no undue loosening and wearing of the elevating screws. In temperatures ranging between -10℃ and -30℃, this condition appears to alter radically, and if the mortars are fired for prolonged periods at a high rate, the rate of breakage in firing pins and particularly in base plates becomes disabling to operations. Other than the data from the 1st Marine Division during the Chosen Reservoir operation, there is no broad basis from the Korean experience for the making of this comparison.
    This was the only winter campaign wherein the mortars were fired excessively for prolonged periods (12-14 days) under sub-zero conditions. Over-all, the durability of the mortars in all sizes was well attested during the course of Korean winter operations. Troops had no complaint on this score; within the 1st Marine Division; despite the fact that most of the mortars had to be replaced in whole or in part when the operation was completed, the commanders and crews felt that this did not reflect a lack of serviceability in any of the three weapons, though it did warn that a surplus of spare parts was a prerequisite for sub-zero operations. They said frankly that the rate of breakdown was due to excessive firing in extreme cold rather than to any fault in the structure.
    
    
    
    4.2英寸迫击炮
    这种武器在朝鲜的步兵战斗中像驮马一样任劳任怨。没有任何一种更新式的武器被应用于更广泛的用途或在部队中赢得了更多的宠爱。士兵们众口一词地表达了对它的热爱。4.2英寸迫击炮既精确又耐用；它的一次炮击具有和一发105mm炮弹轰击相当的冲击力；在连续执行任务和显著缓解紧急情况方面，它可能比步兵团中其他任何武器作用都大。一大批营长、团长评论到：他们希望看到步兵团里配备双倍的4.2英寸迫击炮，并觉得由此带来的战斗力增长，在任何地形和气候条件下都绝不会仅仅证明增加这点负担是必要的，(它必然会产生更多的战术价值)。在古土里防御战中广泛使用4.2英寸迫击炮之后，刘易斯 普勒上校作了如下评论：真是完美武器。我们有敏捷而训练有素的迫击炮组，他们让八门迫击炮同时开火，我们发现他们可以在第一枚炮弹爆炸之前向空中打出96发炮弹。
    THE 4.2
    This weapon is the workhorse of infantry operations in Korea. None of the
    other relatively new weapons has been put to more general usage or found greater favor among troops. The enthusiasm for it is unanimous. The 4.2 is accurate and sturdy; the round packs as much wallop as a 105-mm shell; for continuity of performance, and visible impact upon an emergency situation, it is valued perhaps more highly than any other weapon within the infantry regiment. A number of battalion and regimental commanders commented that they would like to see twice as many 4.2s within the infantry regiment, and that they felt that the gain in fighting power, under almost any condition of terrain and climate, would more than justify the added burden. This comment was made by Co1 Lewis Puller, after extensive use of the 4.2 in the defense of Koto-ri: “It is a beautiful weapon. With a fast and well-trained crew and with all eight mortars firing, we found it possible to put 96 rounds in the air before the first one burst.”
    
    
    
    81mm迫击炮
    在朝鲜战争的历次战役中，这种迫击炮如特洛伊城的卫兵一般守护着我军阵地。在朝鲜的战斗里，它发射的照明弹在有限的补给消耗殆尽之前效果特别良好。因为一般的连级阵地缺乏60mm照明弹的补给，所以81mm照明弹就要执行比在二战时更多的任务。81mm迫击炮照明弹为抵御夜袭的步兵连提供近距离火力支援时，可能比155mm炮弹更加有用，因为后者制造的光圈覆盖的面积太大，为进攻者提供了某些便利。
    下面这个典型的战报摘录涉及1951年2月进攻440高地时实施81mm迫击炮火力的情况。这支部队是第27团的重火器连。指挥官弗兰克 L. 迪特里希中尉的记述如下：“我们在2月4日16点45分进入阵地，在那一晚并没有开火。在2月5日4点30分，我收到在我们右翼的第35团遭受敌军进攻的消息。为了支援第35团，我们向高地发射了155发炮弹。我们地图上的数据相当精确，弹着误差不超过100码。天亮以后不久，我们开始射击以支援第3营(第27团的第3营正在从左翼沿着山脉走向进攻440高地)。我们不停地向2800—3000码远的目标射击。在那个白天，我们一共打了500发炮弹，用弹药运送车补给了两次，消耗了可载重1吨拖车载弹量的3/4。其中，57发是白磷弹；两次齐射的效果都很糟；还有七八发臭弹。由于校正机损坏，我们也有几次哑火。在这次战斗中， L连的SCR 300电台出了故障；我们改用营里的有线网络，直到另一部无线电台在那里恢复工作。否则，那将是一次理想的射击——尽善尽美。这个炮兵连里有一门炮参与了朝鲜战争爆发以来所有的战役。”
    在这个战例中，81mm迫击炮被用来轰击440高地中央的敌军步兵群，以其火力覆盖沿着山势通向敌军后方的狭窄的石头路。当美军发展攻势时，4.2英寸迫击炮被用来向高地发射烟雾弹。M16半履带式自行高射机枪与81mm迫击炮的发射阵地基本相同，但其活动射角要大得多，可通过修正诸元使其弹着保持在我军先头散兵前约50码。这种高射机枪既可执行4.2英寸迫击炮发射烟雾弹的任务，也可执行81mm迫击炮发射高爆弹的任务
    那天的天气完全适合使用烟雾弹。出现了预期的烟云效果，烟雾停留在山脊上很长时间。步兵需要30分钟掩护冲击距离的烟幕，这一措施对于减弱隐藏在440高地岩壁上的中共军队掩体内的机枪火力很有效果。但在所有武器冲出烟幕之前，这些烟幕只掩护了冲击距离的一小半。这位指挥官谈到这个问题“这都是由于缺乏经验。我们在一开始，甚至在我军尖兵进入合适的位置之前，放了太多的烟雾弹。我信任烟雾弹的使用价值，特别是它在进攻中的使用价值。但这次是我来到这个战区以后第一次用迫击炮发射它。因此，我削减了迫击炮弹药的供应量，结果当需要使用它们的时候，弹药就不敷分配了，甚至在必须完成机动的那段时间也是如此。”
    THE 81-MM
    This mortar has done trojan service throughout the Korean campaign, and its illuminating round was used with particularly good effect during the Korean fighting until the scant supply petered out. It is given relatively more work than during World War II because of the short supply of 60-mm shell in the average company position.For close support of the infantry company withstanding night attack, the 81 mortar illumination is probably better than the 155-mm artillery shell because the circle of light created by the latter often covers too large an area, yielding some advantage to the attacker.
    This typical extract covers operation of the 81s during the attack on Hill 440 in February 1951. The unit was Heavy Weapons Company of the 27th Regiment. The deSCRIPTion is by Lt Frank L. Dietrich, commanding: “We went into position at 1645 on 4 Feb but we did not fire that night. At 0430 on 5 Feb I got word that the 35th Regiment on our right was under attack. We fired 155 rounds against the Hill in support of the 35th. Our map data was almost exact; it came out within less than 100 yards. Shortly after daylight we began firing in support of the battalion (3rd Battalion of 27th Regiment which was attacking Hill 440 along its length from the left flank). We were firing at’ 2800-3000 yards range. During that day, we fired 500 rounds, resupplying twice with carriers, using 3/4 tons with one-ton trailers. Of this amount, 57 rounds were WP; two salvos were altogether bad; seven or eight other rounds failed. We have also had misfires from breakage of the projector that the charge fits on. During the operation we had one radio failure - the SCR 300 in Love Company; we changed over to the battalion wire net until we got another radio up there. Otherwise, it was perfect fire all the way through - right on the button. There is one barrel in the battery which has served all through the Korean campaign.”
    The 81s in this case were employed to fire against the central mass of Hill 440, covering the narrow, stony passages along the heights and leading back to the enemy’s support area. The 4.2s were used to smoke the hill as the American attack developed. The AA quad-50s, firing from approximately the same ground as the 81s traversed over a much wider arc, adjusting so that their fire kept approximately 50 yards ahead of our most forward skirmishers. The artillery was used both to augment the 4.2 in smoking the hill and further the HE missions of the 81s.
    The atmospheric conditions were just right for the use of smoke. The first cloud effects were promising; the smoke held fairly well to the ridge crest. The infantry needed about 30 minutes of smoke to cover the distance with relative immunity to the CCF machine guns firing from bunkers tucked away among 440’s rocky ledges. But they had bounded not more than half the distance before all weapons ran out of smoke. The commander said this about it: “It was all due to lack of practice. We laid the smoke on too heavy in the beginning even before we had moved into the right area.I believe in the use of smoke, particularly in the attack. But this was the first time I’ve used it - with mortars - for screening since I’ve been in the Theater. Consequently the mortars had cut down on the amount they carry for our support, and when called on to use it, they couldn’t apportion it, evenly, according to the time required to work out the maneuver.”
    
    
    建议采取的改进措施：
    为改进81mm迫击炮，使其在步兵团中发挥更大的战术校能，多位指挥官提出了如下意见：
    ?尽一切办法减轻重量，以增强其越野机动性；
    ?改进结构，使长炮管可拆解更换为短炮管，这样就可以在保留强大的近程冲击力的同时减轻负重；
    ?分段铸造底盘，使负重均匀分布；
    ?改进升降螺丝杆的冶炼或设计，升降螺丝杆的损坏和迅速磨损现在是这种武器主要的结构缺陷。
    SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS
    Among the suggestions put forward by various commanders for modifying the 81-mm so as to make it more useful to the infantry regiment there were the following:
    ? Lighten it in “any manner possible” to increase its cross-country mobility.
    ??Build it so that it could be broken down from a long barrel to a short barrel, thus making a lighter pack possible while preserving its heavy punch at the short ranges.
    ? Sectionalize the base plate so that the load can be distributed.
    ??Alter metallurgically or in design the elevating screw, the breaking and rapid wearing of which is now the chief structural weakness in the weapon.
    
    
    
    
    60mm迫击炮
    60mm迫击炮有几种型号的弹药性能不可靠，这种武器在朝鲜的军事行动中所受的主要批评都是因此而起。1951年1月在临津江畔试射60mm照明弹时，第25步兵师发现这种弹药的35%存在缺陷。这些照明弹能飞出炮管，但不能发光。
    11月的会战中，在更寒冷的环境下，陆战1师在古土里和下碣隅里战斗中发射这些照明弹，80%到90%的炮弹照明效果都很糟。
    60mm白磷弹的表现也劣迹斑斑。在报告中，60mm白磷弹比81mm白磷弹出的故障要多。在冬季的军事行动中，即使保守地说，每5发60mm白磷弹中也至少有1发臭弹。
    THE 60-MM
    The unreliability of 60-mm ammunition in several types is the cause of chief criticism of the weapon in Korean operations.
    In test firing of the 60 illuminating shell along the Imjin River in January 1951, the 25th Infantry Division found that the ammunition was approximately 35 percent defective. The round would leave the tube but would not produce a light.
    Firing in combat, under more extreme cold, the 1st Marine Division at Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri got 80 to 90 percent negative results with the same round in the November battle.
    The WP round has also performed spottily; more failures are reported with the 60 than with the 81 WP. It is conservative to say that during winter operations at least one in every five WP 60-mm rounds failed.
    
    
    手榴弹
    
    主要武器之一
    格兰特的部队在维克斯堡战役中偶然发现了手榴弹的价值，与之相似，由于朝鲜的地势，敌军对手榴弹的使用也要求我们用这种武器回敬他们，朝鲜的战斗中手榴弹的重要性在不断增长。几乎毫无例外，所有在朝鲜的战斗中都有手榴弹的使用。与消耗的手榴弹数目相比，美军在朝鲜使用手榴弹的方式与一战或二战中的使用方式别无二致，(毫无进步)。
    因此，我军在训练方面准备不足。在早些时候，对手榴弹和枪榴弹的评价都偏低；极少有投弹专家准备好了去训练他人；在班里，士兵们不知道怎么组织一个投弹组，系统地进行战地投弹；对手榴弹的供给缺乏或根本没有管理，这导致了巨大的浪费。通过从实战检验和失误中学到的经验教训，上述局面已经逐渐改善。
    总之，手榴弹是当前战斗中的主要武器之一，但是我军的训练却从没有预料到这样的情势。不幸的是，从差不多自1918年以来这种武器的训练记录来看，我军练习投弹时几乎把全部精力都用于准备堑壕袭击战和清除障碍物，(而忽略了其他方面)。“既然一个普通美国人都知道怎么扔石头，那么把大量精力投入到手榴弹技术上只是浪费训练时间”，近年来，受到这种理论或多或少的影响，我们继续沿着老路走下去，(缺乏创新)。
    因此，虽然49% 的美国士兵有良好的臂力可用于投掷，我们的投弹战术却在很大程度上只能算是普普通通，尽管到处都有偶尔的出色表现。
    在高低起伏的山地国家，投弹的实际效果与对付一个堑壕体系或加强的灌木篱墙没什么不同。在这种地形下，敌方存在射击盲区，这个区域可以为爆破手提供保护。一个膂力强劲的投弹手可以肃清前方20—35码远的所有地域。当他抬起身体投掷手榴弹的时候，他所在小组的同伴可为他提供掩护。他能通过接力传送的方式得到补给。在手榴弹爆炸的掩护下，这个小组可趁机跃进。这个程序并不复杂，但必须组织好人员去实现它，它成功与否与关键人员的选择联系紧密。在白天进攻顺着山脊延伸的堑壕阵地时，在战术上除了接近敌军防线上最近的缺口之外没什么别的东西。即使这样，我军步兵在山顶的战斗中仍然没有广泛应用这种方法，因为他们中没有人被教授过。仅仅在偶尔的情况下，某个有灵感的下级军官或某个行动坚决的班凭经验实施了这种战术并发现它的确有效。
    在夜间防御中，有效使用手榴弹本来可以在对付中共军队的早期战役中给美军以极大的利益。中国人把自己当成了掷弹兵；他们也幻想：美军被这种武器吓破了胆，手榴弹能严重挫伤美军的士气(这是从十一月的会战中缴获的中共军队秘密文件得知的，这份文件是关于在进攻中的武器使用的，它绝对地陈述了那些看法。敌人的战术完全遵循这些教条也证实了这一点)。但是正如在早先的战斗中一次次地证明的那样，敌人的这两条都错了。中共士兵作为投手臂力孱弱，在身体上并不适合攻击性地使用这种武器。我军士兵曾轻蔑地划线标记中国人的(轻木柄型)手榴弹的投掷距离。
    敌人的这些战术选择，再加上他们缺乏执行它们的天赋，本来可以在随之而来的依靠臂力交锋的战斗中给与我们一项宝贵的优势。要是我军士兵曾准备过这种战斗，为此进行过训练， 了解开始和发展战斗时如何补给，(他们就能够取得这种优势)。然而实际情况却不是这样。的确，对于任何一种武器，如果只对它进行一般地、肤浅地而不是坚强有力、富有想象力的训练，士兵们就会低估它潜在的战斗价值，忽视“未与敌军接触时应节约弹药”的原则，而且，在战斗开始后不能迅速领会如何根据形势使用武器。除非战士们特别接受过投弹教学，他们便不能以投弹手的思维考虑问题。迄今为止在约30年的时间里，陆军低估了系统地进行投弹训练的价值和在每个步兵连里配备数名投弹专家的极度必要性。在朝鲜，我们不得不为这项疏忽付出代价。
    当我军与中共军队交战时，他们从未准备好在近距离内换用不同武器。枪榴弹发射器早早被丢弃。在行进间，士兵们粗心大意地投光了手榴弹。需要在该地重新使用手榴弹时，再教导该连“节约弹药以便发现合适目标时能及时投掷，而不要在空旷地上炸出一声巨响。”已经太迟，不能保证在夜间防御中自始至终都能有效地使用手榴弹了。如何使手榴弹和子弹形成合成火力，士兵们知道得很少或根本不知道。给臂力强劲和活跃的投手分配较多的手榴弹，可能会对该连取得最好的结果有利，但我们没有发现这种情况。所有对手榴弹的使用都是不协调的、随意的。
    未接受过投弹训练的下级军官在夜战中不能认清战术形势，不能根据形势下达使用照明枪榴弹、手榴弹和近距离杀伤弹的命令。因此，他们也就没有急迫地要求上级提供这些弹药。等到士兵们开始了解到这些可能使用的战术手段并临时准备使自己的投弹发挥更大的效力的方法时，数周时间已经过去了。
    从朝鲜战役中得到的主要教训之一是：陆军应当恢复投弹教学，并以和一战时差不多的方式促进士兵在服役期间系统地、明智地掌握这种武器。
    
    
    
    GRENADES
    ONE OF THE MAIN WEAPONS
    As happened with Grant’s troops in the Vicksburg campaign, the hand grenade has become of ever-increasing importance in the Korean fighting because the ground and the enemy’s use of it necessitated a return to this weapon. Practically without exception, all in-fighting in Korea is attended by hand-grenade action. In comparison to the numbers engaged, use of the hand grenade by American troops in Korea is manifold what it was in either World War I or II.
    For this our forces were ill-prepared in point of training; in the early stages, appreciation of the usefulness of the grenade (both hand and rifle) was at a low ebb; there were few specialists at hand who were prepared to coach others; within the squad, men did not know how to organize as a grenade team for the systematic bombing-out of ground; there was little or no control over grenade supply, which resulted in large wastage. That the situation has gradually improved is due to what has been learned through combat trial and error.
    In sum, the grenade is one of the main weapons of the fighting, but training had never anticipated any such condition, Unfortunately, that has been pretty much the training history of this weapon since 1918, when grenade practice, in anticipation of trench-raid operation and the clearing of traverses, was rather thorough. In more recent years, we have proceeded more or less according to the theory that since an average American knows how to throw a rock, it is a waste of training time to devote any large amount of attention to grenade technique.
    In consequence, though approximately 49 percent of American troops have good throwing arms, our grenade tactics are for the most part mediocre, with just here and there an occasional brilliant performance.
    In its practical effects, grenading in uneven hill country is not unlike going against a trench system or a fortified hedgerow. There is dead space which can be used for the bomber’s protection. One strong-armed thrower can clean out, all ground 20-35 yards to his fore. Part of his team can cover him when he rises to throw. He can be kept supplied by relay. Under cover of the explosion, the group can bound ahead. There is nothing complex about this procedure; but men do have to be organized for it, and its success usually hinges around the selection of the key man. In daylight attack against dug-in positions along the ridge crests, there isn’t anything else in tactics which is more likely to close the last gap. Even so, there is no general application of this method by our infantry in the hilltop fighting because none has been taught. Only now and then an inspired junior leader or a determined squad empirically puts it into effect and discovers that it works.
    In night defense, efficient use of the hand (and rifle) grenade would have given American forces a heavy advantage in the early stages of the campaign against CCF. The Chinese fancy themselves to be grenadiers; also, they were suffering from the illusion that American troops were unduly fearful of this weapon and that it had an extremely demoralizing effect upon them, (This is known because of the capture, during the November battle, of a secret, CCF paper on weapons usage in the attack which categorically stated these propositions, and because the tactics pursued followed this instruction absolutely.) But the enemy was mistaken on both counts, as was proved time and again in the early fighting. The CCF were not physically suited to aggressive use of this weapon, being weak-armed throwers. Our troops had toward the Chinese grenade (light potato-masher type) a scorn bordering on contempt.
    The enemy’s election of these tactics, combined with his lack of natural aptitude for them, would have given us a priceless advantage in the arm’s length fighting which followed, had our men been prepared by training and the state of their supply to recognize the opening and exploit it. Such was not, the case. It is true of any weapon that when training is generally of superficial character, instead of being vigorous and imaginative, troops will put a low estimate on the probable fighting value of the weapon, be careless of its conservation when not in contact with the enemy, and, after the fighting starts, will be slow to see how use of the weapon should be applied to the situation. Men in battle cannot think as grenadiers unless they have been specially schooled as grenadiers. For almost 30 years now the Army has discounted the value of systematic grenade training and the pre-eminent worth of having a few grenade specialists in each infantry company. The price for this neglect has been exacted in Korea.
    When our forces began to engage CCF, they were in no wise prepared for the exchange at short range. Rifle-grenade launchers had been thrown away. The troops had carelessly disposed of their hand grenades during the advance. When re-issue was effected on the spot, it was too late to school the company in the efficient use of the grenade in night defense toward the end that the weapon could be conserved for timely use against suitable targets instead of exploded to make noise over relatively empty terrain. The troops knew little or nothing about how to use grenade fire and bullet fire in combination. It was not seen that for the good of the company the best results would ensue if a larger share of grenades were given to the strong-armed and active throwers. All that was done with respect to employment of this weapon was uncoordinated and haphazard.
    Not, having been grenade-trained, junior leaders did not recognize that the tactica1 situation in the night fight was made to order for the illuminating rifle grenade, the hand grenade, and close-range fragmentation bombing of the revealed targets. In consequence they did not press upon higher command any demands for these materials. Weeks passed before men within the squads began to recognize these possibilities and to improvise methods which would give greater effectiveness to their own grenading.
    One of the main lessons of the Korean campaign is that the grenade school should be restored by the Army and used in about, the same way as during World War I to promote systematic and intelligent understanding of the weapon throughout the service.
    
    
    
    寒冷天气时的操作
    在零度以下的战斗中，手榴弹对使用者自身是个非常严重的威胁。因为寒冷，手榴弹的栓销很难拔开，因此在投弹前必须脱下手套。只要握住这些冰冷的金属几秒钟，手指就会冻僵。尽管使用者的握持时间只足以使栓销松动并将手榴弹投出，在多个步兵连中仍因此产生了冻伤。此外，在冬季战斗中，放在开在散兵坑侧面的泥搁架上的手榴弹，很快会从半冻结的地面上吸收潮气因而失效。很多连级军官得出这样一个结论: 由于上述原因，目前的这些手榴弹在零下20℃或更低气温下是无用的。
    COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS
    In sub-zero operations the hand grenade is a source of deadly danger to the user. The pin is hard to extract because of the cold; therefore the mitten must be removed prior to throwing. The cold metal, held in the hand for only a few seconds, will freeze the fingers. Infantry companies took frostbite losses from this cause even though the users held the bomb only long enough to work the pin loose and get the grenade away. Furthermore, in the winter fighting, grenades placed on a dirt shelf cut into the side of the foxhole soon absorbed moisture from the half-frozen ground and became inoperative. Many company officers reached the conclusion that for these reasons the present grenade is useless during in-fighting in temperatures running -20 and lower.
    
    
    
    
    总体效能
    在进行夜间环形防御时，不可能去评估美军投弹对敌军行动的影响有多大。询问参战人员的结果只表明：在一般性的射击中使用了过多的手榴弹，结果当活动目标在近距离出现的危急关头来临时手榴弹就不足了。在近距离战斗中敌军战斗群被我军集中使用的手榴弹明确阻止或摧毁的战例很少，在非常适宜使用手榴弹的情况下发挥领导才能指导士兵们协同使用这种武器的战例则更加罕见。
    在朝鲜，手榴弹并不像在二战时那样广泛地用于扫荡残敌。除了因为敌军的山顶掩体经常在投弹手接近它之前就已被我军的平射武器摧毁，还因为敌军严重缺乏重装备。然而，当步兵别无他法只能依靠直接攻击夺取阵地时，投进敌军掩体枪眼的那些手榴弹的轰鸣通常才是致命一击。
    没有使用枪榴弹的战例。在这项分析涉及的所有军事行动中，我军都没有使用过这种武器，只有我们的敌人中共军队使用过它。在山顶的战斗中，枪榴弹可能会非常有效，交战双方的距离与它的射程正好匹配。可是，我军士兵早早就丢弃了枪榴弹发射器。
    在朝鲜的战斗中，除了严寒中的军事行动，发给部队的爆破型手榴弹大体能够满足战术需要。
    更有经验的士兵们评论道：不管在何种情况下，带锯齿的改进过的蛋形手榴弹在攻防作战中更加实用，只要让一个一般臂力的投手攻击性地使用它就可以了。这个人可以是玩过棒球的或者在高中以后有打橄榄球的相当经验的士兵。一个连队里总有这样的人。他们可以很自然地使用这种武器，而且更有可能击中目标。
    在我们所研究的连级战斗中，都使用了手榴弹，还没有出现美军因己方手榴弹火力伤亡的实例，不论是因为手榴弹过早爆炸还是因为距弹着区太近。
    除严寒天气以外的战斗中，我军手榴弹的哑弹率如此之低令人觉得有些不可思议；而在另一方面，数据显示20%至30%的中共军队的手榴弹因为机械故障或操作不当未能爆炸。
    
    
    
    GENERAL UTILITY
    Under the conditions of the night perimeter defense, it is impossible to make any estimate of the effectiveness of American grenading upon enemy action. Interrogation shows only that perhaps an excessive percentage of grenade is used in genera1 fire, resulting in subsequent shortages during the crisis when there are live targets within close range. There are very few clean-cut examples of an enemy group being stopped or destroyed by concentrated use of the grenade during close action, and even fewer examples of leadership directing coordinated use of the weapon in situations well suited to it.
    
    
    
    The grenade is not used as extensively for mop-up purposes in Korea as during World War II operations because of the enemy’s general lack of heavy installations, other than the hilltop bunkers, which are usually knocked out by flat-trajectory weapons before the grenadiers can close in. However, when the infantry has no recourse but to take the position by direct assault, the sing of a few grenades through the embrasures is the accustomed coup de grace.
    There are no examples of the use of rifle grenades. The weapon was not used during any of the operations included in the analysis, except by the CCF enemy. Rifle grenades could have proved useful in the hilltop fighting; the distance between the engaging sides was usually such that its range was appropriate. But the launchers had been thrown away.
    Except for operations in extreme cold, the issue explosive-type grenade is generally satisfactory to the tactical need in the Korean fighting.
    The more experienced troops comment, however, that the serrated, modified Mills bomb is more practical for both offensive and defensive uses, so long as it is employed offensively by an average strong-armed thrower. This would include individuals who have played baseball or have had considerable experience with passing the football in their high school years or later. There are always such men in a company. They can use the weapon in a natural way and they are more likely to get it on the target.
    In the company actions taken under study, all of which made some use of the hand grenade, there is no instance of an American casualty resulting from our own grenade fire, either in consequence of a premature explosion or from being too close to the impact area.
    The percentage of dud grenades is so small as to be inconsequential except in extreme cold weather; on the other hand, the figures indicate that somewhere between 20 and 30 percent of CCF grenades do not fire because of defects either in the mechanism or in the handling.
    

网友评论(15102007)2013-02-21 18:10

    中共部队的攻击战斗
    S·L·A·Marshall
    
    译者：Light
    第一部：跟据1950年11月Kunu-ri之役中第二步兵师步兵连作战行动之研究
    1、对阵地的攻击
    2、运动模式
    3、行进中射击的使用
    4、目标的特性
    5、使用掩护
    6、受攻下的防御
    7、重视手榴弹
    8、中共军手榴弹战斗的程度
    9、辨识的问题
    10、中共军武器的效果
    11、展开的方法
    12、从战斗中脱离
    13、连级的补给
    14、节约的问题
    15、其他武器
    16、保养的问题
    第二部：根据1950年11月20日至12月10日陆战第一师在古土里、下碣隅里、柳檀里区域作战之研究
    导言
    武器与构工
    纵队中的秩序
    中共军的大目标
    中共军方面的损耗与隐蔽
    前进路线
    中共军的态度
    美军防御阵地的组织
    铁丝网的使用及效果
    照明的使用
    防御的机制
    攻击的机制
    行军要求
    酷寒的影响
    休克与疲乏
    防寒鞋
    酷寒下的武器
    
    
    第一部：跟据1950年11月Kunu-ri之役中第二步兵师步兵连作战行动之研究
    
    1、对阵地的攻击
    在对付第二步兵师各步兵连的各阶段行动中，中共部队没有尝试对各防御阵地进行大包围作战。初步攻击的重点通常是在连阵地的后方。攻击的全部兵力会集中在一个排的阵地上，但偶尔也会涵盖两个排，特别是当这两个排比较靠近的时候。当在突破并巩固阵地后，敌军会继续向下一个山头阵地无防备的侧翼进攻。这是一个大略但非一成不变的模式。在攻击第三十八步兵团F连时，攻击的范围包括了所有的排，并且持续了整晚。在两个小时之内，所有防御的美军步兵排都在强攻之下，而位于稍后方的重兵器排和连部除了受到侧翼的迫炮和重机枪猛烈轰击外，并没有被敌人步兵围攻。敌军并没有排成一长条散兵线来进攻，也没有以连续数波来攻击第二步兵师各连的阵地。攻击线上最多可见60或70名散兵，通常是30至40名。
    
    2、运动模式
    这些敌兵经常是直立着前进，但有时也会弯低。虽然他们偶尔也会冲刺或小跑一段，他们通常还是以步行速度前进。当停下来时，他们并不会利用地形地物匍匐前进。当卧倒时，他们只移动到找到最近的掩蔽物而已。下面是他们在夜间攻击的行动特徵：在攻击发起时，他们并没有将部队全面展开来以涵盖美军排阵地的整个侧面或后方。中共军会找出一条最容易进入阵地的通道，这可能是一条深沟 、一道山洼、或是一条小径。假如防御的一方集中在高地，敌军通常会避开陡峭的山坡而选择比较和缓的山坡进攻。第一个攻击群会直接上来，有时用散得很开散兵线，有时却又排成直排，有时则呈凌乱的队伍。
    
    3、行进中射击的使用
    不论是跑是走，他们几乎总是一成不变地在行进中射击。这是他们火力交锋开始的特色，而且经常发生在开始用机枪和迫击炮轰击之前。不过，这种行进中射击的方法不但错误而且没有什么效果。我们的士兵很少因此伤亡，并且众口一声地说，这种方法不会影响到士气，更不会把我方士兵压制到无法还击。中共军使用这种前进方式的战术目标似乎是想要接近到近战距离，然后在位于50到800码不等距离外的机枪和迫击炮压制防御者的同时，迫近到能使用手榴弹的近距离。在美军阵线火力因弹药耗尽而减弱前，这些攻击波似乎从来不曾尝试过要真正逼近。事实上，找不到有任何一个敌人的攻击部队直接全面突击消灭我们排级以上的部队，使得幸存者落荒而逃的例子。他们并不是靠无比的勇气、狂热、或是快速集中的兵力来攻陷阵地。他们是靠逐步增加兵力和火力对阵地挤迫，并且耐心地等候，当防御者武器人员弹药耗尽时会自然瓦解。
    
    4、目标的特性
    当中共军攻击的前卫遇到防御火力时(通常发生在不到50码的距离)，他们会趴到地上。如果防御火力暂时停止，他们会站起来再度前进，直到又遇到防御火力为止，然后他们会再度趴倒。但是一旦他们决定了一条前进路线，即使战术状况改变让它似乎不再有利，他们仍然不会改变。他们只会在先头部队后面继续前进增援。当他们死伤时，其他人会前进来取代他们的位置。冲锋枪、步枪、和手榴弹是这些先头部队的武器。这些先头部队从不会暴露太多目标给我们的自动武器；我们的机枪或白朗宁自动步枪(BAR)每次最多不过能扫掉4、5个中共士兵。后者和破片手榴弹是我方成功抵御中共部队攻击的基本武器。任何能够在这些中共士兵后方照明的方法都会对他们造成极大影响甚至撤退，有时几乎可说是惊慌失措。
    
    5、使用掩护
    在日间战斗时，这些战斗单位会尝试从壕沟或散兵坑来战斗；当被逐出时，他们会继续使用灌木丛、树木或类似的掩护。夜间攻击有明亮的月光时，他们会善加利用大石头、悬崖、以及长岭投射出的阴影。任何能够将他们日间战斗的掩护烧掉，或是在夜间照明他们的方法都能大大降低这些隐密战术的功效。第二步兵师的步兵在攻击时并没有配备火焰喷射器，也缺乏信号照明弹或大型照明弹等弹药。但在三个不同的场合中，我方的枪火无意间在敌人攻击线的后方引燃了野火，结果是出奇的好。其中一个状况中，敌军停止攻击，转而尝试扑灭野火达一个半小时之久；在这期间，我方机枪打死数十中共士兵。
    
    6、受攻下的防御
    当被我方防御火力钉住不能动弹时，敌人的攻击部队仍然会利用我方火力暂时减弱或停止的空档突进；这些火力空档的原因包括了人员伤亡、弹药耗尽、机枪或自动步枪故障等等。但是他们只会在我们部队不得不开始撤出阵地的时候才会全速突进。
    第二步兵师于Kunu-ri北方在受攻下防御的战斗记录相当良好；在16个战斗行动经过仔细分析的连中，只有一个排级单位不是因为弹药耗尽或类似的理由而后退。在这个例外中，这个排缺少领导者 ，也没有沿攻击来的方向巩固阵地；他们被割裂并且一个班接一个班地吃掉。即使如此，他们仍然把伤者撤出，而最后撤退时只剩下11个人没有受伤。
    第九步兵团B连在11月25日上午10点钟于219高地山脚下和一股优势敌军开始交战时有126人。25小时后当撤退令下来时，它仍然坚守着阵地并且持续战斗中，但是只剩下34人还能行动，其中还有不少人身负轻伤，都是手榴弹破片引起的。这不是特别的例子，而是第二步兵师各步兵连典型的作为。
    
    7、重视手榴弹
    在一个布局良好的地区性战斗中，敌军似乎时常喜欢以手榴弹兵为先锋，有时候这些士兵除了手榴弹外并不携带其他任何武器。手榴弹会用绑在腰间的一个布袋装着。他们大量使用手榴弹，当手榴弹耗尽时，我们士兵会看到他们似乎是空着手向我们阵线前进。在手榴弹攻击时，极少有步枪火力的支援，但有一大堆冲锋枪兵夹在手榴弹兵中前进。在更后方，有一到三挺机枪(但在攻击连阵地时不会超过此数)扫射防御阵地的高处和其他地区。就比例来看，我们最严重的伤亡看来是由准确的机枪火力造成的。在以步枪兵打头阵的少数攻击中，他们在接近手榴弹距离时会让手榴弹兵快速地上前穿过步枪兵行伍，以便使用手榴弹。不是所有的手榴弹兵都有步枪，但是大部份步枪兵都带了至少5枚小型木杆震撼式手榴弹 。(这些中共士兵都没有刺刀)他们所有的近战战术似乎都在依赖使用手榴弹来迫使联军部队退出阵地。虽然中共士兵被教育说美军士兵特别无法承受手榴弹攻击，但实际上手榴弹攻击对联军部队的效果不彰。我们许多受到中共军持续数小时手榴弹攻击的兵士仍然对他们的手榴弹表示轻蔑。主要有两个因素造成他们这种态度：
    •1.中共士兵投掷手榴弹不远且不准确。
    •2.中共手榴弹本身杀伤力不强。
    
    关于第一点，在仔细研究一堆手榴弹战斗的案例后似乎找不出特别的例外。中共士兵使用低手甩动的方式投掷手榴弹，在平地上最远距离不会超过20至25码，在陡峭的山坡向上投掷时距离更短。在一次山头战斗中，我方部队据守山顶，中共部队在下方20码处，他们的手榴弹兵花了一小时尝试将手榴弹投过我们的壕壁，都没有成功。
    在另外一次战斗中，我方有7个士兵紧围着一个小土堆防守，在一个半小时内，中共军于15码的距离外对他们投了50到60颗手榴弹，其中30到40颗被我们的人踢掉或丢回去，剩下的在他们防御位置中爆炸。
    在另一次排战斗中，有30人受到手榴弹破片的伤害，但没有人严重到无法继续进行战斗。因为中共手榴弹而受伤的案例在这些连中比比皆是，但是致命的案例少之又少。似乎只有当身体或头部跟爆炸的手榴弹几乎直接接触时，才会引起重大伤害。
    我们部队已经习于中共手榴弹的效果，也因此它们不会有损我们的士气。当在防御中我方的手榴弹供应充足时，中共军的手榴弹兵不是被消灭就是被击退。有些步兵根本没有手榴弹。在许多案例中，战斗开始后要再补给(手榴弹)不是完全不可能就是极度困难。但是当手榴弹可以充分供应，而且防御者能有效地使用时，都可以挡住敌人的攻击。
    
    8、中共军手榴弹战斗的程度
    保持手榴弹在交战时供应无缺似乎是中共军步兵系统的主要目标之一。在所有研究过的近接战斗案例中，除非是小群部队在毫无准备的状况下撞在一起，要不然都找不到中共战斗单位耗尽手榴弹的例子。另一方面，如果在毫无准备下做近距离接战，他们似乎无法适应快速地使用这个非常有价值的近战武器。
    这里有两个例子，一个发生在第二十三步兵团第一营的夜间战斗中，另一个发生在第九步兵团第二营的日间战斗中。第二十三团的这个部队当时正在宿营，没有布置好防线。一大堆配备了手榴弹和步枪的敌兵渗透入它的营地，但是却就地找掩护然后就不动作，并没有趁机攻击我方。当第一营组成散兵线并且使用手榴弹和步枪扫荡整个营地的时候，这些渗透者仍然不动作，在这个战斗阶段这些中共军甚至连一颗手榴弹都没有用上。在第二个例子里，有约120名中共部队在大白天走入第九步兵团G连据守的隘路中。这些中共士兵完全没有使用身上的手榴弹，经过数分钟的步枪交火后，他们或是被杀或是被俘。中共部队在手榴弹战斗中只使用小型(木杆)震撼式手榴弹，即使他们有其他类型的手榴弹，也没有被看到使用过。
    
    9、辨识的问题
    从各个不同的战斗行动概括看来，我们步兵在阵地中能确认是面对敌军的中共部队的距离，在夜间是15到50码，在日间是50至200码。部份的原因(但只是一部份)是敌人在前进的时候很少使用掩护火力，另一部份是在战场上辨别敌友的困难。其他限制了在较远距离外辨识敌我的因素是：
    •1.(我方)极少在行进时使用侧卫。
    •2.在运动时尖兵和主要部队间距离不足，特别是在上山路段。
    •3.没有在阵地或部队主体外布置警戒哨。
    •4.缺乏像是绊脚线等可以制造警讯提供辨识的装置。
    •5.连与连间的平行通讯不良。当无线电收讯不佳时，各连并没有使用传令互相通报状况。结果就是，即使隔壁连已经全面交战1至3个小时之久，许多连仍然在毫无戒备下被中共军逐一突袭。这种状况也发生在许多排级单位上。
    •6.缺少强力而持续的巡逻。
    
    
    10、中共军武器的效果
    在Kunu-ri战斗中，中共军武器对我方步兵的效果可以从伤亡率、对士气的影响、以及对阵地的压制来衡量。它们的效率评估如下：
    •1.轻机枪
    •2.迫击炮(通常60mm)
    •3.手榴弹
    •4.冲锋枪(通常是汤姆生冲锋枪)
    •5.步枪
    
    中共军的机枪火力一直很准确并且很持续。他们会持续发射机枪直到被摧毁，也会利用掩护把机枪尽量往前推进到近距离。他们似乎没有很多轻机枪；在攻击一个连阵地的时候几乎没有使用超过两挺机枪的例子。它们的战术目的似乎是在提供压制防御者的火力。在一般状况下，迫击炮并没有集中使用。在某些特例中，两或三门迫击炮会集中火力来使用。通常中共部队只使用一门迫击炮，而且是在攻击已经开始一阵子后。迫击炮火分两类：一是一般区域性的压制，一是集中在主要设施，例如防御的机枪、迫击炮阵地、指挥所、以及补给点。他们的区域压制火力并不猛烈，我方部队也并不太在意。但在集中射击方面，他们的迫击炮火都能很快而准确地命中特定目标，这似乎意味着他们发展出了能够在战斗中做快速三角定位的方法，但也有可能是他们已经在周遭潜伏一段时间并且测好距离，所以在战斗时可以很快地根据火光来定位。在步枪火力方面，他们的冲锋枪火力不论是在日间或夜间战斗中都不是十分准确，而且他们常常在过远的距离就开始使用冲锋枪。但是，中共部队拥有许多汤姆生冲锋枪，这可以从Kunu-ri战斗的报告和从他们的死者和俘虏身上搜集到的数目看出。
    中共部队在Kunu-ri战斗中仅使用少数火箭筒，但是目标通常不是步兵阵地，而是支援的装甲单位。在这些少数的例子中，他们接近到极近的距离(20-40码)来攻击我方坦克，而他们的瞄准非常准确。而在我方的坦克能在比较远的距离和这些反装甲单位交火的情形下，他们通常会退却逃跑。至于FA是否能有同样的效果则不确定，没有任何FA近接战斗的例子可供分析，不过由于双方通常都太接近，FA恐怕也无法发挥功效。
    
    11、展开的方法
    在向交战区域前进的时候，中共部队的队伍似乎都选择最容易前进的路线主要补给线、补给小径、河床、以及山谷。当沿着高处防御时，他们并不经由脊线前进。当他们遇到强硬抵抗时，他们的战斗单位一个接一个地抽离，直到最后整个战术队伍都消失掉。因此，(我的)初步意见是，中共部队之所以能够成功地攻击这么多我们后方的指挥所、炮兵阵地、以及其他敏感而脆弱的单位，主要是因为运气好而非小心仔细的侦察与计画。我们部队的支援单位特别喜欢集中在补给路线和交叉口处；如果敌人沿着最自然的路径前进，他们几乎不可能失之交臂。
    
    12、从战斗中脱离
    在Kunu-ri战斗初期，中共部队都尽可能地在黎明的时候从战斗中脱离。脱离战斗后，在早晨大约7 点钟时候，他们会从一个大锅中进早点。这时，在步枪掩护下的担架队会到前线收容伤亡。救护站设在部队进餐的集结点，死者就浅浅地埋在附近。在这个时段，中共部队似乎极少采取对四周的警戒。他们的士兵通常会处于松懈的状态，而此时如果碰上我方部队的话，他们似乎无心战斗。
    
    13、连级的补给
    在Kunu-ri战斗期间，我方步兵通常携带约90至120发的卡宾枪弹药，或是两个子弹带的M1 弹药，以及0至2颗手榴弹。很少连的士兵自己身上有携带粮食。大部份连里面，士兵会携带一个睡袋和轻背包。在这种重量负荷下，当行军直线距离超过3.5英里后(根据在当地的地形，可能实际上超过7英里)，脱队问题会造成战术上无法掌控的凌乱队形。
    
    14、节约的问题
    在作战中，特别是在夜间，要如何重装卡宾枪弹匣与M1步枪弹夹是个蛮严重的问题。大部份步兵连在开始接战的阶段，即使没有多少目标，仍然会有过度消耗自动武器弹药的情况。但另一方面，各连却都能小心节省使用手榴弹，可能是因为手榴弹本来就短缺。不过有些步兵连还是能够维持控制士兵的步枪火力，直到有良好目标出现为止。一般情况下，在山头的战斗中，当中共部队逼近后，自动武器对付敌人散兵几乎没有什么效果。中共士兵会利用岩石和突出的岩架做掩护，我方部队必须冒着身影在天空背景透光的危险才能对他们射击。但尽管如此，在许多例子中，白朗宁自动步枪有效的使用在是防御成功的重要因素。在敌人逼近并采取掩护后，手榴弹成为近接防御战斗中最有价值的武器。但是由于手榴弹的短缺，只能使用自动火力来对付近距离目标，不但没有效果，更进一步耗费了弹药。
    作战状况主要就是这样，当伤亡增加后，持续抵抗的可能性也渐渐减低。几乎所有的阵地在交战还不到三分之二的时候就已经用完手榴弹了。在第九步兵团B连战斗快要结束的时候，连长带着一个排的部份士兵，在晨光中站起来用石块和口粮罐头向中共部队投掷，以让其余部队可以撤退。这些投掷手死了5名，伤了2名，可见当时情况的危急。在另外4个战斗中，当弹药耗尽时，我方士兵用上拳头和枪托来对付逼近的中共部队。中共士兵在这种型态的战斗中表现并不佳。
    
    15、其他武器
    中共部队在Kunu-ri地区没有使用任何炮兵。除此之外只看见过使用一次新型的小火箭弹，不过这不是由火箭筒发射的。它被用在对付第九步兵团B连的阵地，从战壕前沿弹起，在后面的防壁爆炸，效果中等。
    
    16、保养的问题
    携带卡宾枪的士兵报告发生了许多武器操作上的问题，不发弹、卡弹、操作不顺畅等等。有一部份的问题是因为保养不良引起，许多单位都缺少润滑油。但是，在寒冷的天气下，过多的润滑油也会造成问题，这些卡宾枪必须要先加热让冻结的润滑油融化，才能行半自动或全自动射击。通常以单发射击 10至15发子弹结束后就可以运作如常。M1半自动步枪的性能一如预期，极少有操作上的问题。
    调查显示，习惯在可能接战前检查武器并试射数发的几个步兵连在战斗中武器的操作情形最为良好。
    
    第二部：根据1950年11月20日至12月10日陆战第一师在古土里、下碣隅里、柳檀里区域作战之研究
    
    导言
    对1950年11月20日至12月10日陆战第一师在古土里、下碣隅里、柳檀里地域与中共部队作战行动的详细研究验证了《中共部队的攻击战斗》(ORO-S-26,EUSAK，报告日期1951年1月5日)中提出的所有主要的结论。不过在Kunu-ri的战斗中这很少发生。我们的士兵很少配备超过两颗手榴弹，这是根据1950年11月24日至12月1日期间美国第二步兵师在Kunu-ri地区与中共部队作战的经验来对中共部队的战术方法与武器使用的评估分析。
    在中共部队对抗陆战第一师的过程中，他们从来没有成功地包围并穿插割裂过该师任何主要单位，并且除了一些外围阵地外，也从没有突破攻占过任何主要防御阵地。所以，他们的战斗单位并不如和攻击第二步兵师在Chongchon河东岸时一样地全面展开，因此能够观察中共部队在全然多变战况下作战的特点的机会就比较少。
    由于第二步兵师在Kunu-ri周遭与陆战第一师在古土里周遭战斗时的环境状况完全不同，不但地形不类似，而且我方部队和中共方面各部队始初的布阵也不同，要把这两个作战行动作一个全面比较并不恰当。在(本报告中)如果有做比较的地方，完全是为了要强调衬比中共部队的特徵与能力。
    
    武器与构工
    整体来说，跟陆战第一师交战的中共师团的装备并未比在同时期与第二步兵师交战的中共部队好多少。主要的差别在于跟陆战第一师交战的中共诸师团似乎在粮食和弹药补给上极度短缺。在中共部队与第二步兵师的战斗行动中，当共军自固定位置开火时，机枪手和手榴弹兵似乎从来就没有缺过弹药，而且可以看到在火线上的部队后面有长串的士兵搬运弹药。在长津湖区作战的中共部队则正好相反，参与战斗的中共师团似乎很快就耗尽所携带的弹药，由于没有再补给，他们的作战效率就此消失。当他们耗尽弹药撤退时，其他新的师团会移上前来递补阵线，而这些补给耗尽的师团则从前线消失。指挥的陆战师长奥立佛·P·史密斯少将曾经记述到这个现象，而且也从许多团、营长口中证实。战俘口供显示这些部队中大部份是在11月13至16日间渡过鸭绿江，正好跟陆战第一师开始从基地港口向北前进大约同时。在渡江后，他们以全速向作战地区急行军前进。看来他们似乎只想要赶快将部队向前移动，即时到达陆战第一师的纵队附近，以便在陆战第一师把大部份兵力用在攻击长津湖区时切断该师的主要补给线；也因此这些中共部队对于诸如有效补给等重要课题方面并没有妥善安排。跟这个假设吻合，并且陆战第一师下属各单位都注意到的是，他们的中共敌军都是一成不变地以单线攻击，没有使用其他不同的战术。这不但在师级单位如此，甚至到营级或连级都一样。每个单位被赋予一个选定的任务，他们似乎都在剩余战力许可之下尽力达成这个任务。但当他们被击退无法达成任务时，中共部队会显得茫然毫无计画，无法重新组织起来转移攻取其他可能的目标。士兵们会从战线上撤退，涣散地坐在原野间。即使如此，战俘的口供中显示出了中共士兵一般的智力不低。不单只在军官之间，就连一般受审讯的士兵也都能说出他的连、团、师、军团、以及集团军的番号，并且知道上级单位的计画与意图。陆战第一师也就是从被俘的中共士兵口中首先听到中共部队计画“在该师的两个团向北前进后”，以主力切断该师的主要补给线。这项情报是当这两个团还在北进途中获得的。但是真正特别让人困惑的是这些战俘没有阶级的概念，这些战俘会称自己是“士兵”或“军官”，但说不出自己的军阶。如果中共部队中有士官的话，他们也无法表明自己的阶级。
    在陆战第一师的作战中，有六次战斗时攻击的中共部队有轻型炮兵的支援。每一次所使用的炮数不超过二或三门，发炮数也是寥寥数发。总体来说，敌人攻击的火力依靠自动武器，主要是.30口径的机关枪(包括路易斯轻机枪与哈乞克斯机枪)；冲锋枪、步枪、及轻型木杆手榴弹则是中共步兵的主要武器，这个现象不论是在对陆战第一师周边防线的攻击或是他们自己阵地的防御战斗时都一样。除了曾经在手榴弹上绑上引爆索作成诡雷外，在这些武器的使用上并没有什么出奇的新意。这些诡雷被安装在阻绝道路的路障上，长长的引爆索则拉回到路旁的散兵坑中。这些诡雷时常失败，因为在散兵坑中的中共士兵往往在有机会引爆诡雷前就已经被杀。有一次更是因为手榴弹的安全针冻住而失败。在防御的时候，这些中共部队会在山头阵地建构防弹掩体，以双重粗树干绑在一起做墙，顶上以木头做盖，再加上两尺厚的泥土石块为顶。这些工事可以抵御空中攻击，除非是火箭直接命中。他们用骡马将这些建材运到高处，当中共部队在周遭地区展开后，骡马会被移到远离(美军)主要补给线的荒野地区。当美国空军开始扫荡周遭地区时，几乎看不到什么骡马。当中共部队在古土里以北及下碣隅里以西切断陆战第一师的主要补给线，以便孤立并消灭该师时，他们用上了大量的路障，以及少数的爆破手段。沿着(美军)撤退路线，在一些最敏感的位置上，炸药被有效地用来切断交通。最好的例子莫过于炸断位于古土里以南、1081高地山脚不远处横过发电厂水管的工作桥。这座桥位于一个落差1500英尺的峡谷之上，如果不能修复的话，任何车辆都不能通过向南撤退。该师早已预料到这个问题，并且准备在不浪费纵队的宝贵时间下尽快架桥通过这个空隙；一座预制桥早就由空军运来跟纵队一起行动。即使如此，中共部队还是以少量的炸药造成了最大的阻碍。如果敌军有足够的炸药的话，整个路线上像这样的机会比比皆是。整个主要补给线就像是在山壁上开凿的狭窄栈道一样，只要造成几处大山崩，它就会完全毁损无法通行。但是，虽然中共部队已经盘据这个地区超过一个星期之久，他们并没有尝试这类大规模的炸山行动。在此处，以及更北面位于下碣隅里和柳潭里之间的路段上，中共军手上的炸药似乎只够用在几处可以很容易地以少量炸药爆破的小型桥梁上。一般实体路障是由石块、泥土、及杂物堆成平均2英尺半到3英尺半高度，并不太坚牢的阻绝障碍。大约半数路障地点的侧翼有火力掩护通常是在侧面岭线上布阵的一、两挺机枪，或者是迫击炮。在没有掩护的路障地点，即使侧面高地还没有被(我方)前卫完全扫清，在步兵纵队先头的推土机通常就已经把这些障碍物推开一旁了。不过，还是有些路障地点被由侧旁高地射来的自动武器火力，以及逼近到轻武器有效距离的狙击手强力而持续地封锁的例子。这时车辆会被击毁，纵队停顿，并且沿着路边演变成一场人员和物资的持续消耗战，直到中共部队被(我方)优势火力与运动压制住为止。
    
    纵队中的秩序
    在有关这个话题的事例中，德来斯戴尔特遣队(TF Drysdale)11 月 27 日夜间 在古土里与下碣隅里间路段的经验会是最有教育性的例子。这支小型的特遣队由 英国突击队、一个陆战连、以及一个步兵连组成。他们在收到中共部队已经切断 通往下碣隅里的主要补给线的报告后由古土里向北出发，尝试打通补给路径。它先扫清了古土里以北紧邻主要补给线的脊线，然后乘坐卡车前进。一支补给车队 原本预计要接受它的保护，紧接它的后方前进。在特遣队的最前端有一个中型战 车排，最后端在卡车纵队之后也有另一个战车排担任后卫。 这支纵队在古土里山岭线以北开阔地区撞入了中共部队(估计约3营兵力弱)的伏击，它的溃散主要得归罪于其中装甲部队的运用态度。虽然规模较小， 但是在这个事例中，行动与反应等等几乎就跟三天后在 Kunu-ri 与 Sunchon 路 段之间发生在第二步兵师纵队上的不幸遭遇如出一辙。当那些装甲薄弱的车辆进入敌人火力走廊时的安全完全依赖着运动的快速程度时，坦克车却在中共部队 开始对它们厚重装甲不痛不痒地射击时停下来还击。这造成了整个车队的停顿， 并且让卡车部队被从侧面射来的火网痛击却无法反击。跟坦克部队的多次争论与恳求都没有什么效果，他们并不受特遣队指挥官的节制，而且他们对于自己的行动造成后方车队的损伤的情形也无动于衷。 为了避免整个特遣队被摧毁，步兵单位的军官们(包括一名空军前进观测官)不得不起而干涉战车部队的行动，要求他们不要还击而继续前进。在车队最后方的人根本搞不清楚发生了什么事，更不知道引起整个车队瘫痪的原因并不是中共军的炮火，反而是自己的坦克部队。最后，特遣队中大约有半数脱身，也丧失了约50% 的车辆；补给车队全军覆没，人员不是伤亡就是被俘；引起同伴这场大灾难 的战车部队却安然脱身，毫发无伤。
    那些能看到这支小小特遣队遭遇伏击与溃败全貌的人都同意，失败的主因不在于中共军炮火的效果，而是在于战车部队自身缺乏管制，它与后随的卡车部队间缺乏通信，以及坦克部队不了解他们打打停停的战术对于后面车队造成的严重后果 。这对于美军装甲部队与摩托化部队在陆上共同行动来说是个相当新的问题。它的共通点可以从德来斯戴尔特遣队和第二步兵师纵队的相同经验中看出。它们也许应该被更进一步地仔细研究一番，因为从中可以发掘出许多重要的教训。而且，只要敌人继续采取横过后方切断撤退路线的战术，这个情形就可能再度发生。很明显地可以看出的是，除非能够仔细地评估这个问题，并且订定果断的标准作战 计画来确保纵队中战术上的整体行动，战车部队的存在对于一支经由狭窄道路通过敌方控制区域的摩托化纵队并不见得能保证有额外的保护作用，它反而可能增加了纵队的脆弱性。在机动性是安全前提的行动中，原本以为是个防盾的单位却拖累了整个部队的运动， 在第二师的事例中，装甲单位散布在整个纵队之中。德来斯戴尔特遣队中则是用来掩护纵队的前头和尾端。由于两者在开始行动前都没有事先确认管制与通信的方法，结果也是同样地凄惨。
    
    中共军的大目标
    虽然在陆战第一师的整体行动中，德来斯戴尔特遣队算不上非常重要，但是由于它是中共军在对陆战第一师攻击中根据其整体目标获致战术上区域性成功的一个例子，因此我们特别强调德来斯戴尔特遣队的经验。在这个例子中，就如同中共军在Kunu-ri以南攻击第二步兵师的行动一样，敌军的主要目的在于诱使我方攻击兵力作最大限度的延伸，然后切断主要补给线，当主力部队开始对其后方的压力做出反应的时候，再以包围的态势摧毁主力部队。陆战第一师防止了这个事态的发生。陆战第一师不论在攻击或是防御的行动中，总是以最大的努力保持阵线的稳固，这包括了它最初北上长津湖区与西向柳潭里的攻击，以及后来向南撤到真兴里的行动。德来斯戴尔特遣队的不幸在于它受命打通从古土里到下碣隅里间的主要补给线；在此事件后，虽然中共军切断了古土里与下碣隅里(陆战第一师师部)间，以及下碣隅里与柳潭里(第五团和第七团作战区域)间的主要补给线，陆战第一师不曾再尝试以兵力不足的部队打通补给线。它暂时接受了这个状况。在此后陆战第一师各单位以要塞的观念来防御自己的阵地，但是也采取必要的反击行动来打乱中共军的阵脚，并且不轻易地让中共军不付出代价就取得寸土。实际上，陆战第一师的纵队等于是在敌人控制区域中以一连串的坚强据点所构成的。对于这些据点的补给与伤患的撤退都是由空中进行，飞机跑道的建构早在中共军开始在长津湖区现身之前就已经紧锣密鼓地进行当中。正如本文后面会再度讨论的，在它的四个主要据点中柳潭里、下碣隅里、古土里、真兴里陆战第一师极度强调(防御)组织的深度以及地区中各部队的整体性；有时甚至为了保持阵线较大的严密性而把紧邻的高地弃之不顾，任其落入中共军手中。这样的抉择后来证明收获极大，并且没有引起我方太大的损失。中共军在对这些坚强据点的持续攻击中损失惨重。在这四个区域中发生的都一样，随着时间的流逝，中共军的攻击从开始时极度猛烈，强度逐渐地减弱，直到最后他们再也受不了，从前线撤退；这时虽然他们人数仍然还有许多，并且在白天可以看到四散在原野和山岭间，他们却显得十分被动消极，也没有持续有组织的攻击行动。坚决果断的防御影响中共军攻击士气的效果可以从陆战第七团F连令人惊异的例子中看出。F连独力据守从下碣隅里的师部到柳潭里的第五团和第七团所在地之间的一个隘口，完全被孤立在阵地之中，守了五天五夜。在这段期间，这个连被大约两个营的中共军重重包围。第一晚，他们的阵地遭到猛攻并有一角被突破，但是在天明前又重新夺回。第二晚时，敌军以和前晚约略相同的路线及兵力攻击，也再度被击退。第三晚，虽然F连已经有许多伤亡，但是中共军的攻击也显得软弱无力。接下来两天中，虽然在F连阵地的目视距离内可以看到有大量中共军的活动，但是却没有采取任何攻击行动。到了第五天早上，第七团的一个营前来援救F连，但在离F连不到1000码处遇到中共军强烈的抵抗而停了下来，此时F连虽然已经死守阵地5天，却仍然士气高昂，他们用无线电跟该营联络，准备主动派出一支巡逻队替他们领路。这个例子并不是罕有的特例，这是充斥在陆战第一师战斗行动中的典型精神。“我们一直觉得是占了上风，并且当敌人想要打上一仗时我们总能将其痛殴一顿。”史密斯将军谈到其部队的行动时说道。从陆战第一师主要作战地区各连和各排行动的仔细分析中，以及从火线上所看到中共军的损失与反应中，都可以支持他的看法。就他们所见所想而言，(陆战第一师的士兵)相信他们在各场战斗中都是胜利者，他们自信是主要凭着自身的战斗力而获致这样的结果。他们对那些对于他们行动嗤之以鼻的新闻报导感到愤慨 ，这些报导天马行空地推论说由于陆战第一师在敌人控制地区过度延伸，因此不得不由其他非陆战队的单位 施以援手才能逃脱。在记录上再加这一条就足够了：自第五团和第七团从西面的柳潭里撤出并接近位于长津湖南端的下碣隅里的师部防御阵地开始，陆战第一师对于其本身抵御更大中共军压力的状况与能力感到十分有信心。从那时之后，主要的问题是在于如何能保存实力，并以最少人员和车辆的损失驱离南面主要补给线沿路岭线上的中共军。
    
    中共军方面的损耗与隐蔽
    除了那些想以直接攻击摧毁陆战第一师在柳潭里(两个团级战斗群)，下碣隅里(一个加强营)，和古土里(一个加强营)的阵地，自身反而被击溃或摧毁的单位外，中共军自11月27日至12月2日期间的努力集中于将其他单位沿着这些战斗焦点间的走廊部署展开，这些单位虽然位于各防御阵地步兵武器的射程之外，但却不是没有遭到骚扰。从真兴里到古土里的距离是12英里，从古土里到下碣隅里9英里，从下碣隅里到柳潭里13英里，被飞机或是路上巡逻队发现的目标(中共军)通常都位于部署在这四个防御据点其中一或两个地方的陆战师炮兵射程之内；另外，在大部份时间里天气状况也有利于空中攻击。在作战的早期阶段，陆战第一师的参二 根据老百姓的报告结果，早已认为中共军是以相当大的纵队队形穿过原野移动，而这些纵队正躲藏在村庄以及在古土里与柳潭里地区常见的矿坑之中；他们认为敌军大部份都是以这种方式在白天躲藏起来，而不是像有些人认为的在高地挖了掩体隐蔽。这些意见都转发到(陆战队)航空队手上。起初航空队由于空中侦照都看不到在村庄中有任何部队活动而对这项情报研判存疑，但是从老百姓得来的情报源原不断，并且有北韩老百姓请求(陆战队)指挥官向村庄进攻以赶走中共侵略者。
    在主补给线被切断后，(美军)才开始对紧贴道路以及荒野间的村庄大规模轰炸。结果完全证实了当地老百姓的说法。当炸弹开始落在茅舍间时，中共士兵从房舍中四散涌出。但是空中观察员发现，这些士兵对于村庄房舍十分依赖，当飞机投完炸弹，甚至还没完全离开这个区域，剩下的中共士兵就又跑回半毁的房舍中。他们人数非常集中，据估计一整个营的兵力可以挤入大约20间的小茅舍里。在原野间活动的陆战队巡逻队也有相同的报告。他们发现敌人的主要部队都是躲藏在村庄里，只在前方山顶工事部署少数警戒兵力。据称空中攻击炸坍了一个矿坑，估计里面大概容纳了中共军一个团的大部份兵力。从巡逻队及各步兵连攻击的目击，再加上那些被俘后又被解救的美军战俘的报告中，可以证实中共军在整个作战期间是很有系统地利用这地区各种看来正常的人造掩蔽处。
    至于这种利用村庄做为大白天隐蔽处的手段是仅仅发生在此处，亦或是由于敌军部队没有毯子、厚重大衣，而且只穿了网球鞋式的鞋子在零下的气温中行动所致，是很值得仔细考量的。当然对那些沿着陆战第一师主要补给线边缘扎营，等了漫长的一个星期准备把南撤的第一师困在陷阱中的中共部队来说，因酷寒引起的伤亡必然十分可怕。在天候的鞭挞下，猎人自己变成了猎物，数以百计的中共士兵由于根本无法支撑而投降。许多因为酷寒而冻毙，身上半点子弹或弹片伤痕都没有。有些投降的士兵四肢都冻坏了，有些告诉审讯人员他们有大半星期没有食物可以果腹，他们为了求生，挖了仅能一人容身的坑洞，整个人挤到洞里，就像冬天的动物一样，尽量不动以保持身体的体温。这些士兵中有许多已经无法拉动步枪枪机或甚至扣扳机，但是还是有相当数目的士兵仍然有能力执行阻绝的任务，直到陆战第一师各营将一条条脊线扫荡乾净让车辆部队能够通过隘口为止。陆战第一师使用逐步射击运动的方式，在主要补给线两旁把中共军扫清了宽广的带状地带；该师比较南端的据点形成了相对于这些扫帚的畚斗，部份防卫兵力也在主要纵队往南前进时同步配合向北进击，也因此将大量中共部队围困在他们本来要替陆战队准备的死亡走廊中。陆战队突围的行动看来进展缓慢，让焦虑(即使不是惊慌)的外界担了不少心，但其真正的原因部份是由于天然环境地形造成的困难，再加上陆战队本身在攻击之前总是不厌其烦地小心整顿和准备可用的资源之故。
    在整个作战期间，气温大部分在华氏20度与华氏零下20度之间变动，也有过一次积雪6英寸的暴风雪，在某些地方由风吹成的雪堆更高达5、6英尺深。有系统地使用掩护从置身于开阔荒野的敌军所面临由大自然和美军无情地营造出的状况看来，中共军的主体在这周遭地区使用村庄做掩蔽并非只限一时一地的权宜之计。实际上，由于缺乏任何其他合乎逻辑的方法，这更支持了中共军是有系统地使用村庄做掩蔽的假设。他们一定是以西方士兵所想像不到的密度躲在那些小屋中。由于除了是在洞窟或茂密森林地区外没有任何其他地方可供躲藏，他们一定得将部队在白天集中在紧邻前进主轴或是攻击目标的村落中。不论伪装技术多高明，一支大部队不可能躲在人为构筑的工事中而不被一般空中侦照发现到。他们也不可能沿着岭脊或山头疏散而又能在极短期间有效地集中来攻击更具机动性的敌军。这些都不是人力所能为，而中共军在韩国的行动也未曾显露出有任何超人的能力。因此，让这些部队无法使用村庄做掩蔽看来应该是可以用来打乱并瘫痪他们行动的重要步骤。不论是在那个季节，把他们驱赶到开阔荒野，他们将会丧失有效的机动性。
    
    前进路线
    真兴里以北的台地属于针叶林带，除了近年来重新种植数目的地段外，稀疏的枞树与白杨树多半长在山岭的北面与西面。中共军攻击时通常是沿着能够利用这些天然掩护的路线。当中共的战斗单位在这些林区停留较久时，他们有时会将这些树在一半高度砍断，将它们上截弯下提供较好的掩蔽。跟在攻击第二步兵师时一样，敌军在攻击陆战第一师时也是沿着冲刷山沟的天然路径，以及其平行的小径与通路，渗入美军的主要补给线。在接近过程中没有半点隐藏的手法可言；他们有时用走的，有时小跑步，但都是以直立的姿势前进。在对同一目标重复攻击时，他们最初的前进路线会变成一条被打得很惨的路线，但是他们使用火力的方法却只有很少或甚至根本没有变动。或者是由于补给物资过度匮乏，或者是由于缺少战斗纪律，当他们攻击到看来快要成功的时候，往往会停下来掳掠并摧毁(美军的)物资。在防御的时候，他们的主要战术是依赖来自俯瞰岭脊上的自动武器火力；他们的前卫紧贴着山脚行动；当美军的攻击部队被从高地来的火力阻止时，只有极少数强悍的中共士兵会尝试逼近到可以使用小型武器或手榴弹的有效距离。在攻击时，他们不常翻越岭脊线，而是沿着山脚绕一大圈。除了在少数发生于双方进行夺取控制高地的密接战斗中的例子外，这个模式似乎一成不变。在这个作战中，和第二步兵师在Kunu-ri作战中的情形一样，中共军喜欢采用夜间攻击，而当被挡住或击退时，会在黎明前撤退。他们夜间攻击的战术跟在《中共部队的攻击战斗》报告中描述的没有显著差别，只是由于他们的攻势都被陆战第一师的防御部队所解消，所以没有发展到完全开展的阶段。他们的攻击总是一成不变地想以机枪火力盯住防御者，在其掩护下达成局部突入，然后再以冲锋枪和手榴弹尝试造成突破。在至少有六个战例中，这种突穿得到初期局部的成功，但是进一步的扩张战果却徒劳无功。更进一步的扩张不是被陆战队支援武器对突破区投下绵密的火网所阻止，就是被逆袭的陆战队将中共军逐退、夺回阵地。
    仔细分析这些战斗行动，有五个案例中敌兵是伤亡于刺刀之下。陆战第一师一直配备着刺刀，而且在阵地防御的时候总是上着刺刀的。不过，其中三人是被同一陆战队士兵所杀。由于插梢在酷寒之下冻结，防御者很少使用手榴弹在这些战斗中；而且如果士兵把手套脱掉来使用手榴弹，暴露时间过久的话往往会造成冻伤。
    
    中共军的态度
    在整个作战期间，敌军对待美军伤患的态度一直是不可解之谜而且在许多地方互相冲突。例如，当从长津湖东岸将美军伤患经过湖面撤到下碣隅里地区时，中共士兵就站在离救伤队不到100英尺的堤岸。但是整整两天的时间内，当美军伤患或走或爬下堤岸走向安全地区时，他们没有遭到任何射击。替美军工作的北韩本地人员可以走到东岸村落中美军战俘与中共士兵共处的屋内。中共士兵并没有尝试要提供这些伤患任何食物或医疗服务，不过如果这些伤患伸手去取食物或饮水，中共军也不加干涉。这些北韩人员公开的在中共士兵面前向伤患传递纸条，上面写着如何脱逃的步骤。中共军并不伤害北韩人员，当有些美军伤兵遵照指示离开屋子时，他们也不阻止。另一方面，在许多案例中，当他们攻击路上的纵队时，他们总是将火力集中在标识着一个大红十字的救护车，偏执的程度甚至到了紧接着救护车前后的车辆都不会被波及到。
    
    美军防御阵地的组织
    除了第七团F连不寻常的情形外，陆战第一师的防御阵地都是以至少一个营基础。在柳潭里，第五团和第七团被统合起来，构成单一的防御阵地，并将所有炮兵、支援火力、及人员都包起来。这个防御措施有一点独特的地方是，虽然组织十分复杂而且外在压力极大，所有命令决策都是由两个团长和他们的参三以会议的方式决定，在协调一致而毫无摩擦的情况下，才能维持这种防御的机构。在主要补给线上的其他重要据点上，每个营防御阵地都是一个围绕着炮兵与跑道的紧密“刺猬”阵地，可以面对360度作战，炮兵也都面向着敌人最可能用来前进的山沟，随时可以发射。战斗巡逻和担任攻击任务的连从基地出击时也只在基地炮兵有效射程内活动。而且，在阵地外围执行任务的小部队的活动范围也被绝对限制在能够与部队主体保持无线电联络的距离。在布置这些阵地的时候，宽广射界不是主要的考量因素，反而优先挑选那些可以提供防御者最大交互支援的地形。陆战第一师舍弃那些“可能”有助于长距离有效击杀敌人的位置不用，反而将防御阵地建立于“必定”能在短距离挡住中共军，并且保持阵地完整的位置。(防御阵地)都没有过度展开。相反地，防御阵地集中紧密的程度让他们能够组织一支机动的局部预备队。在始初阶段，由于防卫部队人数较少，地形的影响，而且有纳入机场跑道的必要，所以下碣隅里的阵地或许是这个通则的例外。不过，勤务部队与事务人员等都在受到中共军攻击情况危急时，被用来堵住阵线上的漏洞，并做为局部的预备队。虽然地面(冻结)的状况让标准的构工工具一次只能敲开一小块泥土，各阵地还是都挖得很深，各营营长更亲自检查了散兵坑及其他工事。值得特别注意的地方是，在少数中共军成功地侵入防御阵地的例子中，都是由于时间太急迫、防御部队来不及完成工事的地方。
    
    铁丝网的使用及效果
    陆战第一师将拥有的少量铁丝网都尽可能地用来布置在各防御阵地上。蛇笼和双层铁丝网被布置来阻断可能用作接近路径的山沟，另外在某些地方用灌木堆和有刺植物补强，不过由于这一区树木不多，能用的材料有限。绊脚线被布置在防御阵线的前面，当可以弄得到警告焰火时，它们也都被用上。
    连级的作战(分析)提供了中共军对于这些铁丝网障碍极度反应的良好观察，他们似乎对于要克服这些防御铁丝网完全不太热中。即使碰到的是拉在离地面18英寸的绊脚线，他们仍然会停下并尝试从其下爬过。这种反应并非个人单兵，而是全面性的。同样地，他们会尝试要从蛇笼或双层铁丝网下爬过，而非先排除这些障碍。一名中尉的意见：“看起来他们好像对铁丝网有种迷信似的恐惧，它每次都会把他们挡下来。”
    
    照明的使用
    在这次作战中，相当少有机会能研究当中共军进行夜间攻击时，从后方使用照明方法暴露其身影的效果。迫击炮本来有充分供应的炮弹来测试这种技巧，不幸的是照明弹都是属于1944年生产的同一批有缺陷的弹药，极度的酷寒也可能是造成哑弹的因素之一。平均说来，每四发照明弹中只有一发能燃烧。另一方面，中共军的照明弹的光线要比我们的白得多，时间也短得多，却几乎达到了百分之百的燃烧率。由于这些原因，再加上士兵都以为中共军的照明弹是我们自己的近发弹，在下碣隅里地区很快地就有命令停止发射照明弹 。不过，在少数使用照明弹，并且成功燃烧的例子中，明亮的光线对中共军有迟滞的效果。
    
    防御的机制
    陆战第一师在防御阵地之外更使用了警戒哨与听音哨，使用的程度则视地区状况和指挥官不同，每个基地也不相同。在柳潭里，有些排级兵力的警戒哨被派到主防御阵地之外1,000码远的地方。小型听音哨布置在前方约200到300码的地段。完全没有在毫无防备下被突击的例子。通常在40到150码的距离间可以辨识出中共军。当敌人在逼近途中用不错的英文喊话时(这经常发生 )，防御阵线上会对声音来源开火。即使喊话者声称自己是陆战队自己人，并且说出自己的部队番号，防御者仍然会开火。整个白天直到傍晚期间，陆战队会派出巡逻队，主动巡逻可能接近阵地的路线。虽然这些巡逻队也尝试搜集敌军的资讯，他们的主要目的是要对密切注意他们行动的中共军表示，陆战第一师不但没有溃散现象，反而仍有相当的企图心。这些巡逻队通常是连级兵力，有时也使用加强排的兵力。根据状况与目的不同，他们有时乘车，有时是步行的。这些巡逻行动通常不会远离主阵地超过1,500码，不过在柳潭里的据点也有巡逻队远达五英里的例子。巡逻队总是在炮兵火力可及的范围内行动，随队行动的有一名炮兵前进观测官，而且，如果可能的话，空中再配备一架观测机，以增强巡逻队的观测能力，并且协助他们与主据点间的通讯。陆战第一师相信由于这些频繁的巡逻行动，所以他们的主阵地在白天从来都没有被小群的中共部队骚扰过。那些进入荒野地区的巡逻队在许多时候都搜集到有关敌军集中地区及即将发生的攻击的情报。主防御阵地在夜间通常以一半警戒的方式轮更。每个容纳两人的散兵坑中，一人警戒、另一人休息，另外有巡哨人员逐一巡查各防御工事以便他们保持清醒。武器在这种零下的天气下都被给予特别的保养(更详细的讨论见后)。以上是让这个防御保持活力的一般战术与警戒措施。
    要仔细描述武器的使用如何确保各防御阵地的完整性的话会超出本报告的范围，因为这需要一步步地描述各连如何抵挡中共军并且反击的过程。不过，一部份连排长已经提供了相当数量的详细战斗过程资料，可以用来做一个简短的评估。
    在整个作战记录中最为显目的一点是，不论在什么时候步兵防线遇到直接突击的时，所有的支援武器都能被快速而大量地投入到战斗的焦点上。由迫击炮、野战炮，有时甚至包括了战车炮所形成的火网会在中共军有时间投入大量兵力以扩大战果前把通路补起来。因此，中共军的攻击会被击灭，突击的第一波总是得不到后面的强力支援。这没有什么极端或是不合常道的，各处的防御不过仅仅是充分利用了支援武器的优势，根据敌人攻击展开的方式，以混合火力的形式来达到最大的效果。这不过是“照本宣科”的战斗，而且其精度与威力更验证了一项古老的事实，就是当正确地使用武器的时候，一定都会成功(地发挥作用)。(有效支援火力)对于这些小而严密的“刺猬”阵地的防守者士气的影响和对被它痛击的中共军士气的影响是同样的明显。从古早以来，当步兵和敌军紧密交战时，心理上总会觉得自己形单影只、孤立无援。但是从对陆战第一师防守各个不同阵地士兵的访谈中，许多人都深为支援火力的灵活性与威力所鼓舞，让他们觉得有“绝对的信心”可以击退中共军的攻击。当他们谈到这些有系统的火力所带来对士气的影响时，他们并不是以一个陆战队员的身份来谈论部队的战法，而是以亲身体验战斗恐怖的个人经验来谈到自己的看法。
    陆战第一师使用的方法是，在战斗准备和战斗进行中，各级连、排长不必担负起准备、计画、并且导引重型支援火力的复杂工作。这些工作都由营级的支援武器中心(Supporting Arms Center)来执行。原则上支援武器中心的协调官相当于助理作战官，负责攻击及防御时的火力计画。一般情形下，他在营作战中心作业；但当在进行阵地防御的时候，他的位置通常是在指挥中心或是作战官的营帐中。当在组织部署防御阵地时，他会伴随著作战官进行初步侦察；这样的话他会有机会熟悉阵线、了解重机枪火力的部署、并且观察那些迫击炮和大炮火力所必须压制的接近路线。当侦察结束后，前线阵地位置会被标记在一张战况图上。然后他会告诉炮兵官哪些地方要行标定射击。这些标定射击是由前进观测官来执行；当标定射击完成后，这些资料会被传给协调官，并且记录在一张重叠在战况图的透明纸上。当派出巡逻队时，协调官会时时在图上标示他们的位置，以便能快速地提供支援火力。支援武器中心协调官通常是步兵军官，他同时也跟战术空中协调中心(Tactical Air Control Center)密切联系，如果他的目标同时也适合使用空中攻击的话，可以很迅速而有效地进行协调。陆战第一师各营认为他们支援火力在韩战中的效率与组织性有一大部份要归功于对支援武器中心作业的精益求精。各级对于这种作业技巧都十分热中，尤其以各步兵连为最。
    
    攻击的机制
    陆战第一师在攻击时的主要特徵是它细心地准备各种武器的部署与协调的工作，以便帮助攻击的连或营以最小的代价夺取目标。在一般典型的状况下，步兵连暂时地会被从高地来的炽密自动火力钉住无法动弹，而且从敌人部署的情形看来，防御火力会来自许多不同方向，攻击线要持续前进的话会产生重大伤亡。(我们发现中共军通常以这种方式布置山顶的阵地：沿着山顶的阵地通常是比较不重要的，它们通常是用来分散敌人注意力，自动武器真正集中隐蔽的地方是在两山之间的鞍部。)该步兵连会就地据守并且呼叫迫击炮火轰击敌人位置。在这同时或是紧接在迫击炮火之后，炮兵火力会轰击敌人火力密集的位置，以及其后的岭脊。通常有个空中管制官伴随该步兵连。一些飞机已经被召来现场，当最后一发炮弹落下时，这些飞机会对同一敌人位置进行空中攻击。
    根据与中共军阵地的距离远近，步兵会在飞机开始对地攻击时，或者是最后一颗炸弹爆炸时开始向前突进。陆战第一师各级步兵单位和众多支援火力在攻击间的这种协调并非希罕或不寻常的特例。这是一般的程序。在北方的作战中，很少有不遵循这样的程序的例子。各连、营、团一次又一次的攻击，都是根据同样的模式。对一般士兵来说，这是他受到所有可能提供一臂之力的支援火力支援的最好证明。毫无疑问的这种对支援火力的信心对步兵的攻击行动有非常正面的影响。这种混合了平射、曲射、以及垂直落下火力的互补增强的效果，无疑地要比各种火力单独使用时杀死更多中共军。不过，最主要的效果还是其对士气的价值，特别是对攻击中的步兵的鼓舞。攻击的步兵连注意到的是，即使大量使用炮兵火力，并且能够准确地命中目标区，除了在落下爆炸时之外，并不能压制中共军的火力。当炮击停止时，中共军的自动武器马上就又开始射击。
    不过如果是空中攻击的话，对于防御者士气的影响则有直接与显著的不同。即使中共军没有被轰炸与扫射消灭，他们的阵地也会沈寂一阵。从次复一次的例子中看来，我们可以推论，似乎根据轰炸对防御者造成的实际损失与震撼程度的不同，防御者受到震撼不能回复的时间长度约在12至25分钟之间。近接空中支援对士气鼓舞的效果可以从陆战第一师一名营长的话中验证：“空中攻击激起我们士兵新的气力与决心的程度，不是亲眼目击再多的炮兵火力落下所能比拟的。士兵们看到飞行员们冒着极端的危险低飞攻击，效果就像磁铁一样会让他们被吸引着想再度攻击前进。”许多其他连、排长也有类似的说法；他们对于这种鼓舞士气的效果在许多战术状况下引起的结果有极为详细的描述。
    有关于地面与空中的协调合作的案例以及导致其成功的作法的资料都已经被搜集做为基本作战研究之用，本研究报告也简短地使用其中一部份，但并不详细地描述讨论，因为空军的战术作为不属于本报告的范畴。
    
    行军要求
    在陆战第一师从下碣隅里向南的攻击中，除了驾驶兵及车载武器的操作手外，所有能行动的人都下车步行，并且随时都准备担任步兵的任务。它命令所有被弃置的车辆必须是完全无法修复的；只有在现场最高阶的指挥官的许可下才能丢弃任何已经损毁的车辆。今天，在整个师里，这道命令的发布与遵守已经是他们引以为傲的重点之一。
    
    酷寒的影响
    陆战第一师在真兴里以北的作战是近代所有美国部队的作战中，对于酷寒的气候加诸人员、武器、装备之上的效果提供了最好研究机会的一次。对于这个题目各个不同的面向，已经搜集了大量的资料并且有部份整理过了。这可以导出一些概括的通则以及相当程度特定的应用。陆战第一师和任何根据现行编装表配备的美国师团一样有相同程度的配备以遂行寒冷气候下的战斗。不但如此，它的规范更给予士兵个人在严寒下最大的生存机会，并且让他不至于匮乏或受到严酷的考验。帐棚随军携带，并且在战斗状况许可下尽量使用。不论是外围警戒哨的士兵，或者是远离防御阵地长时间暴露在酷寒下进行攻击的部队，一旦回到己方防线时，都会被轮派到有暖炉的营帐取暖。在这些营帐中他们能够将袜子烘乾，并且让防寒鞋解冻。在那里还有热咖啡和在滚水中加热过的口粮罐头供应。伤患被安置在有暖炉的营帐。当营帐开始爆满时，那些轻伤的被轮替回防线上，不过为了怕他们伤势恶化，伤势时时都被检查。由酷寒及过度消耗体力引起的重度休克或脱力的病患则可在有暖炉的营帐中休息24小时，然后就回到战斗线上执行任务。上面是他们所采取来在严酷气候下维持部队健康与战力的一些措施。其结果可以总结如下：
    1、大约20%的士兵得到呼吸道的疾病，病症从重感冒到肺炎都有。医事人员认为在这种状况下算是相当低的数字。
    2、士兵“战斗疲乏”以至于永远无法再执行战斗任务的病例少之又少，几乎不构成任何医疗上的问题。比较常发生的“休克”现象中，当事人通常在休息24小时后都还可以回复服行勤务。
    3、该师有2700个非战斗伤亡的伤患，其中大约2000人属于冻伤伤患，在这之中，95%是足部冻伤。大部份手部冻伤的情形不算严重。耳朵冻伤的案例通常是因为个人不小心引起的。但是，在调查足部冻伤的原因时，史密斯将军及麾下的指挥官和各团的军医问过许多士兵、排长、和其他人以了解来龙去脉，他们结果估计足部冻伤的伤患中只有20%能怪罪伤患个人粗心大意，80%得要归因于作战的状况以及不适用的防寒鞋(见后面的注脚)。
    4、由于吃了半结冻的口粮罐头，有很高比例的士兵发生肠胃症状以至于无法在火线上服勤。部队普遍知道这个危险性，因此面包及饼乾类口粮成为最热门的食物。在作战最激烈的时候，火线上的士兵除了饼乾等外不吃别的。这证明了现行野战口粮不足以提供在极端寒冷天候下部队运动与作战的需要。
    
    休克与疲乏
    当陆战队开始向北推进时，第一道寒流的效果让一些军医非常震惊。在前线服勤数个小时后回到温暖帐棚的部队中，他们发现“许多人产生严重的休克反应”。他们描述道：“数以百计的士兵来到医护站，表现得有如经历迫击炮和大炮猛烈轰击过的士兵一样。他们有很显著的颤抖现象，但并非单纯地因为寒冷而致。他们可以用兴奋剂来治疗。在比较不严重的病例中，一杯白兰地加上一点炉火的热量通常可以让他们很快地回复过来。当处于休克状态时，这些人的心理与生理状态都有显著的改变。许多士兵茫然瞪视着空中，似乎对别人的话完全没有反应。有些人啜泣良久，却一言不发。但是，过了几天，当部队开始适应这种极端的温度后，我们注意到这种休克反应症状的消退。”即使如此，寒冷，再加上激烈的体力消耗，持续地严重影响个人的反应机制，并且也对部队造成了前所未有的问题。这种极限发生在陆战第七团第一营的身上。当他们越过荒野进行夜间攻击，试图解救第七团F连的时候，在华氏零下20度的气温下，该营营长戴维斯中校发现虽然他的部队仍然在和中共军持续战斗中，他自己却似乎陷入什么都不想做的状态。酷寒似乎把他的脑子都冻住了，他不得不“对每个决定都再三检视”，生怕自己在头脑不清的情况下做出判断。
    由于了解到他的士兵可能已经到达个人体能的极限，他命令他们停止，准备建立急速防御阵地。不过，在几分钟之内，他注意到寒冷的效应已经让他的部队“倦成一团”，所以他决定最好的办法还是继续前进。他的部队在深雪中跌跌撞撞越过许多脊线。在快要到达F连位置的最后一个山丘，当他的部队爬到山顶时，碰上中共军据守的地区。开始交火后，戴维斯中校亲身领队投入战斗。但是当他手下各连到达山顶时，他看到队伍先头的人突然倒下，这种状态感染了其他人，也像推骨牌一样地连环倒下动弹不得。他们躺在地上“对于在四周横飞的枪弹完全毫无所觉”，带队军官或士官必须猛烈地摇晃或是拉着他们，才能让他们站起来。不过，当他们打赢了高地这场战斗，并且在山顶短暂地休息一阵后，当清晨到来时整个营又能再度前进。
    
    防寒鞋
    防寒鞋是陆战第一师最为怪罪的东西，而且它也被认为是该师非战斗伤亡的主要原因。士兵、指挥官、以及医疗人员对它的一致批评是：在行进或者攻击前进时，脚部会大量出汗。当行进无法持续而队伍停止时，流的汗会沿着鞋子内侧鞋垫的边缘结冰。在这个时候，除非能够换掉袜子并且把鞋子弄乾，要不然无法保护足部不被冻伤。大部份时间里，在战斗状况下根本无法办得到。
    
    酷寒下的武器
    在零下的低温中，M1步枪、机枪、以及75mm无后座力炮的的性能表现仍然十分耐用良好。陆战第一师各营对于后者都十分赞扬。他们认为在山顶的战斗中无后座力炮是“不可或缺的”，士兵并不因为它“可能暴露己身位置”而不愿用它，所有人的报告都认为它是非常有价值的战斗武器，特别是在对付敌军工事的时候；士兵们也对它特别锺爱。当用来对付掩体和其他炮位时，它的有效距离长达1,200码。对它一致的看法是：“我们需要更多这种武器”。在零下低温的战斗中，105mm榴弹炮在发射后有时会花上两分钟才能完成复进的程序，因此显著地影响了发射速度。有关白朗宁自动步枪的报告明显地好坏不一，有可能是由于在寒冷状况下保养方法上的差异所引起的。陆战第一团下的各营不使用擦枪油，用汽油洗枪已去除任何残留的油渍，并且不时地开上几枪以保持武器温暖，他们没有任何问题。另一方面，也有一些在同一团下的连，仍然使用薄薄的一层擦枪油，也不定时开枪保暖，但他们的武器却也毫无问题。陆战第七团F连的白朗宁自动步枪在持续战斗中夜复一夜地故障失效，但到了白天检查时却又找不出问题所在，小心地保养也毫无帮助。其他单位也报告有相同的经验。不过，白朗宁自动步枪的操作性能平均说来仍然良好，而且使用它的士兵通常对它都有信心。在酷寒下性能上以及保养方法上的差异(在陆战第一师及第二步兵师中都一样)应该显示了需要对这武器进一步地测试与实验，以找出可能最佳的解决之道。陆战第一师的指挥官及士兵们对卡宾枪没有多少信心。一般的看法是当卡宾枪被改良成全自动时，反而变得“太娇贵”。陆战第一师各步兵连中最好的记录是大约有30%的卡宾枪会故障。当士兵们有机会弄到M1半自动步枪时，他们会把卡宾枪尽快丢弃。也有人抱怨卡宾枪缺乏“制止力”。一些排长和班长谈到曾经在不到50英尺的距离打中中共士兵两三枪，看到他咬牙皱眉，却仍能继续逼近来。整体来说，陆战第一师各营对各种迫击炮的操作性能非常满意，其中部份单位对四二炮特别赞赏。他们觉得如果有更多这种炮的话效果会更好，特别是如果能将其轻量化以便移动，但仍能保持在短距离时同样的爆炸威力的话。不过，不论是哪种口径的迫击炮，当架在冻硬的地面以高速快放时，往往会“把自己打坏”。最会出问题的地方是炮座底板，不是扭曲变形，要不就是龟纹断裂。高度调整螺丝也会在酷寒中松动，并且很快就锈蚀。资料中也发现击针非常容易断裂，以至于弹药营不得不就地取材制造。四二炮在这些问题方面比轻型迫击炮要少得多。炮管方面，没有爆裂的现象，但是枪械士发现由于寒冷的关系，炮弹尾翼在炮膛上留下的刮痕似乎较深，也导致过度的炮口焰。在整个作战中使用迫击炮最多的应该是陆战第一团，例如，连着14晚，60炮整夜持续发射。在作战结束时，这个团里所有的迫击炮都必须被全部或部份地更换，没有任何一具是还在安全的操作状况。
    陆战第一团也用汽油来洗机枪。机枪的润滑油在酷寒下会变得非常黏滞，直到变暖前会让枪机动作变慢。不论周围状况如何，重机枪每20至30分钟就得发射一阵，以保证能够运作。在这武器中的抗冻剂可以承受大约零下30度的温度，但是它只保护了枪管，枪管延伸部、枪机、以及缓冲组件都没有保护。金属部份会结霜，会把整支枪冻得结结实实；因此定时地开上几枪是必需的。3.5寸火箭筒的弹药在最冷的几天里都冻裂了，根据对它了解的人的说法，它们本来应该能够抵抗零下20度的低温的。士兵们尝试着将它们埋在冻土层以下来保护它们，但是这努力并没有成功。史密斯少将注意到直升机在这种寒冷稀薄的空气中的浮力减弱不少，降落时往往会从离地10英尺处重重落下。至少有一架直升机就是因此而毁损的。另外，在空投物资时，货包中有很高的比例，大约十分之一，会在降落伞能够展开前就跟伞包脱离。这不知道到底是不是因为寒冷气候加上高度的关系，还是有其他因素。不过，在柳潭里据点这种垂直掉落的弹药包中，士兵们发现炮弹如果是装在木箱中的话，几乎都还可以回收使用，但是如果是装在金属箱里的弹药的话，会毁损得无法使用。
    

网友评论(15102007)2013-02-21 18:11

    一直想为五十年前在朝鲜战死的中国人写几句话。
    
    
    半个世纪风雪过去了，反思那场战争的得失现在更多了，说什么的都有，什么样的面孔都有。很多人没有意识到，在这里，一切婉转和掩盖都是不必要的。如何看待那些在寒冷的冰面上冲锋和烈火的山头阻击的中国人，在根本的意义上，是现代中国人做人的底线。复杂的，在这里是简单。这当然不是说有关的学术讨论没有正当性。朝鲜战争有没有负面的后果？世界上没有一维的存在。比如说弱者依靠顽强的精神力量战胜困难的巨大成就，大概也有力的推进了毛泽东对群众运动和"精神原子弹"的执迷，从这里说去也是他后来的一系列穷革命运动的一个信念来源。再比如不管我们今天如何向美国人发誓我们离强大还差得远，都不可能让他们放心。经过朝鲜战争后我们已经不得不为声名所累，不得不为美国顽固的担忧和遏制付出代价。我们已经不可能再当麦克阿瑟眼中的纸老虎、幻想让韬光养晦的计谋得以瞒天过海。还可以数出很多这样的负面后果，它们在自己的角度上看都是真实的。
    
    
    但是，且让我们的脚向上抬一尺，再上一层楼。
    
    
    让目光将民族、国家和五百年江河日下的历史收在眼底……
    
    
    我们看到了什么？
    
    
    中国这本书在被世界打开之后，历史的每一页都在证明我们是劣等的黄色人种中的劣等民族。不需要在这里历数那数不清的屈辱篇章，最后的结果是，作为国家所经历的一切衰亡，在世人眼里意味着关于每一中国人的特质的判断：在智力、精神、体质、心灵等等的一切方面，中国人本质上是低下的、奴性的、胆怯的、虚弱的、自私的。当每一个黄脸的中国人面对着西方人时，他都背负着这样的民族国家的命运给他烙下的这个先天判断，想把自己个人和民族分割开来的一切努力都是可笑的。不仅仅是敌人，就是中国人的西方同情者和朋友，也对中国人的精神状态抱着负面的评价。所以麦克阿瑟将中国当时的一切警告视为虚张声势的恫吓时，他其实是有理由的，就像李奇微所描述的，"麦克阿瑟动辄压制批评他的人，斥责他们根本'不懂得东方人的思想'"。麦克阿瑟是懂得他眼睛中长期存在的那种东方人的。他有充分根据藐视懦弱的中国人的言辞，因为即使赤色中国真的愚蠢地出兵，那将只是为他们创造了回到石器时代的机会。现在我们知道了，事实是麦克阿瑟
    
    
    "自己在判断敌人意图时，却完全误入歧途"，事实是万众视之若神的麦帅以最大的跟头结束了他的戎马生涯。但有多少人意识到了，晚节不保的麦克阿瑟所代表的转折性的历史意义，和对我们每一个中国人的生命意义？
    
    
    数百年里第一次为我们每一中国人抹去了那种黑色胎记的，是那些藐视一切、胆大妄为、勇往直前的志愿军将士。是他们证明了懂得东方人的麦克阿瑟们不懂得东方人。许多西方历史书专门描述了他们化装成南韩军队大摇大摆地向美军哨兵枪口行进，并蒙混过关将敌营一举拿下的战例。有哪些怯弱的人能受得住那向枪口行进中的心跳？有谁曾相信死气沉沉的黄种人可以演出这样的神奇活剧？所以，每一个要自尊的中国人，和民族一体，在五十年前重新出生了。朝鲜战争不仅是人们说的中国的"立国之战"，它还是我们每一个愿意当中国人东方人的个体的重新定义之战。这不仅仅指在西方人的眼里、在西方的价值体系中的地位，中国人曾经也不相信自己有这样的精神状态和能力，自己认同那种先天判断的中国人曾经不是少数。没有朝鲜战争，中华人民共和国将会被广泛认为是由愚民所组成的叁流国家，她在世界民族之林中的资格是没有证明的。日本根本上是被美国和苏联击败的，中共1949年的胜利只是以国民党军队为坐标，这在美国人那里是不算数的。只有通过世界的，当代最严厉的考验，中国人的武装力量那中国男人的精神力量的集中体现才能让我们在世界的席位上安然入座。
    
    
    有人说过，任何民族在走向复兴的道路上，没有精神的复兴是不可能的，朝鲜战争为中华民族的复兴和强大提供了这样的最有力的精神支持。在"中国精神的百年跨越"一文中，我写道：
    
    
    "然后我想起朝鲜战场上的中国血。当今天的庸人们在为每一笔得失纠缠时，一切其实都是再清楚不过的事情。这是中国人第一次使用列强'同样的说话方式来赢得他们的尊重'。这回是美国的将军称中国人为勇士。当中国今天还这样站立着，是因为黄继光在前面，是因为中国当年在上甘岭站立着。我们今天每时每刻都在感受到他们的尊严。这就是为什么印度人开航空母舰美国人可以熟视无睹，中国人却是模拟战中的恶梦。因为军事推理的前提来自近五十年前的长津湖和汉江雪：如果这样的士兵掌握了和我们同样的技术装备将会怎么样？"
    
    
    李奇微说："要不是我们拥有强大的火力，经常得到近距离空中支援，并且牢牢地控制着海域，中国人可能已经把我们压垮了。"这就是那些在朝鲜殊死而战的中国人，他们改变了中国的位置，他们改变了我们的面孔，他们对我们每一个中国人有恩，他们给我们留下了无穷的精神财富，他们所获得的，超越了一切其他得失的评判。那些死在寒冷和烈火中的志愿军将士，是中国在世界史上死得最有价值的中国人。我们谁有资格去"怜悯"这些英雄的生命的丧失？真正珍视他们生命的价值的，是坚持他们为之献身的那种精神财富。借口志愿军死伤重大而言他的人，其实没有必要掩饰自己的灵魂。在这里，人的内心阴阳晨暮，均洞若观火。这是因为那生和死筑成的分水岭，是国家和人的价值的标尺，是人心的明镜。当你听到有人恣意嘲笑志愿军的时候，你只能感到对这些不具有基本的羞耻感的懦夫们的厌恶和怜悯。这种人只有叁种可能：或者是极端的愚昧，或者是极端的奴性，或者两种兼而有之。曾经有一位以"忠贞报国"和"民主自由"的口号来为林彪翻案的人，在同一篇文章里嘲弄志愿军不怕死是"愚昧"。你我只能为他也是黄种人也能讲中文而感到极大遗憾。除了与之割席而坐，你别无选择。在中华民族国家和人的历史长河中，朝鲜战争是凤凰迎风更生的火焰。
    
    
    中国人感谢为恢复国家和人的尊严而燃烧的志愿军将士们。
    

网友评论(15102007)2013-02-21 18:13

    可算转完了·
    妈呀·
    我自己都不想再看了·
    

网友评论(10922820)2013-02-21 18:19

    好长，先留名
    

网友评论(1157008)2013-02-21 18:21

    主楼的东西看完往下一拖还有这么多就吓跑了，也就4楼的仔细看了看
    我说楼主你不写点自己的感想啥的吗？
    

网友评论(1213204)2013-02-21 18:25

    建议进微民网博物馆!!!!!!
    

网友评论(585000)2013-02-21 18:26

    最后那里太燃了！！
    

网友评论(9438500)2013-02-21 18:27

    我一看右边进度条的长度就想求总结了、。、、
    

网友评论(473273)2013-02-21 18:29

    我就想起了以前那篇著名的“他们像一群原木在移动”
    
    
    他们象一群原木在移动
    
     三年前的冬天，我送女儿去加拿大留学，来到埃德蒙顿市附近的一个叫阿尔伯特的小城。这大概是只有几万人口的小城吧。到达之后的第三天，房东对我说，附近“必胜客”匹萨店的老板想请我吃饭。
    
     “他请我吃饭做什么？我又不认识他。”我感到奇怪。
    
     房东说：“我的女儿杰恩在‘必胜客’打工。也许我们这里是个小地方，见到中国人好奇吧，总之老板很想见您。他是一个很和蔼的老头儿，在这里生活几十年了，邻里们都很喜欢他。你就去见见他吧！”
    
     “好吧。”我答应了。两天后的中午，房东陪着我和女儿应邀赴宴。
    
     1月，正是阿尔伯特最寒冷的季节，零下二三十度，奇冷无比。出门一会儿，脸、手和脚丫子就冻得生疼。从北京来时，我们倒是买了厚厚的羽绒大衣、手套和棉皮鞋，但是，到了这里不太管用。
    
     “必胜客”店离我们的住地大约有一公里远。我建议走着去，正好让女儿体验一下加拿大的雪景和严寒。
    
     我们仨人，在冰雪中的小路上小心地走着，穿过冰冻的小河，一步一滑，前俯后仰。一会儿，脸上、手和脚指头就没感觉了。女儿看见这么美丽洁白的冰雪世界，兴奋异常，一边走着，跑着，一边玩着雪，还摔了几跤，引得我们哈哈大笑。
    
     远远地就看见老板在店门口站着，腰板挺直。老板有70多岁了，面色红润，看来身体还不错。他中等个，穿着深咖啡色的西装，扎着深红色的领带，满脸笑容，非常谦恭的样子。
    
     我们打着招呼，握手的时候，我感觉到他的手指有些凉，想必他在门口等了一些时候了。他走路的样子有点别扭，像个小脚老太太。
    
     与洋人一起就餐就那么回事儿。一人一盘匹萨饼、一个大沙拉，每个人都规规矩矩地坐着，每个人都人模人样地端着，每个人都拿着刀叉吃着，每个人都客客气气地说着。老板依然满脸笑容，非常谦恭的样子。
    
     他说，今天能见到我这样一个中国军人非常非常高兴。他用了“非常非常”这样的词。
    
     他说，他叫约翰，原来是美国人。早年当过兵，参加过 朝鲜战争；后来就回国了；再后来就娶了一个加拿大姑娘；再再后来就在这个小城里开了一家“必胜客”的连锁店，几十年就这么过去了。这就是他的故事，很简单。
    
     我与老板寒暄着，说着那些客套的话，说着那些与每一个洋人都可以说的，甚至是装出来的那些话。最后，我送给他一盒中国茶叶作为答谢，他捧在手里一再表示“非常非常”高兴，“非常非常”喜欢，也“非常非常”感谢。
    
     一顿饭就这样吃完了。
    
     回家的路上，房东告诉我，几十年了，老板还从来没有像今天这么高兴过。
    
     不久，女儿的一切都安顿好了，我要回北京了。临走前的一天，我忽然接到约翰打来的电话。他说，希望能再见我一面，希望能邀请我去酒吧喝酒，如果我愿意的话。
    
     我有些奇怪，但盛情之下，只好答应了，就当是练一把英语得了，心里只是觉得这个洋人老板也太盛情了，我一个过路客，值得如此这般热情吗？
    
     那天，女儿要做作业，房东也有事。于是，下午5点多钟，我就自己去了。
    
     还是那样奇冷无比的冰雪天，还是那条一步一滑的冰雪路，还是穿过那条冰冻的小河，只是天早早地就擦黑了。我老远就看见了老约翰，还是那样笑容满面地在店门口的灯光下等我，还是那一身西装，还是腰板挺直，走起路来怪怪的样子。
    
     我们一起走进了“必胜客”店隔壁的一家酒吧。可能是因为天气太冷了，酒吧里人不太多。我发现，人一喝酒，外语能力就提高了，一点语言障碍都没有。
    
     下面是我们在酒吧里聊天的回忆记录：约翰说：“我终于又见到您了，太高兴了。50年了，我一直在等这一天。”
    
     我很惊讶：“我们以前并没有见过面啊。”
    
     “我们见过，在朝鲜，50年前。”约翰十分肯定地说。
    
     “哦？”我更奇怪了。
    
     “50年了，我一直想再见到你们。我非常敬佩你们。”“不，也许您记错了，那不是我。”这老头儿怎么啦？我更疑惑了。
    
     约翰说：“不，我没记错，那是你们。”“这……从何说起呢？”我问。约翰开始讲述他毕生难忘的亲身经历———
    
     “那是1950年12月，很快就要过新年了。当时，我是美军某连的一名士兵，我们已经打到离鸭绿江只有几十公里远的地方，战争很快就要结束了。”
    
     “北朝鲜的冬天太可怕了，山里的风非常大，夹着大雪，整天下个不停，整个世界都被冻住了，我们只有待在屋里才能活下来。”
    
     “一天晚上，我们的连队住在一个叫××××的小山村里(他说了一个很奇怪的地名，我没记住)。寒冷冻得我怎么也睡不着。我刚刚躺下一会儿，突然，屋外响起了激烈的枪声和爆炸声。
    
     “我从窗口向外看去，天上有照明弹，前方有你们的中国士兵在冲锋，他们一群一群地从树林里冲出来，他们在树林里不知躲藏了多长时间，他们像僵硬的原木在移动……您知道什么是原木吗？log，log，原木，僵硬的，unprocessedwood，被采伐成一节一节的木头。”约翰不断地在重复着。
    
     “小山村的前面有条小河，十多米宽，河水不深，河上的冰已经被我们的炮火炸碎了，河水冒着水汽在缓缓地流淌；你们的中国士兵正在淌水过河；上岸后，他们的两条裤腿很快就被冻住了，他们跑得很慢，因为他们的裤腿被冻住了不能弯曲。我们的火力很猛，他们的火力很弱，而且没有炮火掩护，枪好像也被冻住了。他们像僵硬的原木在移动……”
    
     约翰不断地重复着这句话，他接着说———
    
     “我们的火力很猛，我们有坦克、大炮，我们用卡宾枪、机关枪和大炮向他们射击，他们一个一个像原木一样地倒下，可他们总是不断地又有人冲向前、冲过河；然后，他们一个一个地又像原木一样地倒下，然后他们又不断地有人冲向前、冲过河；炮火中，你们的士兵仍然在冲锋。我们的火力很强，但无法阻止他们，他们像僵硬的原木在移动……不断地涌过河，冲上岸，扑向我们。小河里，河岸上，躺满了一片一片的尸体，那些尸体像满地的原木一样横七竖八着，是僵硬的……”
    
     “冻得晶莹剔透的冰雪世界骤然破碎了，大地在震动，河水在跳跃，硝烟染黑了白色的世界。雪夜中，火光一片，枪声一片，喊声一片，血光一片；空气中也弥漫着硝烟的味道，冰雪在燃烧，河水红了，洁白的冰雪也红了……他们像僵硬的原木在移动……”
    
     我被约翰不断重复的这句话惊呆了，也被他说的这种场景惊呆了。约翰的眼神发直，手在颤抖，两眼紧紧地盯着我，一张僵硬扭曲的脸。
    
     约翰说不下去了，他低下了头。好一会儿，他抬起头，两眼直勾勾地盯着我。须臾，他喝了一大口酒，说，“那天晚上，我被那个像僵硬的原木在移动的场面惊呆了，被那些不畏死亡的士兵的灵魂震撼了，这，太可怕了。”稍停片刻，约翰说：“我当时就知道，这是一场没有胜利希望的战争。”
    
     约翰告诉我，后来，他们被包围了，再后来，他们就逃出去了，只逃出来十几个人，逃到了几十公里之外的冰雪世界中去了。他说：“那天晚上，我冻掉了7个脚指头。”
    
     我这才明白他走路时，为什么一副怪怪的样子。
    
     他说，后来，他被送到了东京，再后来，他被送回了美国，再再后来，他来到了加拿大……
    
     我仔细地听着，每一个单词，我都听懂了；每一个句子，我都记住了：“天上有照明弹，前方有你们的中国士兵在冲锋，他们一群一群地从树林里冲出来，他们在树林里不知躲藏了多长时间，他们像僵硬的原木在移动……他们像原木一样倒下，然后他们又有人冲上来了，他们的裤腿冻得像原木一样不能弯曲，他们不断地涌过河，冲上岸，扑向我们。他们像僵硬的原木在移动。”
    
     约翰十分不解：“他们为什么会毫不畏惧地去选择死亡？他们都很年轻呵。50年了，我一直不明白。”约翰问我，也像是在问他自己。接着，他又说：“50年了，我一直不明白，世界上怎么会有这样一种不畏死亡的精神？世界上怎么会有这样一群勇敢的灵魂？你们的军队究竟凭什么呢？”
    
     我说：“约翰先生，您可能很难理解，这支军队生来如此。”我思索片刻，说：“这支军队刚诞生的时候甚至连枪都没有，他们的第一支枪是拿着自己的刀和棍棒从敌人手里夺来的，他们的敌人有枪和大炮，有飞机，他们没有这些。不但没有，他们还经常吃不饱，常常被冻死。该有的，他们几乎都没有。但是，他们就是这么走过来的。”
    
     约翰静静地听着。我接着说：“您刚才讲得非常准确：‘天上有照明弹，他们像僵硬的原木在移动，他们像原木一样倒下，他们的后面又有人冲上来了，他们的裤腿冻得像原木一样不能弯曲，他们在强大的火力打击下冲锋陷阵……’这，就是这支军队的全部历史。因为，他们知道，不怕死，这支军队还可能有生的希望；怕死，这支军队连生的希望都没有了，所以，他们从诞生的那天起就孕育了这种不怕死的精神，否则，这支军队早就死了，真的，早就死了。他们没有别的选择。”
    
     我有些按捺不住，也有些激动。我说：“您可能还不知道，约翰先生，这支军队一辈子打的所有的仗，都是一百个理由都不能打的仗；他们所进行的所有的战争，都是一千个理由都必死无疑的战争； 朝鲜战争，那更是一万个理由都打不赢的战争！因为他们的对手是世界头号军事强国———美国+16国联合国军，而且，这个军事强国还刚刚在日本扔了两颗原子弹，还准备在朝鲜和中国再扔几十个原子弹呢。按一般的战争概念，这是一场输定了的战争，但是，这支军队打胜了。”
    
     我喝了一口酒，说：“您可能不知道，约翰先生，这支军队最高统帅的儿子与普通士兵一样，就是您说的那些移动的僵硬的原木，最后都埋在了朝鲜的冰雪中了。他们输过不止一次的战斗，也输过不止一次的战役，他们死了很多很多的人。但是，他们从来没有怕过，从来没有屈服过。就是凭这个精神，他们最后总是赢得了胜利。”
    
     约翰目不转睛地望着我，我问：“您刚才不是问，这支军队凭什么吗？就凭这种精神。他们没有空军，没有大炮，没有原子弹，他们常常吃不饱、穿不暖……可他们就是这么打过来的。后来，这支军队有了自己的坦克、大炮、飞机、原子弹……也是凭这个。这支军队的历史就这样。真的，约翰先生，您感到很奇怪吗？这是一种您很难理解的东方民族精神，也是您很难理解的另一种军队的精神。”
    
     “这，太不可思议了！”约翰直摇头。他说：“麦克阿瑟将军当时说，中国军队是很容易打败的，历史上都是这样。”
    
     我说：“是的，一百多年来，中国军队经历过很多次一败涂地的战争，这是我们军队永远忘不了的奇耻大辱。不过，参加 朝鲜战争的这支中国军队是一个例外，他们完全不同于中国历史上的任何一支中国军队。因为这支军队有着中国军队历史上从来不曾有过的独特的灵魂：一个不怕鬼的灵魂。正像您亲眼看到的那样，他们不畏死亡，他们像原木在移动。”稍停片刻，我说：“中国军队的确不是世界最强大的军队，但是，中国军队的确是世界上最难战胜的一支军队。难道 朝鲜战争不是改写了中国军队的屈辱历史吗？难道那次战争不是这支军队最辉煌的战绩吗？两支实力对比异常悬殊的军队，两个不是同一技术时代的国家，一场必死无疑的战争，没有空军，没有海军，中国士兵甚至在冰雪中穿着单衣……但是，他们始于鸭绿江，止于三八线。他们什么都凭不上！就是凭那个不怕鬼的精神！其他什么都不算！这个不怕鬼的精神为这支军队所独有……”
    
     “什么叫鬼？”约翰问我。我为难了：“就是那些很可怕的东西，谁都怕，比如原子弹，比如特别厉害的武器或特别厉害的军队什么的。”
    
     约翰似乎不太明白。我解释道：“鬼，是我们东方的一个精神概念，世界上一切让人们都害怕的东西，我们都称之为鬼。中国人和中国军队原来是很怕鬼的，怕了一百多年了，见鬼就怕，见了西方的坚船利炮就怕得要死。从1840年的第一次鸦片战争开始，我们的军队每战每败，败得一塌糊涂，一败涂地；结果，越打就越怕鬼，越怕鬼就越多，越怕越挨鬼打，越怕越是输。中国军队的那点自尊和自信早就输光了，见鬼就吓跑了。一百多年来，中国军队一直找不到北，一直找不到自己的生路到底在哪里。最后，我们输得就只有吓死这一条路了。后来，中国出了一个不怕鬼的人，他亲手缔造和培育了这支不怕鬼的军队，正是这支不怕鬼的军队，打了一辈子不怕鬼的仗。从那次始于鸭绿江，止于三八线的 朝鲜战争中，中国军队找到了自己的尊严，洗雪了自己的百年屈辱……这就是关于中国军队不怕鬼的故事。”
    
     “来！喝酒，干杯！”约翰兴奋地与我碰杯。我一口气干掉了一大杯白兰地。
    
     约翰说：“50年了，我一直忘不了那个原木在移动的夜晚，一直忘不了那些不畏死亡的灵魂，并且，我一直被那支不解的东方军队的灵魂所困扰，我一直想再见到你们，我一直想知道，那是一个什么样的灵魂？”
    
     我不想说了，我没话说了。我真不知道该如何向一个洋人老头儿说明，什么叫中国军队的灵魂？那是一个怎样的灵魂？……唉，这个洋人老头儿，喝酒就喝酒吧，扯什么灵魂呢？
    
     酒吧里就剩下我们两个人了。
    
     突然，约翰问我：“你们军队有军歌吗？”
    
     “当然。”我说。
    
     “您能唱给我听听吗？”
    
     “这很重要吗？”我问。
    
     “是的，我想听听一支军队灵魂的声音。”
    
     “OK！”我毫不犹豫地答应了，并忘情地唱了起来———
    
     向前，向前，向前！
    
     我们的队伍向太阳，脚踏着祖国的大地，背负着民族的希望，我们是一支不可战胜的力量。我们是工农的子弟，我们是人民的武装，从无畏惧，绝不屈服，英勇战斗，直到把反动派消灭干净，毛泽东的旗帜高高飘扬。听！风在呼啸军号响，听！革命歌声多么嘹亮！同志们整齐步伐奔向解放的战场，同志们整齐步伐奔赴祖国的边疆，向前，向前！我们的队伍向太阳，向着最后的胜利，向着全国的解放！约翰默默地听着，脸上没有了微笑，很肃穆的样子。
    
     …………
    
     三年多过去了，那晚的激情早已成为遥远的过去。我偶尔还会给约翰发个E-mail，说几句问候的话，倒是约翰常常给我发来E-mail，说，还想再见到我，还想和我一起喝酒、聊天，还想聊聊关于中国军队灵魂的故事。洋人就是这样一根筋！
    
     倒是我与朋友们聚会时，偶尔也会说起那个关于原木在移动的故事，听的人都当听段子一般，大家还挺诧异：“他们怎么不懂战术呢？工兵怎么不提前架桥呢？为什么不使用坦克大炮呢？”
    
     “他们怎么不懂战略呢？明明是不对称就别打嘛，不战而屈人之兵，善之善也……”
    
     有时候，我也回想起那个关于原木在移动的故事。每当我回味那些早已逝去的灵魂时，感觉真好，一下子就像换了一个人似的……
    

网友评论(16236956)2013-02-21 18:29

    这有点略长了
    

网友评论(18532505)2013-02-21 18:29

    Reply Post by 索林·橡木盾 (2013-02-21 18:11):
    
    一直想为五十年前在朝鲜战死的中国人写几句话。
    
    
    半个世纪风雪过去了，反思那场战争的得失现在更多了，说什么的都有，什么样的面孔都有。很多人没有意识到，在这里，一切婉转和掩盖都是不必要的。如何看待那些在寒冷的冰面上冲锋和烈火的山头阻击的中国人，在根本的意义上，是现代中国人做人的底线。复杂的，在这里是简单。这当然不是说有关的学术讨论没有正当性。朝鲜战争有没有负面的后果？世界上没有一维的存在。比如说弱者依靠顽强的精神力量战胜困难的巨大成就，大概也有力的推进了毛泽东对群众运动和"精神原子弹"的执迷，从这里..
    
    我觉得你这段话能让所有给朝鲜战争里志愿军抹黑的人闭嘴了。
    

网友评论(2209667)2013-02-21 18:40

    Topic Post by 索林·橡木盾 (2013-02-21 18:09):
    
    一些排长和班长谈到曾经在不到50英尺的距离打中中共士兵两三枪，看到他咬牙皱眉，却仍能继续逼近来。
    
    7.62穿透效果过大制止性差是一方面，另一方面更是人的因素。
    

网友评论(415076)2013-02-21 18:40

    长贴留个名，我在20分钟只看了一小部分的情况下，决定回家用电脑看。
    ----sent from my Xiaomi MI-ONE Plus,Android 2.3.5
    

网友评论(1286666)2013-02-21 18:48

    历史的每一页都在证明我们是劣等的黄色人种中的劣等民族
    但从这时刻我们不再是了。
    

网友评论(1288378)2013-02-21 18:50

    唉
    
    真是从此才站起来了
    

网友评论(1868786)2013-02-21 18:58

    谁来个总结
    
    
    ----sent from my HUAWEI HUAWEI U8950D,Android 4.0.4
    

网友评论(457034)2013-02-21 19:04

    Reply Post by 尼伯龙根指环 (2013-02-21 18:29):
    
    我就想起了以前那篇著名的“他们像一群原木在移动”
    
    
    他们象一群原木在移动
    
     三年前的冬天，我送女儿去加拿大留学，来到埃德蒙顿市附近的一个叫阿尔伯特的小城。这大概是只有几万人口的小城吧。到达之后的第三天，房东对我说，附近“必胜客”匹萨店的老板想请我吃饭。
    
     “他请我吃饭做什么？我又不认识他。”我感到奇怪。
    
     房东说：“我的女儿杰恩在‘必胜客’打工。也许我们这里是个小地方，见到中国人好奇吧，总之老板很想见您。他是一个很和蔼的老头儿，在这里生活几十年了，邻里们都很喜欢他。你就去见见他..
    
    这篇文章最早看之后很热血沸腾感
    
    后来琢磨的多了感觉有高端黑的嫌疑